In any legal battle, time is always of the essence. Thus, it is a lawyer’s duty to diligently and seasonably act on any legal matter entrusted by his clients, and he shall not cause or occasion delay in any legal matter before any court, tribunal, or other agency. These duties are codified not only because of the client’s right and desire to obtain speedy justice, but also due to the lapse of a certain period provided by the law, which results in a loss or waiver of the right to prosecute cases. The latter instance is called prescription.
Even the most meritorious claims have an expiration date, save for some exceptions. Why is this so? The Supreme Court, in the case of Pablo R. Antonio, Jr. v. Engr. Emilio M. Morales citing U.S. v. Serapio ruled that prescriptive statutes intend to prevent a situation where claims spring up at great distances of time, thereby surprising the parties against whom the claims are filed, at a time when the facts have already become obscure due to defective memories or deaths of witnesses. Thus, the consequence of filing a case beyond the prescriptive period is a dismissal.
Applying this to criminal cases, one may imagine a comical situation where a person, in his extreme hunger and desperation as a struggling young man, steals a loaf of bread, then worth Thirty Pesos (P30.00), to prevent his own death due to starvation. Peculiarly, the store owner took this personally and vowed to eventually file a criminal case against the young man at a crucial point in his life. By the grace of the universe, thirty years later, the young man is at the zenith of his career and is now being interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council in hopes of becoming a judge.
Without prescriptive statutes, the store owner may stir controversy by finally filing a criminal case against the judge-to-be. One may argue that no one would mind that case due to the value of the thing stolen. Yet, should the store owner be able to prove it, a crime was indeed committed. Common sense would dictate, however, that the act of the young man thirty (30) years ago should have been cast into oblivion due to the passage of time.
Thus, in criminal cases, prescriptive statutes are “not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out.”
Under the law, theft of such value is only considered as a light felony which are infractions of law, for the commission of which, a penalty of arresto menor (imprisonment of 1 to 30 days) or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both is imposed by the Revised Penal Code. For crimes punishable by arresto menor, the prescriptive period is two (2) months from the discovery of the crime. The store owner’s grudge that gave birth to his grand plan is not incentivized by the law. He sorely missed his chance at vindication.
Comically as they may have been put, these disquisitions tell us one thing clearly: lawyers should always be aware of and be guided by the prescriptive periods set forth by the law. Otherwise, they run the risk of dealing injustice as the clients who trusted their expertise are sure to be confronted with a dismissal of their cases for being filed beyond the prescriptive period. Looking out for these situations and ensuring compliance with such periods for various kinds of cases are usually within the control of the lawyer—until Corpus, Jr. v. People (hereinafter referred to as “Corpus”) came along.
The Corpus case involves the crime of causing slight physical injuries. To cut a long story short, this case involves an altercation in Parañaque between Roberto and a group of three (3) men, namely Pastor, Zamora, and Corpus, whereby the latter men allegedly inflicted physical injuries upon Roberto on November 25, 2017. On January 08, 2018, Roberto executed his Complaint-Affidavit before the prosecutor’s office. Then, on April 30, 2018, an Information charging the three men with serious physical injuries was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
After trial on the merits, the MeTC convicted Corpus of slight physical injuries and acquitted Pastor and Zamora for failure of the evidence to show their participation. Corpus elevated this case up to the Supreme Court on the issue of prescription, stating that he should be acquitted since the prescriptive period for the subject offense had already lapsed.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Corpus and acquitted him, stating that indeed, the crime had already prescribed.
Generally, in criminal cases, the prescriptive period stops running when proceedings are instituted against the person being accused of the commission of a crime. Bearing that in mind, the crime committed by Corpus is slight physical injuries. Under the Revised Penal Code, it is a light offense; thus, similar to the example given above, the crime is punishable for two (2) months. In the Corpus case, the material dates are as follows: (1) the altercation in Parañaque happened on November 25, 2017, (2) Roberto filed his Complaint-Affidavit before the prosecutor’s office on January 08, 2018, thus officially instituting proceedings against Corpus and his cohorts. From this, it is easily surmisable that Roberto filed the case within the prescriptive period of two (2) months, if the general rule is taken into consideration.
So why did the Supreme Court say that the crime had already been prescribed?
The Supreme Court said that the crime of slight physical injuries is clearly governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure being punishable by arresto menor, and such Rules provide that criminal cases falling within its scope can only be commenced by the filing of an Information in court and not by the filing of a Complaint-Affidavit to institute proceedings against the person accused of the commission of a crime.
Section 11 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure states that:
SECTION 11. How Commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. (emphasis supplied).
The Supreme Court succinctly explained, in relation to such section, that “in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, prescriptive period is tolled only by the filing of an Information in court and not by the commencement of a preliminary investigation by the investigating body nor the institution of the complaint with the investigating body.”
It is important to note at this juncture that while Roberto filed his Complaint-Affidavit before the prosecutor’s office in Parañaque City within the prescriptive period, the investigating prosecutor was only able to file the Information in court on April 30, 2018. A plain reading of the Rules would indeed clearly dictate that if the reckoning period were the date of the filing of Information in court, the crime would indeed be prescribed.
To the author, this creates a new hurdle for lawyers who put their best foot forward in the service of their clients. Corpus and its cited case Republic v. Desierto placed a new variable to consider (and deeply contemplate) in determining the outcome and progress of their cases covered by the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure: when will the Information be filed in court? This is a variable that is beyond the control of the lawyer and his client. The Supreme Court even addresses this in Corpus in this wise:
“To be clear, we are fully aware of the unfortunate outcome of this ruling to the private complainant who rightfully seeks legal redress. Indeed, it is not the failure of the complainant, but that of the prosecutor’s office to timely file the Information before the court, which necessarily results in the dismissal of the case against Pastor.”
Be that as it may, the Supreme Court had addressed the matter before in the case of Zaldivia v. Judge Reyes, Jr.:
“The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.” (emphasis supplied)
In his practice, the author had personally witnessed the dismissal of criminal cases in court due to prescription, with the honorable judges applying the doctrines in Corpus and Desierto. One may therefore ask: what happens to those cases that are still pending before the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor even before these cases were published? How about cases pending before the Department of Justice which have been elevated via a Petition for Review—since the Information for cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (like Violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) have not yet been filed by the investigating prosecutor?
It must also be noted that procedural laws such as the Rules on Summary Procedure may apply retroactively as long as the effects thereof are favorable to the accused and that the said accused is not a habitual delinquent. Bearing this principle in mind, the answer to those questions, for now, is simply that all such cases will befall the same fate of dismissal due to prescription.
To the mind of the author, it is quite difficult to accept, much less to confront the client with, the reality that this is the law, that is how it has been interpreted, and that there is nothing that can be done. The author looks back at Zaldivia, and while he agrees that a rewording of the Rules is proper, he is likewise at a crossroads in determining whether it would indeed be a distortion of the meaning of the Rules to provide a different interpretation.
The author trusted that in due time, he, along with many others who may have been thinking about the same matters, would find satisfaction in how the law and these Rules had been dispensed with justice. However, it did not take too long before the Supreme Court abandoned its rulings on prescription in Corpuz, Jr. and Desierto.
In the recent case of People v. Consebido, the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, recognized the reality that the prompt resolution of cases, though ideal, may not always be the reality:
“With this dilemma, the Court takes this opportunity to pronounce that the filing of the complaint before the prosecution office and the conduct of the summary investigation should toll the running of the prescriptive period. While it is ideal that all cases are resolved promptly, the reality is that this is not done at all times, whether for valid reasons or not. The offended party, which is primarily the State, should not be prejudiced by any delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation even for cases covered by summary procedure. The Court reiterates its reasoning in People v. Olarte that “it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.””
Recognizing possible delays during preliminary investigation, the Supreme Court laid down the proper recourse for the respondent:
“As explained in Panaguiton, Jr. and reiterated in Desierto, the injured party, i.e., the government, should not be penalized for the delays in the investigation even if the complaint is timely filed. If there is undue delay in the preliminary investigation, what should be invoked by the accused is the violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases under Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution and not the prescription of the offense.”
The Supreme Court likewise held that the most favorable interpretation to the accused should be adopted with respect to laws on the prescription of crimes. Hence, the ruling in Consebido applies prospectively:
“As pointed out by Chief Justice Gesmundo during the deliberation, the prescriptive period of a penal provision is an amnesty granted by the State in favor of the defendant. It is a surrender by the State of its right to prosecute and, as such, a liberal construction in favor of the defendant is proper.
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But in line with the time-honored principle that the interpretation that is most favorable to the accused should be adopted with respect to laws on prescription of crimes, this new rule shall apply prospectively.”
To the author, this ruling corrected what may have been perceived as an inequitable rule. It realigns jurisprudence with the principles of fairness and access to justice, while still considering the favorable interpretation of the law that must be afforded to the accused. Likewise, the current rule on the issue is once more aligned with previously decided cases by the Supreme Court such as People v. Olarte, Francisco v. People, Reodica v. Court of Appeals and People, Cabelic v. Judge Geronimo, People v. Bautista. For reference, in Bautista, citing Olarte, the Supreme Court held:
“The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.”
Be that as it may, the author cannot help but think that the shift from Corpuz, Jr. and Desierto to Consebido shows the fragility of precedent in our jurisdiction, which affects real life. In the years when Corpuz, Jr. and Desierto governed, cases were in fact dismissed on the ground that prescription was not tolled by the filing of a complaint before the prosecutor, as mentioned earlier. For the complainants in those cases, the Supreme Court’s reversal in Consebido comes too late. What relief can these complainants take from the assurance that the doctrine has now been changed, when their own pursuit of justice has already been cut short?
What also crosses the mind of the author is possibly a broader concern in the Philippine legal landscape: the predictability of the law. Lawyers advise clients, chart litigation strategies, and even discuss settlements based on the stability of jurisprudence. If rulings can change from one interpretation to another within a few years, then there is a tendency for the law to become less a rule to be relied upon and more a moving target. The more difficult question, then, is whether justice is being fairly administered when outcomes turn not on the merits of a case but on the timing of its resolution.
A complainant whose case was dismissed under Corpuz, Jr. finds himself without recourse, while a similarly situated complainant today benefits from Consebido. Can it truly be said that justice has been equally dispensed when the rights of parties depend on which version of the doctrine happens to prevail at the time of filing? The stability of judicial precedents is a condition that gives legitimacy to certain conduct and decisions. While abandoning previously erroneous rulings is part of the Court’s role, the perceived cost of repeated doctrinal shifts is heavily borne by the very people the justice system is meant to protect. These are important considerations that lawyers must keep in mind, as they continue to advocate for their clients’ causes, in the quest of justice.
In all of these musings, the author remembers passages of one notable case that, for him, explains justice in a beautiful manner. The author most respectfully quotes the Supreme Court, speaking through the brilliant Justice Isagani A. Cruz, in Alonzo v. IAC:
“The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic.”
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“…we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.”
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“More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice “as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due.” That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.”
It is hoped and prayed by the author that through zealous and enthusiastic legal representation, lawyers can aid in the administration of justice and in rendering everyone his/her due.
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Author/s: Atty. Gabriel A. Adora | Litigation Department
About the author: Atty. Gabriel D. Adora is a notable legal professional with a Juris Doctor Degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He finished his Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the same school, wherein he graduated as Salutatorian and with Latin honors (cum laude).
Throughout his academic journey, Atty. Adora exhibited exceptional leadership and scholarly prowess, serving as the Executive Editor of Vol. 65 of the prestigious UST Law Review. His dedication to legal scholarship was further underscored by his consistent inclusion on the Dean’s List within the esteemed UST Faculty of Civil Law. Noteworthy among his scholarly endeavors is his published work titled “The Stepping Stones to Solve Jail Overcrowding: Limitations in Legislation and Litigation,” featured prominently in the UST Law Review Journal.
He has dedicated his professional endeavors to handling both civil and criminal litigation cases across a spectrum of judicial forums, ranging from lower courts to the apex jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as well as quasi-judicial bodies.