Case Digest

Referral to a third doctor is mandatory in case of disagreements between the findings of the company-designated physician and the employee’s physician of choice. Jurisprudence further holds that upon notification by the seafarer of his intention to refer the conflicting findings to a third doctor, the company carries the burden of initiating the process for referral to a third doctor, commonly agreed upon between the parties.

It is not proper to speak to a student in a manner of anger and dissatisfaction in words, especially in a classroom setting or even within the school grounds, where it is clear that the person was acting in their capacity as a professor.

The law categorically provides that the 120-day period for the CIR to decide the administrative claim for VAT refund runs from the date the taxpayer submits “complete documents” in support of its application for refund. The Supreme Court discussed the history of the relevant laws and concluded that it is the taxpayer who ultimately determines when complete documents have been submitted to commence and continue the running of the 120-day period.

As a supervising authority, one is expected to take the necessary precautions to ensure not just the safety of the participants but likewise third persons in the immediate vicinity who may be affected, and to take due care in supervising and instructing those participating in the activity in the execution of their tasks, especially for minor participants.

To us, dismissal should only be a last resort, a penalty to be meted out only after all the relevant circumstances have been appreciated and evaluated to ensure that the ground for dismissal was not only serious but true. The cause of termination, to be lawful, must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood.

A psychological evaluation is not indispensable in proving the infliction of psychological violence under RA 9262 because it is not one of the elements of the crime.

A nuisance candidate is one whose candidacy was lodged merely to create confusion or whose candidacy mocks or causes disrepute to the election process, hence, there is patently no intention to run for office. A candidate without the machinery of a political party or the finances to mount the nationwide campaign “cannot be lumped together with another candidate who was found to have mocked or caused disrepute to the election process.

Facts On 16 October 2019, David filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, praying that an order be issued directing respondents to produce the bodies of his and Harryvette’s two minor children, Rocco and Zahara.  Sometime in 2012, David, an Italian citizen, met Harryvette in La Union, and they began a romantic relationship. Later, they flew to Santa Fe, Bantayan Island in the Province of Cebu. Sometime in 2015, David and Harryvette’s marital relations crumbled. Haryvette alleged that David would physically abuse her, leading to their eventual separation.  In 2018, Harryvette left for Paris, France to find work. A year later, Harryvette returned to the Philippines with her new partner. Afterward, Harryvette again left for France and turned over the custody of their minor children to David.  In July 2019, Harryvette returned to the Philippines. During that time, she and her mother, Joselyn, learned that David went to Thailand for 12 days and left their children in the care of some couple in Bantayan, Cebu, without Harryvette’s knowledge and consent.  Later on, Harryvette then executed a notarized document dated September 4, 2019, authorizing Joselyn to act as the guardian of her children upon her return to Paris. On 7 October 2019, David visited Rocco and Zahara and demanded their custody from Joselyn. However, Joselyn refused his plea and insisted that she had a better right of custody than David pursuant to the authority granted her by Harryvette.  The RTC denied David’s petition and granted Harryvette exclusive parental authority over the minors and allowed only visitation rights to David.  The CA partly granted David’s appeal, declaring that he and Harryvette have joint parental authority over their minor children. Nonetheless, it upheld the RTC’s award of provisional custody to Joselyn and the grant of visitation rights to David.  Hence, this Petition.  In his Petition, David argues that the CA should have awarded them joint custody over the children as Article 213 of the Family Code does not explicitly confer to the mother sole parental authority or sole custody. David likewise contends that Harryvette should be considered “absent” within the contemplation of Art. 212 of the same Code for being away from her place of usual residence. Ruling On the issue of custody, The SC affirms the award of sole custody over the minor children to respondent Harryvette.  Contrary to David’s claims, Harryvette cannot be considered “absent” in contemplation of Art. 212 of the Family Code.  In line with the case of Espiritu, it does not follow that the parent who is in close proximity to the minor child is the most suitable to be entrusted with their care. As applied here, the mere fact that a parent is an overseas Filipino worker does not deprive them of their right to exercise parental authority or sole custody.  Respondent has not been remiss in exercising her right to parental authority and custody over their minor children despite being overseas. Respondent makes a continuous effort to communicate with their children and watch them through a CCTV system. She is also able to financially support them.  Respondent Harryvette is likewise able to exercise sole custody through the grant of provisional custody to respondent Joselyn. This springs from the respondent’s right under Art. 213 of the Family Code as their mother, and thus, is effective only while she is away.  Between respondent Joselyn and Petitioner, it is Joselyn who can better give her full and undivided attention to the minor children and provide them with an environment most conducive to their development. This is as opposed to the latter, who was deemed unfit, being a habitual drinker and smoker, and who has previously exhibited violent tendencies.

Doctrine A co-owner has the right to alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent of the other co-owners. But such alienation is limited only to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet (No one can give what he does not have).  Facts Julian and Marcela died, leaving nine children, including Isidoro. The heirs executed a “Partihan at Bilihan nang Kalahating Bahagi ng Lupang Tirahan sa Labas ng Hukuman,” and sold half of the subject property to Anastacio. The remaining quarter was occupied by Vitaliano’s children, namely, the petitioner and Fermin, while the other quarter was sold by Isidoro to respondent Spouses Garcia. Thereafter, respondent Spouses Garcia filed an ejectment case against Fermin for the ¼ of the subject property. Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, quieting of title and annulment of deed of sale against the spouses Garcia alleging that the Deed of Sale is void since Isidoro is not the true and real owner of the subject property which originally belongs to Julian’s estate. On the other hand, Spouses Garcia argued that the heirs had already agreed to divide the property among themselves when they allowed a portion of the property to be occupied by the heirs of Vitaliano. ISSUE: Whether or not Isidoro, as co-heir, can alienate his pro indiviso share of the co-owned property. Ruling Yes. It is undisputed that the subject property belongs to Julian and that upon the demise of Julian and his wife Marcela, the heirs executed a Partihan at Bilihan nang Kalahating Bahagi ng Lupang Tirahan sa Labas ng Hukuman, which sold half of the subject property to their co-heir Anastacio. As to the remaining half of the subject property, the same remains in the estate of Julian and Marcela.  Nonetheless, a co-owner may alienate an inchoate portion of the subject property that belongs to him or her. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides for the rights of co-owners over co-owned property. Thus, Isidoro, as one of Julian and Marcela’s heirs, has the right to alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent of the other co-heirs.  However, as a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. Nemo dat quod non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Hence, as correctly ruled by the courts a quo, Isidoro’s sale of the remaining half of the subject property will only affect his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. The spouses Garcia will only get Isidoro’s undivided share in the subject property.  However, Reynaldo Reyes’ recourse should have been a division of the common property. To demand a partition or division of the common property is in accord with Article 494 of the Civil Code, that is, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his or her share is concerned. The spouses Garcia, as co-owners of the 231.5 sqm subject property by virtue of the deed of sale dated August 16, 1989, executed by Isidoro in their favor, cannot claim a specific portion of the subject property before its partition. With the subsistence of co-ownership, the spouses Garcia only own Isidoro’s undivided aliquot share of the subject property. The spouses Garcia and all the co-owners cannot adjudicate to himself or herself title to any definite portion of the subject property until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree.

Facts One afternoon, AAA, who was twelve (12) years old then, was asked by her father, XXX, if she had already eaten lunch. When AAA said that she did not eat yet, XXX got angry. XXX cursed at her while asking why she did not eat yet, and then he proceeded to hit AAA with a wooden rod embedded with a nail, hitting her on the back, right arm, and right thigh. This caused AAA to cry in pain as the nail hit her with every strike.  Then, in another instance, XXX saw AAA holding a one-hundred (100) peso bill. XXX asked AAA where she got the money and she said that she got it from her Hello Kitty sling bag. At home, XXX counted the money inside AAA’s coin bank. XXX confronted AAA and her brother, BBB, who was ten (10) years old at that time, asking why the amount inside the coin bank was less than his estimation. XXX threw the coin bank at them and ordered them to go upstairs to look for any money that they might be hiding in their closet.  While they were upstairs, XXX began scolding and hurting both AAA and BBB. XXX pulled AAA’s hair, kicked her, and hit her head. XXX struck BBB with the handle of a dustpan on his left and right sides. XXX only stopped by AAA and BBB gave him the rest of their money. AAA and BBB left the house and proceeded to the home of CCC, their mother. ISSUE: Is XXX guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610? Ruling YES, XXX is guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.  When the infliction of physical injuries against a minor is done at the spur of the moment or intended to discipline or correct the wrongful behavior of the child, it is imperative that the specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human be established. In the absence of this specific intent, the offender cannot be held liable for child abuse but only for other crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, provided that all the elements of the latter are present. pay4d In this regard, to determine the presence or absence of this specific intent, the Court may consider the circumstances of the case and the manner in which the offender committed the act complained of, such as when the offender’s use of force against the child was calculated, violent, excessive, or done without any provocation. Such intention can also be derived from the disciplinary measures employed by the offender, such as when such measures are not commensurate with or reasonable to address or correct the child’s misbehavior. In this case, the Supreme Court determined that XXX committed acts that debased, degraded, or demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings.  Hitting AAA several times with a wooden rod embedded with a nail was certainly not commensurate or reasonably necessary to discipline her just because she had not eaten her lunch. In the same vein, XXX used excessive force when he pulled AAA’s hair, kicked, hit her head, and struck BBB with a dustpan multiple times just because the money saved in their coin banks was lacking.  Although XXX, as a parent, has the right to instill discipline in his minor children, still, the disciplinary measures he employed, in this case, were excessive, violent, and completely disproportionate to correct the alleged misconduct or misbehavior of his children.  His abusive acts may be considered extreme measures of punishment not commensurate with the discipline of his 12-year-old and 10-year-old children. Given these circumstances, it can be reasonably inferred that his act of laying hands on his children was done with the specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean their intrinsic worth and dignity as human beings. RELATED ARTICLE: Is pointing a gun at a child an act of abuse? | Case No. 236628