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MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC

FACTS Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (a.k.a. Grace Poe) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo in 1968. At age 5, she was adopted by celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (a.k.a Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesus Sonora Poe (a.k.a Susan Roces). She initially pursued a degree in Developmental Studies at the University of the Philippines but opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. She immigrated to the U.S. in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares, who was based in the U.S. at the time. In 2001, she became a naturalized American citizen and obtained an American passport. In 2004, Grace Poe returned to the Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for President. However, after a few months, she rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father’s deteriorating medical condition, who slipped into a coma and eventually expired. In her desire to be with her grieving mother, she and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 2005. On 7 July 2006, Grace Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. The BI declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in her name and in the names of her three children. In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Grace Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post, she executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship” before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. The following day, she submitted the said affidavit to the BI and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, Grace Poe stopped using her American passport. On 2 October 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” She obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. On 15 October 2015, Grace Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. Her filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases. These cases argued that Grace Poe cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling, and that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. They also argued that she fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. ISSUE RULING The petition was thus GRANTED. MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

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Case Digest | HERMA SHIPPING TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND HERMINIO S. ESGUERRA VS. CALVIN JABALLA CORDERO

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HERMA SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND HERMINIO S. ESGUERRA vs. CALVIN JABALLA CORDEROG.R. No. 244210 | 27 January 2020 FACTS: Cordero was employed on March 31, 1992 as Able Seaman by HSTC, a corporation engaged in the business of hauling, shipping and/or transporting oil and petroleum products in Philippine waters. During his employment, Cordero was part of the complement of M/Tkr Angat, where one of his primary duties entailed being a Helmsman or a duty look-out during vessel navigation. Sometime in 2015, HSTC discovered significant losses of the oil and petroleum products transported by M/Tkr Angat during its past twelve (12) voyages. Consequently, HSTC conducted an investigation and sent a Notice to Explain/Show Cause Memo on January 28, 2016 to five (5) crew members, including Cordero, requiring them to submit a written explanation for allegedly committing: (a) violation of HSTC’s Code of Discipline; (b) Serious Misconduct; and (c) Willful Breach of Trust and Confidence. Pending the investigation, the five (5) crew members were placed on preventive suspension. In his defense, Cordero denied the allegations against him and claimed that he did not see anything unusual or suspicious during the voyages, and that if there were any such case, he did not see them due to his poor eyesight. After HSTC found Cordero’s explanation insufficient, he was dismissed from employment through a Notice of Termination dated March 8, 2016.This prompted Cordero to file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. For their part, HSTC and Esguerra contended that the significant losses in the oil and petroleum products were confirmed after using a Four Point Analysis, an accepted formula adopted in the oil shipping industry to determine oil/petroleum loss during a sea voyage. Moreover, a suspicious event was captured and recorded by M/Tkr Angat‘ s CCTV camera, showing an unknown boat navigating its way at the side of the vessel, crew members coming out of their quarters, examining/investigating, and waving off the boat, and the blocking/covering of the CCTV camera for three (3) hours between December 26 and 27, 2015. They maintained that Cordero, as M/Tkr Angat‘s Helmsman/Watchman, was undoubtedly aware of the oil pilferage; having had a vantage point from the bridge of the vessel, he would not have missed any boat or vessel that will approach M/Tkr Angat from the side. Likewise, Cordero would have seen who removed the cover of the CCTV camera that was blocked. However, despite the incident, Cordero did not report any irregularity to HSTC. The Labor Arbiter Ruling: In a Decision dated November 21, 2016, the Labor Arbiter (LA) found Cordero’s employment to have been validly terminated and thus, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC Ruling: In a Decision dated February 28, 2017, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s dismissal of the complaint upon a finding that Cordero was validly dismissed for a just cause. The Court of Appeals Ruling: The CA affirmed the NLRC Decision with a modification directing HSTC and Esguerra to pay Cordero separation pay equivalent to one (1)-month salary for every year of service from March 1992 until finality of judgment. While the CA concurred with the labor tribunals’ finding that Cordero’s employment was validly terminated for a just cause, it found that the penalty of dismissal was too harsh under the following circumstances: (a) Cordero worked for HSTC for twenty-four (24) years;(b) the incident while he was on duty was his first offense;(c) he had no derogatory record; and(d) he was already preventively suspended for the infractions he committed. Accordingly, the CA remanded the case to the LA for the proper computation of separation pay. ISSUE: Did the CA correctly awarded separation pay in favor of Cordero “as a measure of compassionate justice” in the exercise of its “equity jurisdiction? RULING: As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of “social justice” or on “equitable grounds.” In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice. A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best, it may mitigate the penalty, but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character. That Cordero had been employed with HSTC for twenty-four (24) years does not serve to mitigate his offense nor should it be considered in meting out the appropriate penalty therefor. In fact, it may be reasonably argued that the infraction that he committed against HSTC, i.e., theft of invaluable company property, demonstrates the highest degree of ingratitude to an institution that has been the source of his livelihood for twenty-four

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Case Digest | KNUTSON VS. FLORES

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Randy Michael Knutson, acting on behalf of minor Rhuby Sibal Knutson vs. Hon. Elisa R. Sarmiento-Flores, in her capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 69, Regional Trial Court, Taguig City, and Rosalina Sibal KnutsonG.R. No. 239215 | 12 July 2022 FACTS: Randy Michael Knutson (Randy), an American Citizen, met Rosalina Siba Knutson (Rosalina) in Singapore. They got married and had a daughter named Rhuby. The family lived in the Philippines. Randy and Rosalina became estranged after he discovered her extra-marital affairs, but Randy supported Rosalina and Rhuby. Rosalina got hooked in casinos and incurred large debts from casino financiers prompting her to sell the house and lot, condominium unit, and vehicles that Randy provided for the family. Rosalina rented an apartment and got herself a boyfriend. Randy advised Rosalina to be discreet in her illicit affairs because it is not good for Rhuby to see her mother with another man. Randy discovered later that Rosalina hurt Rhuby by pulling her hair, slapping her face and knocking her head. One time, Rosalina pointed a knife at Rhuby and threatened to kill her. Rosalina even texted Randy about her plan to kill their daughter and commit suicide. Randy reported the matter to the police station but the authorities explained that they cannot assist him in domestic abuse. The neighbors of Rosalina complained about noisy parties and pot sessions in her apartment. The lessor even terminated the lease after marijuana plants were confiscated in the premises. On December 7, 2017, Randy, on behalf of minor Rhuby, filed against Rosalina a petition under RA No. 9262 for the issuance of Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders before the RTC. Randy averred that Rosalina placed Rhuby in a harmful environment deleterious to her physical, emotional, moral, and psychological development. RTC Ruling: Dismissed the petition, explaining that protection and custody orders in RA No. 9262 cannot be issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child. It ratiocinated that the child’s mother cannot be considered as an offender under the law. Moreover, the remedies are not available to the father because he is not a “woman victim of violence”. Randy moved for a reconsideration but it was denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether the father can avail of the remedies under RA No. 9262 on behalf of his minor child against the mother’s violent and abusive acts.2. Whether RA No. 9262 covers a situation where the mother committed violent and abusive acts against her own child. RULING: 1. RA No. 9262 allows the father of the offended party to apply for protection and custody orders. In Garcia vs. Drilon, Section 9(b) of RA No. 9262 explicitly allows “parents or guardians of the offended party” to file a petition for protection orders. The statute categorically used the word “parents” which pertains to the father and the mother of the woman or child victim. Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget. The law speaks in clear language and no explanation is required. There is no occasion for the Court to interpret but only to apply the law when it is not ambiguous. Similarly, the statute did not qualify on who between the parents of the victim may apply for protection orders. Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, the courts must not distinguish. In any event, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC states that the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner to petitions for protection orders. 33 Under Section 5, Rule 3 of Rules of Court, “[a} minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad !item.” In this case, the title of the petition for issuance of a protection order is unequivocal, to wit: “RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON acting on behalf of minor RHUBYSIBAL KNUTSON, Petitioner, -versus- ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON, Respondent.“ There is no question that the offended party is Rhuby, a minor child, who allegedly experienced violence and abuse. Thus, Randy may assist Rhuby in filing the petition as the parent of the offended party. 2. RA No. 9262 covers a situation where the mother committed violent and abusive acts against her own child. Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 defines violence against women and their children as: “any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.” The law criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e., husband; former husband; or any person who has or had sexual or dating relationship with the woman, or with whom the woman has a common child. However, the Court in Garcia emphasized that the law does not single out the husband or father as the culprit. The statute used the gender-neutral word “person” as the offender which embraces any person of either sex. The offender may also include other persons who conspired to commit the violence, thus: As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan [588 Phil.

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Case Digest | ALEXANDER vS. SPS. ESCALONA

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ALEXANDER vs. SPS. ESCALONAG.R. No. 25614119 July 2022 FACTS: Spouses Jorge and Hilaria Escalona were married on November 14, 1960. They acquired unregistered parcels of land in Olongapo City (Lots 1 and 2). Jorge waived his rights over Lot 1 to this illegitimate son, Reygan. A few years later, Reygan relinquished his right over Lot 1 to petitioner Belinda. Reygan also transferred Lot 2 to Belinda. They entered into a deed of sale covering lots 1 and 2. The spouses confronted Belinda and said that Reygan cannot validly sell the lots, while Belinda invoked the validity of her contracts with Reygan. The spouses filed a complaint for annulment of documents with damages against Belinda since: (1) Hilaria did not consent to the waiver of rights to Reygan as to Lot 1, (2) They never sold Lot 2 to a third person. RTC upheld the transactions between Belinda and Reygan, ruling that the action to annul the documents have already prescribed. The CA reversed the RTC’s judgment. ISSUE: 1. What rules shall govern the status of a contract and the prescriptive period of an action when the husband and wife were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, but the alienation or encumbrance of the property transpired after the effectivity of the Family Code without the spouse’s consent? 2. What is the reckoning point of the applicable law — is the date of the marriage or the time of the transaction? RULING: The SC held that the governing law is the Family Code. More than the date of marriage of the spouses, the applicable law must be reckoned on the date of the alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property made without the consent of the other spouse. Under the Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the wife has the option to ask the courts for the annulment of contracts of the husband entered into without her consent. Hence, under the Civil Code, the transaction would have been simply voidable, and the wife has ten (10) years to cause the annulment of such contract. Under the Family Code, however, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property is void. So when the alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without the wife’s consent, is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the said alienation or encumbrance is not void but merely voidable. The applicable laws are Art. 166 and 173 of the Civil Code. However, when made after the effectivity of the Family Code, it is void. The applicable law is Article 124 of the Family Code. The Family Code expressly repealed the relevant portions of the Civil Code, insofar it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights therein. A vested right refers to a present and fixed interest which is protected against arbitrary state action, covering legal or equitable title to enforce a demand as well as exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Hence, a new law cannot be invoked to prejudice or affect a right that has become vested while the old law was still in force. If Reygan and Belinda had vested rights, even the effectivity of the Family Code cannot impair their rights, which is expressly provided by the Family Code itself. However, they have no vested right since: the transaction for Lot 1 happened during the effectivity of the Family Code, and Hilaria did not give her written consent to these contracts. Hence, any alienation therein is actually void. The alienation of Lot 2 is likewise void since it was made without the Spouses Escalona’s consent.

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Case Digest | MARIA VICIA CARULLO-PADUA VS. JOSELITO PADUA

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FACTS: Petitioner Maria Vicia Carullo-Padua (Maria) and respondent Joselito Padua (Joselito) were married, and their union produced a son. On July 17, 1997, Maria filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage with the trial court anchored on Art. 36 of the Family Code. Maria alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Joselito was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. During their cohabitation, Joselito exhibited excessive sexual desire and forced her to perform oral and anal sex with him; that there were occasions when respondent attempted to sexually molest her sister, nieces and their household help who were staying with them; that respondent admitted to said attempts of molestations but begged her to keep said incidents a secret; and at one point, at the heat of their quarrel, Joselito attempted to kill Maria by threatening to stab her with a letter opener. Maria also alleged that Joselito failed to provide financial support for her and their child as well as emotional and psychological support. Hence, Maria filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Joselito. During trial, Petitioner presented herself and psychiatrist Dr. Villegas as witnesses. Dr. Villegas testified that she diagnosed Joselito with a personality disorder of a sexual deviant or perversion based on Maria’s narrations. Dr. Villegas added that the psychological disorder of Joselito is grave, serious, and not clinically curable which rendered him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The trial court denied the petition, it held that the evidence adduced by Maria failed to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the validity of her marriage with respondent. On appeal, the appellate court sustained the judgment of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether the totality of evidence presented by Maria is sufficient to prove that Joselito is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Maria. RULING: No. Republic v Iyoy instructs that the psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) Gravity – it must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;(b) Juridical Antecedence – it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and(c) Incurability – it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In concluding that the husband was psychologically incapacitated, the Supreme Court used the following parameters (Tan-Andal guidelines) in determining what constitutes psychological incapacity:(1) The psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of marriage;(2) Caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed prior to their marriage;(3) Caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause; and(4) Proven by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, as categorically declared by the Court, expert testimony or the testimony of a psychologist/psychiatrist is no longer required to prove psychological incapacity. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the spouses’ lives before they contracted marriage may testify on their observations as to the incapacitated spouse’s behavior. What is important is that the totality of evidence is sufficient to support a finding of psychological incapacity. Using the foregoing yardsticks, the Supreme Court reviewed the totality of evidence presented by Maria and found that the same was miserably wanting to sustain the conclusion that Joselito was psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of marriage. The psychiatrist’s description of Joselito’s parents’ traits does not give this Court a deeper intuitive understanding of Joselito’s psychological state. Notably, there was no information how Joselito reacted towards the supposed contrasting personalities of his parents during his formative years. Neither was there any account as to how the said contrasting parenting behavior affected Joselito’s social, intellectual, moral, and emotional growth. To emphasize, the testimonies of ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage should include behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. Here, not only was there no interview or psychological test conducted upon Joselito, there was nobody who testified on vital information regarding his personality structure, upbringing and childhood such as members of his family, relatives, friends, and co-workers. The evaluation of Dr. Villegas on Joselito was based merely on information, accounts and descriptions relayed solely by Maria which glaringly and expectedly are biased.

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Case Digest | PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vS. DOMINGO CASTILLO, JR.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO CASTILLO, JR. G.R. No. 121768 21 July 1997 FACTS: Domingo Castillo, Jr. (Boyet) and his father Domingo Castillo Sr. (Domingo), the victim in this case, were in the D&G restaurant in Norzagaray, Bulacan drinking beer. After two (2) hours of drinking, a group of noisy customers arrived. Dimongo knew about his son’s propensity to get into fights so he asked Boyet to go home with him. Boyet drove to the direction of their home in Angat, Bulacan. An argument ensued between Boyet and his father, who were both a bit drunk already, because the former kept insisting that he should go back to the restaurant while the latter prevented him from doing so. Boyet abruptly stopped the pick-up upon nearing their house and the victim alighted therefrom. Holding a bottle of beer in his right hand, the victim raised both of his hands, stood in from of the pickup and said, “sige kung gusto mo sagasaan mo ako, hindi ka makakaalis” (go ahead, run over me if you want to leave). Boyet slowly drove the pick-up forward threatening to run over the victim. Domingo exclaimed, “papatayin mob a ako?” (are you going to kill me?). Boyet backed-up almost hitting an owner type jeep parked at the side of the road and on board which were four (4) people conversing with each other, including prosecution eyewitness, Ma. Cecilia Mariano. Then at high speed, Boyet drove the pick-up forward hitting the victim in the process. Not satisfied with what he had done, Boyet put the vehicle in reverse thereby running over the victim a second time. The appellant then alighted from the vehicle and walked towards their house. Arthur Agaran saw the incident and brought the victim to Dolorosa Hospital at Norzagaray where he died. Boyet passed off the death of his father as an accident. However, a suspicion of foul place surfaced when his sister, Leslie C. Padilla, was given different versions of his death. Thus, she fled an information alleging parricide against her brother. The RTC found Boyet guilty beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether Boyet is guilty of parricide. RULING: YES. The prosecution has successfully established the elements of parricide: (1) the death of the deceased; (2) that he or she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act done without malice but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence, and which has harmed society or an individual. The records are bereft of any evidence that the appellant had tried to avoid hitting the victim who positioned himself in front of the pick-up. On the contrary, Mariano’s testimony is to the effect that prior to actually hitting the victim, the appellant was intimidating him by moving the pick-up forward, thus prompting the victim to exclaim, “papatayin mo ba ako?”. Worse, the appellant back-up to gain momentum, then accelerated at a very fast speed knowing fully well that the vehicle would definitely hit the victim who was still standing in front of the same, A man who had not intended to harm his own father would not walk but more likely run in search of help. Aware of the fact that his father’s life is precariously hanging in the balance, the normal reaction of a child is to waste no time in trying to save his life. The appellant, on the other hand, did not even lift a finger to help his own father whose life he had so brutally taken away. It was Agaran and other workers who, on their own accord, brought the victim to the hospital. In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the court find it difficult to believe that the appellant did not act with malice.

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Case Digest | REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOHN ARNEL H. AMATA

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FACTS: John Arnel H. Amata (Respondent) and Haydee N. Amata (Haydee) met at Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, eventually became sweethearts, and got married. They are blessed with three children. Respondent’s and Haydee’s marriage was blissful at the incipient but eventually turned sour. After an alleged affair was discovered by Haydee, she became suspicious of respondent and started to secretly check his cellular phone. Respondent, feeling betrayed and angry about his spouse’s action, packed his things, left their abode, and stayed in a hotel. Respondent eventually returned home. However, their relationship continued to deteriorate, forcing respondent to leave the house again to spare their children from witnessing their fights. Respondent instituted the instant petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on October 13, 2008 on the ground of psychological incapacity. The psychological and marital evaluation conducted on respondent shows that he is suffering from a passive-aggressive personality disorder. The RTC declared the marriage of respondent and Haydee void ab initio. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the findings of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether there is sufficient basis to nullify respondent’s marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: Yes. Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage, must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Expounding on these characteristics means: that the incapacity should be grave or serious in a way that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party predating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. To support a petition for the severance of marital tie, it is not enough to show that a party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations or was unwilling to perform these obligations. It is indispensable for the party moving for the dissolution of marriage to present proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him or her from complying with his or her essential marital obligations. In this case, the couple had a normal relationship during the period of their courtship, when they were boyfriend-girlfriend, and even during the first 7 years of their 13-year marriage before the instant petition was filed. They had the occasional misunderstandings which they quickly resolved at the instance of the respondent. Respondent even testified that he is capable of taking good care of his wife and children. There was a momentary falling out during the marriage when respondent allegedly engaged in an affair but the couple eventually reconciled and Haydee even conceived their third child. Evidently, the totality of these evidence negates any manifestation that respondent was indeed afflicted with psychological disorder that is so grave, permanent, incurable, and existed at the inception of the marriage which incapacitated him to perform his matrimonial duties and obligations. At most, the evidence presented reveals that respondent’s refusal to cohabit with Haydee was because the marriage has become unsatisfactory. The frequent quarrels caused by suspicion of marital infidelity and the consequent sexual dissatisfaction of the respondent were some of the reasons he is now unwilling to assume the essential obligations of marriage. However, an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. And a person’s refusal to assume essential marital duties and obligations does not constitute psychological incapacity.

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Case Digest | REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vS. ORBECIDO III

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORBECIDO IIIG.R. No.1543805 October 2005 FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code in which the court granted. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), alleged that it is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien.The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. ISSUE:Whether Cipriano can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code. RULING: NO. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However, the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. Due to insufficiency of evidence, the declaration that the respondent is now capacitated to marry could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it which must be proved and the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.

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Case Digest | ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL vs. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL

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ROSANNA L. TAN-AND AL vs. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDALG.R. No. 19635911 May 2021 FACTS: Mario Victor M. Andal (Mario) and Rosanna L. Tan (Rosanna) were married on 16 December 1995. On 27 July 1996, Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, the only child of the parties. The family lived in a duplex in Paranaque City, with Rosanna’s parents living in the other half of the duplex. According to Rosanna, even before their marriage, Mario would be extremely irritable and moody. She also had observed, at the beginning of their marriage, that Mario is emotionally immature, irresponsible, irritable, and psychologically imbalanced. Mario would also leave their house for several days without informing Rosanna of his whereabouts, and whenever he returned home, he would refuse to go out and would sleep for days. When Rosanna confronted Mario about his erratic behavior, she learned that Mario was using drugs. Mario promised to stop using it, but he did not keep his promise. When Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, Mario allegedly did not assist her, leaving her in the hospital even though he knows that she could not move until the effects of the anesthesia had worn off. Mario would only return to the hospital later that evening to sleep. Moreover, when Rosanna and Ma. Samantha were discharged from the hospital, Mario showed symptoms of paranoia. Further, during the times when Ma. Samantha was sick, Mario would instead ignore her. Rosanna had to eventually closed Design and Construction Matrix due to financial losses. Mario’s access to the company funds for his drug use allegedly used up the funds. Rosanna then petitioned the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) to voluntarily commit Mario for drug rehabilitation at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center, and, eventually, at the Seagulls Flight Foundation (Seagulls). Mario escaped from Seagulls on 14 February 200, but he was recommitted again and remained confined there until 24 December 2000, when the rehabilitation center released Mario without completing his rehabilitation program. Since Mario’s premature release from the rehabilitation center, Rosanna and Mario had separated and had not lived together. Mario also failed to give support to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha. These events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to her. To prove Mario’s psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia (Dr. Garcia), a physician-psychiatrist, as expert witness. Dr. Garcia diagnosed him with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features. Mario’s narcissistic antisocial personality disorder, which Dr. Garcia found to be grave, with juridical antecedence, and incurable, allegedly rendered Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to Rosanna. Dr. Garcia testified that Mario’s personality disorder was grave and “deeply rooted” in his character. The Regional Trial Court voided the marriage between Rosanna and Mario as it ruled that Rosanna discharged the burden of proving Mario’s psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals however reversed the trial court’s decision and found that Dr. Garcia’s psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be “unscientific and unreliable” since she diagnosed Mario without interviewing him. The Court of Appeals ruled that Dr. Garcia “was working on pure suppositions and second-hand information fed to her by one side.” Rosanna contends, before the Supreme Court, that psychological incapacity need not be grounded on a particular psychological illness psychological incapacity need not be grounded on a particular psychological illness. Rosanna adds that psychological incapacity is incurable, but not necessarily in a medical or clinical sense. For her, incurability is manifested by ingrained behavior manifested during the marriage by the psychologically incapacitated spouse. ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity needs to be medically or clinically identified. RULING: No. It was in Molina where this Court laid down the guidelines for interpreting and applying Article 36. Under the second guideline in Molina, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. In Santos vs. Court of Appeals (“Santos”) the term psychological incapacity” was first defined as a “mental (not physical) incapacity” to comply with the essential marital obligations. “Psychological incapacity” must refer to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.” In the past, the Court was inconsistent in requiring expert evidence in psychological incapacity cases. Not all cases promulgated after Marcos required the totality of evidence rule. In light of the foregoing, the Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse’s personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations. Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. As to the juridical antecedence requirement, the Court held that the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the medical sense, but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly. This means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. Rosanna discharged the burden of proof required to nullify her marriage to Mario. Clear and

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