Jurisprudence

Facts On October 7, 2021, Ollesca filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of president of the Philippines in the May 9, 2022, National and Local Elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy, Ollesca stated that he is running as an independent candidate and indicated that he is an entrepreneur. On October 21, 2021, the COMELEC Law Department filed, on its own initiative, a Petition to declare Ollesca as a nuisance candidate and asked that the COMELEC deny due course to cancel Ollesca’s Certificate of Candidacy. It asserted that considering Ollesca filed his Certificate of Candidacy to run for president, he should be publicly known by numerous voters. However, he is running as an independent candidate and is “virtually unknown except possibly in the locality where he resides.” As such, he has no capability to launch a nationwide campaign to enable him to be known nationally within the campaign period and to persuade a substantial number of voters from different parts of the country. Viewed in this light, he does not appear to have any bona fide intention to run and “puts the election in mockery or disrepute.” The COMELEC Second Division granted the nuisance petition against Ollesca. It found that Ollesca, who was an independent with no political party, was unknown outside of the community he belonged to and failed to show that he had the financial capacity to “sustain a decent and viable nationwide campaign on his own.” Thus, Ollesca allegedly filed his Certificate of Candidacy “to put the election process in mockery or disrepute and, by the said act or circumstance, he has no bona fide intention to run for President. The COMELEC En Banc denied Ollesca’s Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring Ollesca as a nuisance candidate. Ruling Yes, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring Ollesca as a nuisance candidate. A nuisance candidate is one whose candidacy was lodged merely to create confusion or whose candidacy mocks or causes disrepute to the election process, hence, there is patently no intention to run for office. A candidate without the machinery of a political party or the finances to mount the nationwide campaign “cannot be lumped together with another candidate who was found to have mocked or caused disrepute to the election process. In the present case, the COMELEC again repeated its general allegation of the candidate’s lack of financial capacity to wage a national campaign to shift the burden of proof upon the candidate. It pointed to the circumstances of Ollesca’s running as an independent candidate and his being an entrepreneur, arguing that Ollesca is virtually unknown and therefore has no capacity to persuade a substantial number of the electorate, thereby proving that he has no bona fide intention to run and puts the election process in mockery. From the foregoing, it appears that the COMELEC has the propensity to employ a “cookie-cutter motion” that generally alleges a candidate’s lack of financial capacity to wage a national campaign in an attempt to shift the burden of proving bona fide intent to run for public office upon said candidate. To emphasize, the pivotal criterion that characterizes a nuisance candidate lies in the absence of a bona fide intent to run for public office and it is incumbent upon the COMELEC to identify and adduce supporting evidence of acts or circumstances that show a candidate’s lack of bona fide intent to run for public office, with the objective of “preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.” This determination is governed by the statutes, and the concept is satisfactorily defined by the Omnibus Election Code. Needless to say, the COMELEC is not precluded from considering other factors in determining a candidate’s lack of bona fide intention to run for public office, such as a candidate’s inability to organize a campaign, whether it be manifested through the lack of a nomination by an established political party, a national organization or coalition, a labor union, or similar movements. In lieu or in addition to this non-nomination, the COMELEC may also consider checking for the absence of said candidate’s past record of service. On the other hand, while a mere expression of a candidate’s desire to become an elected official does not suffice, this Court only requires a candidate to show “a significant modicum of support before his or her name is printed on the ballot.” Unfortunately, in this case, in declaring the petitioner as a nuisance candidate, the COMELEC simply relied on a general and sweeping allegation of the petitioner’s financial incapability to mount a decent and viable campaign which is a prohibited property requirement. It failed to discuss, much less adduce evidence, showing how the petitioner’s inclusion in the ballots would prevent the faithful determination of the electorate’s will.

Facts On 16 October 2019, David filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, praying that an order be issued directing respondents to produce the bodies of his and Harryvette’s two minor children, Rocco and Zahara.  Sometime in 2012, David, an Italian citizen, met Harryvette in La Union, and they began a romantic relationship. Later, they flew to Santa Fe, Bantayan Island in the Province of Cebu. Sometime in 2015, David and Harryvette’s marital relations crumbled. Haryvette alleged that David would physically abuse her, leading to their eventual separation.  In 2018, Harryvette left for Paris, France to find work. A year later, Harryvette returned to the Philippines with her new partner. Afterward, Harryvette again left for France and turned over the custody of their minor children to David.  In July 2019, Harryvette returned to the Philippines. During that time, she and her mother, Joselyn, learned that David went to Thailand for 12 days and left their children in the care of some couple in Bantayan, Cebu, without Harryvette’s knowledge and consent.  Later on, Harryvette then executed a notarized document dated September 4, 2019, authorizing Joselyn to act as the guardian of her children upon her return to Paris. On 7 October 2019, David visited Rocco and Zahara and demanded their custody from Joselyn. However, Joselyn refused his plea and insisted that she had a better right of custody than David pursuant to the authority granted her by Harryvette.  The RTC denied David’s petition and granted Harryvette exclusive parental authority over the minors and allowed only visitation rights to David.  The CA partly granted David’s appeal, declaring that he and Harryvette have joint parental authority over their minor children. Nonetheless, it upheld the RTC’s award of provisional custody to Joselyn and the grant of visitation rights to David.  Hence, this Petition.  In his Petition, David argues that the CA should have awarded them joint custody over the children as Article 213 of the Family Code does not explicitly confer to the mother sole parental authority or sole custody. David likewise contends that Harryvette should be considered “absent” within the contemplation of Art. 212 of the same Code for being away from her place of usual residence. Ruling On the issue of custody, The SC affirms the award of sole custody over the minor children to respondent Harryvette.  Contrary to David’s claims, Harryvette cannot be considered “absent” in contemplation of Art. 212 of the Family Code.  In line with the case of Espiritu, it does not follow that the parent who is in close proximity to the minor child is the most suitable to be entrusted with their care. As applied here, the mere fact that a parent is an overseas Filipino worker does not deprive them of their right to exercise parental authority or sole custody.  Respondent has not been remiss in exercising her right to parental authority and custody over their minor children despite being overseas. Respondent makes a continuous effort to communicate with their children and watch them through a CCTV system. She is also able to financially support them.  Respondent Harryvette is likewise able to exercise sole custody through the grant of provisional custody to respondent Joselyn. This springs from the respondent’s right under Art. 213 of the Family Code as their mother, and thus, is effective only while she is away.  Between respondent Joselyn and Petitioner, it is Joselyn who can better give her full and undivided attention to the minor children and provide them with an environment most conducive to their development. This is as opposed to the latter, who was deemed unfit, being a habitual drinker and smoker, and who has previously exhibited violent tendencies.

Doctrine A co-owner has the right to alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent of the other co-owners. But such alienation is limited only to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet (No one can give what he does not have).  Facts Julian and Marcela died, leaving nine children, including Isidoro. The heirs executed a “Partihan at Bilihan nang Kalahating Bahagi ng Lupang Tirahan sa Labas ng Hukuman,” and sold half of the subject property to Anastacio. The remaining quarter was occupied by Vitaliano’s children, namely, the petitioner and Fermin, while the other quarter was sold by Isidoro to respondent Spouses Garcia. Thereafter, respondent Spouses Garcia filed an ejectment case against Fermin for the ¼ of the subject property. Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, quieting of title and annulment of deed of sale against the spouses Garcia alleging that the Deed of Sale is void since Isidoro is not the true and real owner of the subject property which originally belongs to Julian’s estate. On the other hand, Spouses Garcia argued that the heirs had already agreed to divide the property among themselves when they allowed a portion of the property to be occupied by the heirs of Vitaliano. ISSUE: Whether or not Isidoro, as co-heir, can alienate his pro indiviso share of the co-owned property. Ruling Yes. It is undisputed that the subject property belongs to Julian and that upon the demise of Julian and his wife Marcela, the heirs executed a Partihan at Bilihan nang Kalahating Bahagi ng Lupang Tirahan sa Labas ng Hukuman, which sold half of the subject property to their co-heir Anastacio. As to the remaining half of the subject property, the same remains in the estate of Julian and Marcela.  Nonetheless, a co-owner may alienate an inchoate portion of the subject property that belongs to him or her. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides for the rights of co-owners over co-owned property. Thus, Isidoro, as one of Julian and Marcela’s heirs, has the right to alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent of the other co-heirs.  However, as a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. Nemo dat quod non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Hence, as correctly ruled by the courts a quo, Isidoro’s sale of the remaining half of the subject property will only affect his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. The spouses Garcia will only get Isidoro’s undivided share in the subject property.  However, Reynaldo Reyes’ recourse should have been a division of the common property. To demand a partition or division of the common property is in accord with Article 494 of the Civil Code, that is, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his or her share is concerned. The spouses Garcia, as co-owners of the 231.5 sqm subject property by virtue of the deed of sale dated August 16, 1989, executed by Isidoro in their favor, cannot claim a specific portion of the subject property before its partition. With the subsistence of co-ownership, the spouses Garcia only own Isidoro’s undivided aliquot share of the subject property. The spouses Garcia and all the co-owners cannot adjudicate to himself or herself title to any definite portion of the subject property until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree.

Facts One afternoon, AAA, who was twelve (12) years old then, was asked by her father, XXX, if she had already eaten lunch. When AAA said that she did not eat yet, XXX got angry. XXX cursed at her while asking why she did not eat yet, and then he proceeded to hit AAA with a wooden rod embedded with a nail, hitting her on the back, right arm, and right thigh. This caused AAA to cry in pain as the nail hit her with every strike.  Then, in another instance, XXX saw AAA holding a one-hundred (100) peso bill. XXX asked AAA where she got the money and she said that she got it from her Hello Kitty sling bag. At home, XXX counted the money inside AAA’s coin bank. XXX confronted AAA and her brother, BBB, who was ten (10) years old at that time, asking why the amount inside the coin bank was less than his estimation. XXX threw the coin bank at them and ordered them to go upstairs to look for any money that they might be hiding in their closet.  While they were upstairs, XXX began scolding and hurting both AAA and BBB. XXX pulled AAA’s hair, kicked her, and hit her head. XXX struck BBB with the handle of a dustpan on his left and right sides. XXX only stopped by AAA and BBB gave him the rest of their money. AAA and BBB left the house and proceeded to the home of CCC, their mother. ISSUE: Is XXX guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610? Ruling YES, XXX is guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.  When the infliction of physical injuries against a minor is done at the spur of the moment or intended to discipline or correct the wrongful behavior of the child, it is imperative that the specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human be established. In the absence of this specific intent, the offender cannot be held liable for child abuse but only for other crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, provided that all the elements of the latter are present. In this regard, to determine the presence or absence of this specific intent, the Court may consider the circumstances of the case and the manner in which the offender committed the act complained of, such as when the offender’s use of force against the child was calculated, violent, excessive, or done without any provocation. Such intention can also be derived from the disciplinary measures employed by the offender, such as when such measures are not commensurate with or reasonable to address or correct the child’s misbehavior. In this case, the Supreme Court determined that XXX committed acts that debased, degraded, or demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings.  Hitting AAA several times with a wooden rod embedded with a nail was certainly not commensurate or reasonably necessary to discipline her just because she had not eaten her lunch. In the same vein, XXX used excessive force when he pulled AAA’s hair, kicked, hit her head, and struck BBB with a dustpan multiple times just because the money saved in their coin banks was lacking.  Although XXX, as a parent, has the right to instill discipline in his minor children, still, the disciplinary measures he employed, in this case, were excessive, violent, and completely disproportionate to correct the alleged misconduct or misbehavior of his children.  His abusive acts may be considered extreme measures of punishment not commensurate with the discipline of his 12-year-old and 10-year-old children. Given these circumstances, it can be reasonably inferred that his act of laying hands on his children was done with the specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean their intrinsic worth and dignity as human beings. RELATED ARTICLE: Is pointing a gun at a child an act of abuse? | Case No. 236628

Facts Police operatives from the Philippine National Police Women and Children Protection Center (PNP-WCPC) and Anti Trafficking in Person Division formed a team to investigate and conduct surveillance in Rizal after receiving information from a confidential informant about child trafficking On March 15, 2016, the team proceeded to the area subject of the information and found Villaria and Maghirang, sitting at a table. The confidential informant called them to join the team’s table to talk. A few hours later, Maghirang asked the team if they wanted to have lady companions aged 14 to 18 for sex, with prices ranging from Php 1,000.00 for three hours to Php 3,000.00 for an overnight.  A police officer informed them that they would be back to celebrate a friend’s birthday. The accused were arrested on the agreed date after bringing several female minors to the hotel room and accepting marked money from the police. During the trial, the victims revealed that the accused enticed them to attend a party and perform sexual acts in exchange for money. The accused argued that the prosecution failed to prove they threatened, forced, or coerced the minors into prostitution. ISSUE: Is threat, force, or coercion required in child trafficking cases? Ruling NO. The elements of trafficking in persons, as derived from its definition under Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, are:  All of the elements of qualified trafficking were proven beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the victims clearly established that the appellants recruited, obtained, hired, provided, offered, and transported the minors for the purpose of “awra” or prostitution. Their testimonies were corroborated by PINSP Abana who stated that he negotiated with the accused-appellants to procure the sexual services of the victims in exchange for money at an agreed price. It was further established that all the victims were minors at the time of trafficking.  The absence of threat, force, or coercion is immaterial and irrelevant. Under Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, the crime is still considered trafficking if it involves the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation” even if the means employed are not within those outlined in the law. At any rate, accused-appellants evidently took advantage of the victims’ youth and need to earn money to obtain their consent.

Facts Sometime in 1996, Spouses Medado and the Estate of Antonio Consing, represented by Soledad Consing, executed Deeds of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage for the former’s acquisition from the latter of the property in Cadiz City. As part of the deal, Spouses Medado undertook to assume the estate’s loan with PNB. Subsequent to the sale, however, the Estate of Consing offered the subject lots to the government via the Department of Agrarian Reform’s Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) program. The Estate of Consing also instituted with the RTC an action for rescission and damages against Spouses Medado, PNB and the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City, due to the alleged failure of the spouses to meet the conditions in their agreement. In the meantime the Civil Case for rescission was pending, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) issued in favor of the Estate of Consing a certificate of deposit of cash and agrarian reform bonds, as compensation for the lots covered by the VOS. The foregoing prompted Spouses Medado to institute an action for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.  The RTC issued an Order granting Spouses Medado’s application for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Feeling aggrieved, the heirs of the late Antonio Consing questioned the RTC’s order via a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. They sought, among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint for injunction for violation of the rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping. The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion by taking cognizance of the civil case for an injunction while the civil case for rescission and damages was pending, as this violated the rule against forum shopping. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly held that the rule against forum shopping was violated by the filing of the complaint for an injunction during the pendency of the action for rescission and damages Ruling YES. Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia concur. There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendentia are present, i.e., between actions pending before courts, there exist:  Applying the foregoing, there was clearly a violation of the rule against forum shopping when Spouses Medado instituted Civil Case No. 797-C for injunction notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 00-11320 for rescission of contract and damages. All elements of litis pendentia are present with the filing of the two cases. There is no dispute that there is the identity of parties representing the same interests in the two actions, both involving the estate and heirs of the late Consing on one hand and Spouses Medado on the other. The rescission case names “Soledad T. Consing, for herself and as administratrix of the estate of Antonio Consing” as the plaintiff, with “Spouses Meritus Rey and Elsa Medado, [PNB] and the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City” as respondents.  The injunction case, on the other hand, was instituted by Spouses Medado, against “(LBP) and the Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing, as represented by Dra. Soledad Consing.” The primary litigants in the two actions, and their interests, are the same. The two other elements are likewise satisfied. There is an identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in the two cases, with the reliefs being founded on the same set of facts. In both cases, the parties claim their supposed right as owners of the subject properties. They all anchor their claim of ownership on the deeds of absolute sale which they had executed, and the law applicable thereto. They assert their respective rights, with Spouses Medado as buyers and the heirs as sellers, based on the same set of facts that involve the deeds of sale’s contents and their validity. Both actions necessarily involve a ruling on the validity of the same contract as against the same parties. Thus, the identity of the two cases is such as would render the decision in the rescission case res judicata in the injunction case, and vice versa. It does not even matter that one action is for the enforcement of the parties’ agreements, while the other action is for the rescission thereof.  WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s Decision dated September 26, 2008, which reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Cadiz City, dated March 09, 2007, is perforce AFFIRMED.

Facts On March 26, 2014, a drunk Marvin L. San Juan willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threatened the life of AAA, a fifteen year old child, by poking a gun at him without any justifiable cause. This act amounts to a crime, thereby subjecting the minor to psychological cruelty and emotional maltreatment. San Juan argued that he cannot be held liable for child abuse because the information did not allege, nor was his intention to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA proven in trial. ISSUE: Can the accused be held guilty of child abuse? With respect to the act of child abuse, Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610 provides: Ruling It is a general rule that if it is proved that the accused committed the unlawful act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with a criminal intention, and that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. However, there are certain crimes of which a specific intent to accomplish a particular purpose is an essential element. This specific intent was taken into consideration by this Court in the analysis of crimes involving violation of Section 3(b)(2) of R.A. No. 7610. Pointing a firearm towards a minor is intrinsically cruel. “Certainly, the term cruelty, in its common usage, simply means suffering that is excessive and unnecessary to the purpose to be achieved by an offender. An act that is accompanied by such a cruel act can easily be determined by the manner it was executed. It does not need an inquiry into the specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child, as being referred to under the Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610. “ When the act itself is examined based on the inherent characteristic of the act itself and the manner of its execution, and it later turns out to be intrinsically cruel, there should be no need to look into the specific intent. Again, the term cruelty, when not qualified by the terms “to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child,” may still be utilized based on its common usage.

Facts Miguel Aquino had three sons: Arturo, Rodolfo, and Abbulah. Arturo and a woman named Maria Angela Kuan Ho had relations, resulting in the birth of Angela Aquino, their illegitimate child. Maria and Arturo also had plans to get married. Sadly, Arturo passed away on January 10, 1999, before Angela was born and before he and Maria could officially marry. Though Maria and Arturo never got married, Miguel treated his granddaughter very fondly. In fact, he paid for all of Maria’s expenses during her pregnancy and had Angela live with the Aquinos in their ancestral home. Angela’s uncles, Rodolfo and Abbulah, were also quite fond of her, and Rodolfo was made to be one of Angela’s godfathers. Things changed drastically after Miguel’s death. Upon settlement of his estate, it was found that Angela was included among the heirs who would receive portions of the estate. Her uncles, Rodolfo and Abbulah, opposed this. This is because according to them: ISSUE: Can an illegitimate child inherit from his/her direct ascendants? YES. Children, regardless of their circumstances at birth, are QUALIFIED to inherit from their direct ascendants. There was no specification in the term “grandchildren” whether only legitimate children are allowed to inherit from their grandparents, so there was no need to qualify, much less restrict, the application to only legitimate grandchildren. It is unfair for an illegitimate child to be placed in an unfair situation wherein he/she is only inheriting half as much as his/her legitimate counterparts. The ponencia did away with the terms “illegitimate” and “legitimate” when referring to children based on their parent’s status. Instead, Justice Leonen used the terms “marital” and “nonmarital” children.

Facts Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo in 1968. At age 5, she was adopted by celebrity spouses Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces. She initially pursued a degree in Developmental Studies at the University of the Philippines but opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the U.S. in 1988. She immigrated to the U.S. in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares, who was based in the U.S. at the time. In 2001, she became a naturalized American citizen. In 2004, Grace Poe returned to the Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for President. After her father’s death, she and her husband decided to reside permanently in the Philippines in 2005. On 7 July 2006, Grace Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. The BI declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in her name and in the names of her three children. In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Grace Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post, she executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship” before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. The following day, she submitted the said affidavit to the BI and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, Grace Poe stopped using her American passport. On 2 October 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” She obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. On 15 October 2015, Grace Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. Her filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases. These cases argued that Grace Poe cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling, and that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. They also argued that she fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Issue ISSUE 1: Should Grace Poe be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen? YES. Grace Poe’s blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE. To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. ISSUE 2: Does Grace Poe satisfy the 10-year residency requirement of the Constitution? YES. Grace Poe’s claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true. This period of residence corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S. Ruling The petition was thus GRANTED. GRACE POE is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

Facts: Mabao was a a former teacher at BWS. She started working on June 7, 2007 as a grade school teacher. She was granted regular status in 2010.  Sometime in September 2016, Mabao approached the head of the administrative team and Deloso, the grade school principal of BWS, to discuss the matter of her pregnancy which was two months along the way. The father of Mabao’s baby was her boyfriend. In order to avoid any unpleasant remarks from the faculty and staff of BWS, Mabaoapproached them even before her bump became evident. The following day, Mabao was summoned to the conference room of BWS where Deloso verbalysuspended Mabao, telling her not to report to her classes starting the next day until she could present documents showing that she was already married to her boyfriend. Thereafter, she was summoned to the office of the head of the administrative team and was asked to receive a Disciplinary Form and a letter stating that she was indefinitely suspended without pay. Ruling of the Labor Arbiter The Labor Arbiter held that Mabao was constructively dismissed. Ruling of the NLRC The NLRC found that Mabao’s suspension is not tantamount to constructive dismissal. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s ruling that there was no constructive dismissal, but held that Mabao was illegally suspended. Issue Was Mabao illegally suspended? Did Mabao abandon her employment? Supreme Court’s Ruling Mabao was illegally suspended. In the eyes of the law, there is a standard of morality that binds all those who come before it, which is public and secular, not religious. It is important to make this distinction as the Court’s jurisdiction extends only to public and secular morality. The Court has previously ruled in similar cases that premarital sexual relations resulting in pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered disgraceful or immoral when viewed against the prevailing norms of conduct. Sexual intercourse between two consenting adults who have no legal impediment to marry, lie respondent and her boyfriend, is not deemed immoral. No law proscribes such, and said conduct does not contravene any fundamental state policy enshrined in the Constitution. Mabao’s suspension on the ground of engaging in premarital sexual relations resulting in pregnancy out of wedlock is therefore illegal. Mabao abandoned her employment. To constitute abandonment, the employer must prove that: (1) the employee failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there is a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship by some overt act. BWS gave respondent three return to work notices. Despite receipt and knowledge of the return to work notices, respondent failed to return to work. Aside from failing to return to work despite due notice, Mabao clearly manifested her desire to end her employment in her letter where she unequivocally stated that she “could no longer go back to work for the school”. The letter is respondent’s overt act manifesting her clear intention to sever her employment with petitioners.