Sadsad Tamesis Legal and Accountancy Firm

Case Digest

In case of doubt, in whose favor should an insurance claim dispute be resolved?

Doctrine: Insurers must not be allowed to delay the payment of claims by filing frivolous cases in court, hoping that the inevitable may be put off for years—or even decades—by the pendency of these unnecessary court cases Facts Romeo obtained an accident insurance policy from several insurance companies including Philam Life Insurance. One day, as he was coming out of the bathroom, Romeo tripped causing his right eye to hit the arm rest of a chair. He called out to his spouse, Luisa, who promptly rushed to his side Romeo was immediately brought to the clinic Dr. Villanueva. After a series of check-ups, he underwent an enucleation, a surgical procedure involving the removal of his right eye. On account of the surgery, he incurred medical expenses in the sum of PHP 31,060.00. Consequently, Romeo filed written notices of injury with the insurance companies. To his dismay, his claims were disapproved based on the joint affidavit of their former household helpers who denied the occurrence of the accident.  The disapproval of the claims prompted Romeo and Luisa (spouses Soriano) to lodge separate complaints before the RTC against the insurance companies for accident insurance proceeds, specific performance, damages, and attorney’s fees. toto togel During the trial, spouses Soriano presented themselves and Dr. Villanueva as witnesses. On the other hand, Philam Life proffered the testimony of the househelperand the medical opinion of Dr. Dr. Valenton, a credited physician of Philam Life. In due course, the RTC rendered its Judgment, dismissing the complaints based on the equipoise rule. Issue Whether or not the RTC erred in not granting Romeo the insurance proceeds? Ruling Yes. In civil cases, the quantum of evidence to be observed is preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means that evidence which is more convincing to the Court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.  Jurisprudence teaches that when the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine. Here, the RTC erred in applying the equipoise rule considering that the spouses Soriano were able to prove through preponderance of evidence that Romeo’s injury was caused by an accident, thus entitling him to the proceeds of the subject accident insurance policies. Their testimonies were sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Villanueva, who clearly explained the findings he gathered in his examination of Romeo on January 29, 2001 or the day of the accident Determined to prove that Romeo was not entitled to the insurance benefits, PhilamLife raised Dr. Valenton ‘s medical opinion to controvert Dr. Villanueva’s testimony. It claims that Dr. Villanueva found no abrasion or hematoma. However, a perusal of Dr. Villanueva’s testimony plainly reveals that he “observed sub-conjunctival harmorhage, hemorrhage occuring in between the consubjunctival sclera of the eye. In contrast, Dr. Valenton, by his own admission, did not personally examine Romeo, but merely offered a different interpretation based on the findings made by Dr. Villanueva Hence, the Court ordered Philam Life, along with the other insurance companies, to pay jointly and severally actual damages or medical reimbursement to spouses Soriano in the amount of PHP 31,060.00 and the insurance proceeds for the permanent and irrecoverable loss of sight and of Romeo’s right eye.  In so ruling, the Court commiserated with the two-decade plight of spouses Soriano, surpassing the death of Romeo. Certainly, insurers must not be allowed to delay the payment of claims by filing frivolous cases in court, hoping that the inevitable may be put off for years—or even decades—by the pendency of these unnecessary court cases. They employ this period to benefit from collecting the interest and returns on both the premiums previously paid by the insured clients and the insurance proceeds which should otherwise go to their beneficiaries.  Philam Life’s deliberate delay in the payment of insurance proceeds and protracted litigation warrant the imposition of exemplary damages. This imposition serves as a warning to insurers or insurance companies of the consequences of unreasonably denying or delaying the payment of legitimate claims. Hence, aside from the insurance claim, Philam Life was also ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of PHP 50,000.00 with interest.

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Does hostile behavior towards an employee constitute as constructive dismissal?

Doctrine: Employer’s insulting words and hostile behavior toward an employee constitutes constructive dismissal Facts: In 2009, Bartolome was hired by Toyota Q. Ave as a marketing professional trainee of its Vehicle Sales Department. He became a regular employee in 2010, tasked in selling of Toyota’s cars, products, and services.  On December 2015, Bartolome received a Notice of Decision for Habitual Absences for October 2015 and a Notice of Explanation for the same offense for November 2015. He also received a notice putting him on a 7-day suspension for  another offense.  A meeting was set by management for the purpose and Bartolome brought his sibling along, who was a lawyer. After the meeting, he thought that the matter was settled but then the president of the company, in another meeting, uttered remarks against him, especially for bringing his sibling along.  This began a series of incidents which lead Bartolome to resign: These series of events and the hostile working environment become unbearable for him to continue working, and thereafter, he resigned.  Even when he was processing his clearance, he was treated like a stranger. His last pay did not include his commissions and his 13th month pay. ISSUE: Was Bartolome constructively dismissed?  YES. The foregoing chain of events created a hostile working environment that made it impossible and unbearable for petitioner to continue working for TQAI. On this score, we emphasize that these events were not even refuted by respondents themselves. In weighing the argument of the parties, it is important to examine the evidence presented. As substantial evidence, or “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” the detailed series of events supported by documentary evidence of petitioner must be given credence over the general denial of the respondents. The uttered words of respondents against petitioner, contrary to the respondents’ allegation, are not self-serving statements. Here, petitioner’s account of the events which rendered his employment conditions unbearable, leaving him with no other choice but to resign, was “candid, straightforward[,] and categorical.” It came from matters of his own personal knowledge. It should not be brushed aside, more so since it was unrefuted by the other party and was even amply corroborated by documentary evidence. Verily, petitioner was constructively dismissed. Surely, the calculated and combined acts of his higher ups constitute acts of disdain and hostile behavior, supporting the conclusion that they were collectively easing out petitioner who consequently had no choice but leave his employment. This is constructive dismissal pure and simple. Though the labor arbiter found nothing extraordinary about the resignation letter as it did not exactly indicate a tone of anger nor some sense of ingratitude, the circumstance before the resignation would show that he did not contemplate nor had any intention of resigning from the company were it not for respondents’ hostile and disdainful actions. When he tried to process his clearance on April 21, 2016, he was treated like a “stranger-criminal” and subjected to undue harassment. Notably, the document titled “special release of claim and/or quitclaim” dated July 9, 2016, bore, beside his signature, the term “w/o prejudice.” It was an unequivocal reservation of his right to bring an action against respondents despite his execution thereof. Thus, merely 24 days after, on August 4, 2016, he filed a Complaint for illegal/constructive dismissal and money claims against respondents. Doubtless, his resignation was involuntary and bore a clear reservation to file an action against respondents. pay4d idn toto

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Is the absence of one spouse evidence of psychological incapacity?

Doctrine: Unjustified Absence from Marital Home Considered Psychological Incapacity Facts:  Leonora and Alfredo married on June 9, 1984. Their married life started smoothly, but Alfredo’s behavior later on changed. He would come home late or early morning after a night out with friends. He neglected his duty and did not provide food for the family. He treated Leonora as an ordinary occupant of the house, not as his wife. Alfredo also engaged in illicit affairs.  In 1994, they separated. The same year, Alfredo married another woman. Then in 2000, he married another one. Alfredo abandoned his family with Leonora and did not provide any financial support.  restoslot4d amintoto amintoto Leonora then filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. Dr. Ison, a clinical psychologist, found Alfredo to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder with underlying borderline personality traits.  Issue: Whether or not Alfredo can be considered as psychologically incapacitated? Ruling:  Yes. After leaving his family in 1994 and contracting marriage with different women, Alfredo never gave financial support to his children and only visited them once for less than an hour. These indicate that he did not understand his obligations as a husband and father. Article 68 of the Civil Code provides: The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Through Dr. Isons’s testimony who was presented as an expert witness, Leonora was able to prove that her husband Alfred’s psychological disorder is grave, incurable  and permanent. Dr. Ison explained how Alfredo’s personality disorder developed from his childhood and how it is collated to his inability to fulfill his obligations as a husband and father.  The gravity of his personality disorder is shown by his lack of recognition that he has responsibilities to his wife and children. The incurability of his disorder was also explained when Dr. Ison stated in his Judicial Affidavit that those diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder “strongly deny that they are mentally ill, reject the idea of seeking professional help and therefore refuse any form of psychiatric treatment.” Alfredo’s infidelity, failure to give support to his wife and children, and unjustified absence from his family are all indicative that he is not cognizant of his duties and responsibilities of a husband and father. Hence, the Petition was GRANTED.

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When can foreign divorce be recognized in the Philippines?

FACTS: On December 8, 2004, Ruby Cuevas Ng, a Filipino citizen, and Akihiro Sono, a Japanese national, contracted marriage in Quezon City. Their union bore them a child named Rieka Ng Sono. amintoto totoagung2 restoslot4d sakuratoto3 totoagung2 totoagung slotgacor4d sakuratoto qdal88 restoslot4d slotgacor4d sakuratoto2 restoslot4d slotgacor4d slot thailand cantiktoto restoslot4d totoagung restoslot4d situs toto sakuratoto totoagung amintoto totoagung slot totoagung slotgacor4d amintoto restoslot4d totoagung slotgacor4d slotgacor4d restoslot4d daftar slot gacor slot gacor 4d totoagung2 amintoto amintoto cantiktoto situs toto slot slotgacor4d slotgacor4d amintoto qdal88 qdal88 restoslot4d amintoto sakuratoto3 slotgacor4d toto slot amintoto idn slot amintoto slotgacor4d situs toto slotgacor4d   After their marriage, the spouses moved to Japan. Unfortunately, their relationship turned sour and they later decided to obtain a divorce. Thus, on August 31, 2007, they secured a “divorce decree by mutual agreement” in Japan as evidenced by the Divorce Certificate issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines. The DFA in Manila then provided an Authentication Certificate and a Certificate of Acceptance of Notification of Divorce. Likewise, the City Civil Registry Office of Manila released a Certification guaranteeing that the Divorce Certificate provided by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines was filed and recorded in its office. So, too, the fact of divorce was duly recorded in the Civil Registry of Japan as exhibited by the original copy of the Family Registry of Japan bearing the official stamp of the Mayor of Nakano-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, and supported by its corresponding English translation. cantiktoto login pay4d On May 28, 2018, Ruby filed a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry before the QC RTC.    During the initial hearing, the RTC admitted all the documentary evidence submitted by Ruby for purposes of compliance with jurisdictional requirements.  The RTC also allowed her to present her evidence ex parte after making a declaration of general default.   On January 3, 2019, the RTC granted the Petition on the thrust of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines, ratiocinating that there was a valid divorce obtained by Ruby abroad.    Displeased, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, as represented by the OSG, moved for the reconsideration of the Decision, which was eventually denied by RTC. After, the OSG challenged the RTC Decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that the RTC gravely erred in judicially recognizing a foreign divorce that was obtained by mere mutual agreement between the spouses. It centers around how Ruby and Akihiro Sono obtained their divorce, positing that a “divorce by agreement” is not worthy of recognition in the Court’s jurisdiction. Clearly, for a foreign divorce to be recognized in the Philippines, it must be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. The OSG further argued that Ruby failed to prove the foreign divorce law as she did not proffer an authenticated copy of the Japanese Civil Code or one held by the official repository of custodian of Japanese public laws and records. ISSUES: 1.WON the provision under Article 26(2) of the Family Code does not apply instant case as the divorce decree was obtained by mutual agreement and not through an adversarial proceeding in court; and ● WON Ruby was able to prove the applicable law on divorce in Japan. RULING: 1.No, Article 26(2) of the Family Code applies in the instant case.    At the onset, it bears stressing that Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. Nevertheless, jurisdiction is conferred on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without under going trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of marriage. Article 26 of the Family Code – which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner – allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision states:   Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in   accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,   and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those   prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.   Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated   and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating   him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry   under Philippine law.   The case of Fujiki v Marinay elucidates the nature of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, thus –    The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to   address the anomaly that results :from a marriage between a Filipino, whose   laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce.   The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while   the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The   correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign   divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. In the landmark case of Republic v.Manalo, the Court emphatically declared that Article 26(2) of the Family Code only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad capacitating the foreigner spouse to remarry, without regard as to who initiated it. Manaloinstructs that there must be a confluence of two elements in order for the second paragraph of the law to be validly applied, to wit: (1) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) valid divorce obtained capacitating the parties to remarry regardless of the spouse who initiated the divorce proceedings.   Significantly, the Court clarified that pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26(2) applies to mixed marriages where the divorce decree is (1) obtained by the foreigner spouse; (2) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and (3) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.    Accordingly, the Court concluded that “the divorce obtained by petitioner abroad against her foreign husband, whether at her behest or acquiescence, may be recognized as valid in this jurisdiction so long as

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How should the backwages of an illegally dismissed employee be computed?: C.P. Reyes Hospital v Barbosa

G.R. 228357, 16 April 2024 Facts In September 2013, Barbosa signed a six-month probationary employment contract with C.P. Reyes Hospital. During this period, she would train as a Staff Nurse, then as a Ward Head Nurse, then as a Training Supervisor. However, on December 30, 2023, C.P. Reyes Hospital terminated her probationary employment, citing negative performance feedback. toto macau 4d sugar rush x1000 game slot toto slot slot gacor 4d bandar togel sgp slot thailand situs toto slot online slot gacor slot gacor 4d slot gacor 4d togel slot slot gacor 4d togel online terpercaya toto slot toto slot agen judi bola toto togel toto slot daftar totoagung togel slot slot gacor 4d slot gacor 4d login slot gacor slot qris link gacor slot gacor slot qris togel slot link gacor toto slot idn toto restoslot4d pay4d panel slot qris terbaru slot gacor maxwin toto slot slot gacor olympus idn slot slot gampang menang bandar togel terpercaya amintoto angka akurat slot gacor 4d toto slot slot gacor 4d This prompted Barbosa to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against C.P. Reyes Hospital. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of  Barbosa and ruled that she was illegally dismissed. The LA based its decision on the numerical passing marks given by Barbosa’s evaluators showing that she successfully met C.P. Reyes Hospital’s standards. daftar cantiktoto pay4d login The NLRC subsequently reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s ruling in favor of Barbosa. Barbosa filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issues: Ruling The Supreme Court ruled that Barbosa was illegally dismissed; and hence, entitled to backwages. Probationary employment may be terminated when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of engagement. However, in Barbosa’s case, the Court found her dismissal baseless since she obtained the passing grades needed to meet the standards for regularization based on the probationary employment contract. On the other hand, the Court found C.P. Reyes Hospital’s claims of unsatisfactory performance as ungenuine as they were only issued two weeks after Barbosa had already been terminated and without an accompanying performance evaluation. As Barbosa was illegally dismissed, she is entitled to reinstatement, full back wages, and other benefits. The Court clarified that illegally dismissed probationary employees, like regular employees, are entitled to backwages up to their actual reinstatement and not only until the end of their probationary period. In case reinstatement is not feasible, backwages shall be computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the finality of the Decision in the illegal dismissal case. The Court held that both the Constitution and the Labor Code did not distinguish between regular and probationary employees in guaranteeing the right to security of tenure. It added that the mere lapse of the probationary period without regularization does not by itself sever the employment relationship. Without any valid grounds to dismiss a probationary employee, there is no basis to terminate the employment. Thus, the employee is entitled to work even beyond the probationary period. The Court thus ruled that in Barbosa’s case, backwages should be computed from January 1, 2014, when compensation was withheld from her, until the finality of the Court’s decision.

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What makes a quitclaim invalid? Naldo et al. v. Corporate Protection Services, Phils., Inc. (CORPS) and/or Buddy Robrigado and Benjamin Sesgundo

Facts Petitioners Domingo Naldo, Jr., Rogelio Benitez, Isidro Alfonso, Jr., Ronaldo Ledda, Bernardo Fabulare, Armando De Luna, and Nelson Villacentino (collectively, petitioners) were security guards of respondent Corporate Protection Services, Phils, Inc. (CORPS) assigned to Tarlac and Cabanatuan City. Petitioners stated that CORPS required them to work 12 hours a day, every day, including regular and special holidays and their scheduled rest days. Despite this, they claim that they did not receive their regular or special holiday pay, rest day pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, and Emergency Cost of Living Allowance (ECOLA) from CORPS. They also stated that CORPS would deduct certain amounts of money from their salaries per month for trust fund savings and as cash bond. During their conciliation-mediation conference before the NCMB to discuss their grievances, a representative of CORPS offered to pay all their money claims if the employees submitted signed resignation letters. Relying on this, the employees complied. CORPS also made them sign separate quitclaims. However, upon receiving the checks the petitioners soon discovered that they only covered the amounts of trust fund savings and cash bonds. The employees tried to return the checks, but CORPS explained that the checks for the remaining money claims, which were still being processed, would follow. This was reflected in the Minutes of the proceedings. When the employees showed up for work the next day, their supervisors prevented them, claiming they had already supposedly resigned. By the end of the month, CORPS still had not given them checks for the remaining money claims, and they were not allowed to report for duty. CORPS still did not pay the employees’ money claims as promised, and the employees were still not allowed to report for duty. pay4d whitelabel The employees then filed a complaint against CORPS for nonpayment of salary and benefits and constructive illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, ruling that the employees voluntarily signed the quitclaims and the resignation letters, and that there was no clear proof that they were signed under duress. They are thus barred from seeking further claims against CORPS. idn togel totomacau 4d togel gacor4d toto togel slot gacor hari ini Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC. The NLRC ruled that while the petitioners had no intention to resign, there was still no illegal dismissal as CORPS had never dismissed the petitioners in the first place. The NLRC also held that there was a mere miscommunication between the parties as to the money claims. The NLRC ordered petitioners to return to work and ordered CORPS to accept them. Both parties were not satisfied with this ruling and both filed their Motions for Reconsideration, but they were both denied by the NLRC in a Resolution.  Both the petitioners and CORPS then filed their Petitions for Certiorari with the CA. In its Petition for Certiorari, CORPS claimed that the petitioners were guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping is the term for petitioners taking their legal case in whichever court they believe is most likely to provide the judgment they want. CORPS also claimed that the petitioners were barred from filing a complaint because of their quitclaims, which are an acknowledgment that the petitioners’ money claims had all been paid. According to the CA, the petitioners were not guilty of forum shopping, as they had filed a Request for Assistance with the DOLE NCMB through the Single-Entry Approach (SEnA). All labor disputes, with certain exceptions, are required to undergo SEnA as a mandatory procedure prior to the filing of a labor complaint. Thus, availing of SEnA and later on filing a complaint before the NLRC does not amount to forum shopping. The CA also ruled that the resignation letters and quitclaims were invalid, as they were not made voluntarily. Still, the CA agreed with the NLRC that there was no illegal dismissal, and as such, the payment of back wages could not be given as a matter of course. Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration, but were denied by the CA, hence this Petition. Issues The issues for the Court’s resolution are: Ruling 1. The Supreme Court ruled that the quitclaims that the employees signed were void for being executed by CORPS with an intent to defraud. The Court reiterated that for a quitclaim to be valid, (a) there must be no fraud or deceit on the part of any parties; (b) the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (c) the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. The employer bears the burden to prove that the quitclaim constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement of what an employee is entitled to recover, and that the one accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with full understanding. In this case, the employees signed the quitclaims with the honest belief, based on CORPS’ assurances, that they would be paid their money claims in full, as supported by the Minutes of their conciliation-mediation conference. The Minutes show that the CORPS representative expressly stated that management would reconcile the employees’ other claims. The Court found that both parties were aware that there were pending money claims to be reconciled and that the checks did not represent the entire amount due to the employees. The employees likewise did not accept the checks with the intention of forgoing all other money claims against CORPS. 2. The Court also ruled that CORPS constructively dismissed the employees. It is apparent from the facts that CORPS’ representative assured the employees that they would be paid their money claims if they submitted their resignation letters and signed the pro forma quitclaims.  In the instant case, CORPS, through fraud, induced the employees into signing resignation letters and quitclaims. In doing so, CORPS attempted to disguise the employees’ dismissal as a voluntary termination of employment.Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. CORPS is hereby ordered to reinstate the petitions and to

What makes a quitclaim invalid? Naldo et al. v. Corporate Protection Services, Phils., Inc. (CORPS) and/or Buddy Robrigado and Benjamin Sesgundo Read More »

Is it illegal to fire an employee for testing positive for HIV?: Bison Management Corp vs AAA

Facts Bison is the recruitment agency that deployed AAA to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) as an OFW. AAA was hired by Bison as a Cleaning Laborer under a two-year contract and was deployed to Saudi Arabia on October 18, 2017. In January of 2019, after working for fifteen months, AAA underwent routine medical examination and was found positive for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). As a foreign employer, Bison terminated AAA’s employment, as under the laws of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, an HIV+ individual is considered unfit to work. He was sent back to the Philippines on February 8, 2019. slot server thailand The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal, but ruled that AAA is entitled to his unpaid salary from January 26, 2019 to February 7, 2019, vacation leave pay, and attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter decreed that the laws of Saudi Arabia, which state that an HIV+ individual is considered unfit to work, is “a state prerogative of the KSA which deserves our respect.” Further, they also postulated that Republic Act No. 8504, or the “Philippine AIDS Prevention and Control Act of 1998” is a “local law” that should apply only “within our jurisdiction and not to KSA.” In response, AAA filed a Memorandum of Partial Appeal before the NLRC. Contrary to the Labor Arbiter’s finding, the NLRC found that AAA was illegally dismissed. The NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Bison. Because of this, Bison filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA agreed with the NLRC that Philippine law governs the terms of the employment contract as well as the rights of the employee. This conclusion stems from the principle of lex loci contractus, meaning “law of the place where the contract is made.” The CA reasoned that since the law “categorically prohibits the use of a person’s HIV+ condition as a ground for dismissal,” there was no valid cause to terminate AAA. The CA denied Bison’s motion for reconsideration, causing Bison to file a Petition for Review. Issue Bison argues that the CA erred in applying the principle of lex loci contractus rather than the principle of pacta sunt servanda in resolving the legality of AAA’s dismissal. Pacta sunt servanda means “agreements must be kept,” meaning that parties are required to honor their agreements and obligations. Ruling The Court will not engage in an academic discussion on the principle of pacta sunt servanda where the case is essentially one for illegal dismissal of an OFW. Under Section 49(a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 11166, or the Philippine HIV and AIDS Policy Act, it is unlawful for employees to be terminated from work on the sole basis of their HIV status. Since Philippine law prohibits the use of a person’s HIV-positive condition as a ground for dismissal, there was no valid cause to terminate AAA. Further, if the foreign law stated in the employment contract contradicts Philippine law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, then Philippine law shall apply. In this case, even if it is proven that Saudi Arabian law prohibits workers who test positive for HIV, RA 11166 takes precedence over it for being against Philippine law. 

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MANILA CREDIT CORPORATION vs VIROOMAL

Facts Respondent Sps. Ramon and Anita Viroomal obtained a loan from petitioner Manila Credit Corporation (MCC) under Promissory Note (PN) No. 7155 in the amount of 467,600.00 payable in 60 months. gacor4d slot gacor 4d cantiktoto login totoagung pay4d slot gacor 4d situs toto slot bonus restoslot4d bandar toto situs toto situs toto totoagung login agen slot situs 4d situs toto angka jitu toto togel situs toto slot situs pay4d situs judi slot situs toto situs idn toto panel slot slot gacor 4d terbaru situs gacor bandar togel online agen toto togel online slot gacor hari ini idn toto togel online resmi situs slot slot gacor 4d toto slot slot server thailand gacor4d slot thailand gacor 4d slot gacor link bandar togel slot qris slot gampang scatter situs toto slot gacor 4d idn slot bandar togel toto slot agen toto slot link gacor agen slot gacor situs toto situs toto situs toto slot gacor gacor4d toto slot situs judi slot link gampang menang situs toto slot The loan has an interest rate of 23.36% per annum, and is secured by a real estate mortgage (REM) over Ramon’s property in Paranaque City. They later requested a loan restructuring, resulting in the execution of a second promissory note, Promissory Note No. 8351 (PN 8351), in the amount of PhP495,840 payable in 84 months at 24.99% interest per annum. The restructured amount represents the unpaid balance in PN 7155, including interests and penalty charges. When Spouses Viroomal failed to make timely authorizations, MCC demanded full payment of the outstanding obligation of PhP549,029.69 as of October 15, 2016. The spouses, however, claimed they had already paid a total of PhP1,175,638.12 and thus asked for a recomputation, but were ignored by MCC. MCC then proceeded with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, prompting Spouses Viroomal to file a complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of real estate mortgage as well as of the interest rate and other charges for being unconscionable, iniquitous, and immoral. The spouses argued that their loan obligation was already fully paid, had they not been burdened with the 36% per annum effective interest rate (EIR) and other charges which they claim were surreptitiously imposed by MCC. RTC Decision The RTC subsequently rendered a Decision in favor of Spouses Viroomal, declaring void PN 8351 and the interests compounded by MCC in PN 7155 for being grossly excessive. The spouses were thus allowed to recover from MCC overpayment in the amount of PhP417,859.58. The RTC also ordered the title in the name of MCC canceled, and Ramon’s title reinstated. CA Decision The RTC was affirmed by the CA, hence the recourse of MCC to the Court. It held that MCC imposed 36% per annum, equivalent to 3% per month effective interest rate (EIR) on respondents’ outstanding balance upon delay. The EIR was charged on top of the 1/10 of 1% of interest for each day it remains overdue, 1.5% per month penalty charge, and Php 100.00 collection fee, in addition to the stipulated 23.36% interest per annum on the principal amount. In total, MCC charged 77.46% interest per annum, which must be equitably reduced for being exorbitant and unconscionable. Issue Whether the stipulated interests, penalty charges, and the compounding of interests are valid as these were clearly expressed in the contract, which has the force of law between the parties. Ruling The Court cannot sustain the imposition of the compounded 3% monthly ElR. The evidence shows that the EIR was not indicated in PN No. 7155. MCC unilaterally imposed the EIR by simply inserting it in the disclosure statement. This is not valid and does not bind the respondents as it violates the mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil Code, which states that the validity or compliance to the contract cannot be left to the will of one of the parties. Reiterating its 2021 ruling in Megalopolis Properties, Inc. v. D’Nhew Lending Corporation, the Court held that while there is no “numerical limit on conscionability, the rate of 3% per month or 36% per annum is three times more than the 12% legal interest rate, and therefore excessive and unconscionable.” The Court added that the “willingness of the debtor in assuming an unconscionable rate of interest is inconsequential to its validity.” When MCC and the respondents executed PN No. 7155 in September 2009, the legal interest rate was fixed at l2% per annum. This rate was considered the reasonable compensation for forbearance of money. As held in Spouses Abella v. Spouses Abella, while the contracting parties may depart from the legal interest rate, any deviation therefrom must be reasonable and fair. If the stipulated interest for a loan is more than twice the prevailing legal rate of interest, it is for the creditor to prove that this rate is justified under the prevailing market conditions. No justification was offered by MCC in this case.  Further, under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, such contracts contrary to morals are inexistent and void from the beginning. In loan agreements, in particular, while the contracting parties may depart from the legal interest rate, any deviation therefrom must be reasonable and fair. “If the stipulated interest for a loan is more than twice the prevailing legal rate of interest, it is for the creditor to prove that this rate is justified under the prevailing market conditions,” held the Court. Note however that only the EIR and stipulated interest rates and penalties are declared void for being unconscionable. The very nature of the parties’ contract of loan entitles MCC to recover not only the principal amount, but also the payment of monetary interest from the respondents, as compensation for the use of the borrowed amount. Based on Article 1420 of the Civil Code, respondents’ obligation to pay the principal and the interest subsists as this can be separated from the void interests rates and charges.  For PN No. 7155, respondents have a total overpayment of Php 203,532.47. For PN

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BONPACK CORPORATION VS. NMB-SUPER

Facts: The CBA between Bonpack and Nagkakaisang Manggagawa SA Bonpack-Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (NMB-SUPER) states that: Bonpack and NMB-SUPER likewise agreed to establish a labor-management committee, which is a forum wherein the parties are compelled to meet at least once a month to tackle matters of mutual interest particularly those affecting labor-management relations, and/even resolve any dispute between the parties arising out of employer-employee relationship. toto macau terbesar slot gacor 777 situs toto macau terbesar toto macau situs toto gacor pg soft gacor toto macau terbesar slot qris slotgacor4d situs togel online gacor4d login slotgacor4d toto slot situs toto toto macau terbesar toto macau 4d Bonpack then unilaterally revised its old Company Rules and Regulations (CRR), purportedly to harmonize it with the new CBA. According to Bonpack, it rearranged the CRR’s layout for easy reference of the employees, and it incorporated the 120-minute grace period policy.  The revised CRR also defined the act of committing an “over break” as an offense wherein an employee “takes coffee or snack breaks of more than 15 minutes, or lunch breaks of more than one (1) hour for non-straight time and more than 30 minutes for straight time employees.” Said offense has a corresponding disciplinary action of “final written warning.”  This revised CRR was discussed in a general assembly of Bonpack’s employees conducted and held by Bonpack. However, NMB-SUPER unfavorably reacted to the implementation of the revised CRR without it being consulted at all, especially on the imposition of harsher penalties in the commission of company-defined offenses.  NMB-SUPER also claimed that Bonpack was underpaying the employees’ overtime pay by deducting their one-hour meal period from their total number of working hours with overtime. NMB-SUPER repeatedly requested from Bonpack to formally organize a labor-management committee, in order that NMB-SUPER’s concerns may be heard and be given appropriate response, but to no avail. Grievance Machinery: no settlement VA: Upheld the validity of the reformatted CRR. CA: Reversed the VA’s decision. Issues 1. Did Bonpack violate the CBA-mandated right to participate in policy and decision-making processes on matters affecting the general welfare of Bonpack’s employees? YES. It is settled that the exercise by an employer of its management prerogative is not absolute and is subject to limitations imposed by law, collective bargaining agreement, and general principles of fair play and justice. The CBA obligates Bonpack to discuss with NMB-SUPER matters that may involve decisions or policies that may adversely affect the general welfare of the members and all matters of mutual interest particularly those affecting labor-management relations.  While Bonpack indeed had management prerogatives, such prerogative was limited or regulated by the relevant provisions of the CBA, which Bonpackdid not comply with. Bonpack failed to show that it tried to reach out to the employees to obtain and consider their position on the revisions on the CRR.  Nor has Bonpack disputed that it ignored NMB-SUPER’s calls to create a labor management committee as was so required by it under the CBA, thus deliberately depriving NMB-SUPER of its right to participate in policy and decision-making processes on matters affecting the general welfare of the employees. When Bonpack conducted the general assembly with the employees, Bonpack merely discussed the revised CRR and handed copies of the same to the employees, contrary to the requirement in the CBA where such activities shall be done with NMB-SUPER in a labor-management committee forum. As such, the Court found that Bonpack never really consulted to its employees before it implemented the revised CRR. 2. Did Bonpack require its employees to observe one-hour meal breaks which resulted in the employees being underpaid? YES. Sec. 83, in relation to Sec. 85 of the Labor Code, states that the compensable eight (8) hours of work in a day does not include the sixty 60 minutes time-off for the regular meals of an employee, therefore, this statutory one-hour meal break, not being part of the normal working hours of an employee, is non-compensable. Nevertheless, the hours of work of the employees may be modified or regulated in a duly signed CBA between the employer and its employees. A CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.  As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. The CBA states that the working hours shall be eight (8) hours a day including a 30-minute meal break and two (2) 15-minute coffee breaks. This means that the meal time of the employees is divided into three shorter periods so that these periods can be considered as compensable (30-15-15).    However, Bonpack essentially admitted that it wittingly allowed the employees to consume one (1) whole hour of continuous meal break instead of the CBA-mandated 30-mute break and two 15-minutes rest periods. Bonpack, in defining the commission of “overbreak,” classified those consuming the one-hour meal break as “straight time” employees and those consuming the 30-minute meal break as “non-straight time” employees, which established two policies on hours of work and meal period. This classification permitted the “straight time” employees to lump the short meal breaks into one-hour, which is against the CBA. This classification likewise resulted in those employees rendering twelve (12) hours of work in an eight-hour work day being compensated only with three (3) hours of overtime pay instead of four (4) hours, which is also against the CBA.   In sum, the CA correctly ruled that Bonpack’s employees who worked for 12 hours in an eight-hour workday, and took the 30-minute and two 15-minute rest breaks as their meal time in accordance with the CBA, must be

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Canaveras v. Judge Gamboa – delos Santos

Atty. Adan, counsel for defendants in a criminal case for FOPDBPI, failed to appear during a scheduled hearing. The Respondent Judge ordered and ruled that Atty. Adan’s absence thereto is to be construed as a waiver on defense’s part to cross examine prosecution’s witness.  gacor4d toto macau link gacor toto online daftar amintoto bandar togel terpercaya ixplay agen slot gacor slot thailand slot gacor akun slot gacor togel slot amintoto slot mahjong toto macau slot gacor 4d wso slot toto slot akun gacor4d slot qris situs toto angka akurat toto macau toto slot For his part, and during the presentation of the prosecution’s second witness, Atty. Adan explained that he consulted a doctor during the date of the hearing because of the pain he experienced in his eyes. However, the Judge denied Atty. Adan’s MFR to the earlier order primarily because the medcert he presented was not notarized. Moreover, the accused invoked their right to cross-examine an adverse witness which was violated when the Judge construed their counsel’s absence as a waiver of said right. They also assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 10(b) of JA Rule, whose effect was the same as that of the Judge’s order. On the other hand, the Judge said that she did not apply JA Rule in her order, but instead the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases. ISSUE: Did Counsel’s failure to attend the hearing amounted to a waiver of the constitutional right to cross examine witnesses? RULING: NO. The right of petitioners to cross-examine Nenita, being a basic and fundamental right, should be seen as paramount. While the State has the right to due process, such right should not prevail over the accused’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses when it is not shown that the accused applied machinations to unreasonably deny the prosecution of its ability to prove its case.  Nonetheless, the constitutionality of the JA Rule, not being the lis mota of the case, was not passed upon. The Court ultimately resolved that the order was valid insofar as its ground is the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, NOT the JA Rule.

Canaveras v. Judge Gamboa – delos Santos Read More »

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