Author name: Melissa Renee Mendiola

Facts: The CBA between Bonpack and Nagkakaisang Manggagawa SA Bonpack-Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (NMB-SUPER) states that: Bonpack and NMB-SUPER likewise agreed to establish a labor-management committee, which is a forum wherein the parties are compelled to meet at least once a month to tackle matters of mutual interest particularly those affecting labor-management relations, and/even resolve any dispute between the parties arising out of employer-employee relationship. toto macau terbesar slot gacor 777 situs toto macau terbesar toto macau situs toto gacor pg soft gacor toto macau terbesar slot qris slotgacor4d situs togel online gacor4d login slotgacor4d toto slot situs toto toto macau terbesar toto macau 4d Bonpack then unilaterally revised its old Company Rules and Regulations (CRR), purportedly to harmonize it with the new CBA. According to Bonpack, it rearranged the CRR’s layout for easy reference of the employees, and it incorporated the 120-minute grace period policy.  The revised CRR also defined the act of committing an “over break” as an offense wherein an employee “takes coffee or snack breaks of more than 15 minutes, or lunch breaks of more than one (1) hour for non-straight time and more than 30 minutes for straight time employees.” Said offense has a corresponding disciplinary action of “final written warning.”  This revised CRR was discussed in a general assembly of Bonpack’s employees conducted and held by Bonpack. However, NMB-SUPER unfavorably reacted to the implementation of the revised CRR without it being consulted at all, especially on the imposition of harsher penalties in the commission of company-defined offenses.  NMB-SUPER also claimed that Bonpack was underpaying the employees’ overtime pay by deducting their one-hour meal period from their total number of working hours with overtime. NMB-SUPER repeatedly requested from Bonpack to formally organize a labor-management committee, in order that NMB-SUPER’s concerns may be heard and be given appropriate response, but to no avail. Grievance Machinery: no settlement VA: Upheld the validity of the reformatted CRR. CA: Reversed the VA’s decision. Issues 1. Did Bonpack violate the CBA-mandated right to participate in policy and decision-making processes on matters affecting the general welfare of Bonpack’s employees? YES. It is settled that the exercise by an employer of its management prerogative is not absolute and is subject to limitations imposed by law, collective bargaining agreement, and general principles of fair play and justice. The CBA obligates Bonpack to discuss with NMB-SUPER matters that may involve decisions or policies that may adversely affect the general welfare of the members and all matters of mutual interest particularly those affecting labor-management relations.  While Bonpack indeed had management prerogatives, such prerogative was limited or regulated by the relevant provisions of the CBA, which Bonpackdid not comply with. Bonpack failed to show that it tried to reach out to the employees to obtain and consider their position on the revisions on the CRR.  Nor has Bonpack disputed that it ignored NMB-SUPER’s calls to create a labor management committee as was so required by it under the CBA, thus deliberately depriving NMB-SUPER of its right to participate in policy and decision-making processes on matters affecting the general welfare of the employees. When Bonpack conducted the general assembly with the employees, Bonpack merely discussed the revised CRR and handed copies of the same to the employees, contrary to the requirement in the CBA where such activities shall be done with NMB-SUPER in a labor-management committee forum. As such, the Court found that Bonpack never really consulted to its employees before it implemented the revised CRR. 2. Did Bonpack require its employees to observe one-hour meal breaks which resulted in the employees being underpaid? YES. Sec. 83, in relation to Sec. 85 of the Labor Code, states that the compensable eight (8) hours of work in a day does not include the sixty 60 minutes time-off for the regular meals of an employee, therefore, this statutory one-hour meal break, not being part of the normal working hours of an employee, is non-compensable. Nevertheless, the hours of work of the employees may be modified or regulated in a duly signed CBA between the employer and its employees. A CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.  As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. The CBA states that the working hours shall be eight (8) hours a day including a 30-minute meal break and two (2) 15-minute coffee breaks. This means that the meal time of the employees is divided into three shorter periods so that these periods can be considered as compensable (30-15-15).    However, Bonpack essentially admitted that it wittingly allowed the employees to consume one (1) whole hour of continuous meal break instead of the CBA-mandated 30-mute break and two 15-minutes rest periods. Bonpack, in defining the commission of “overbreak,” classified those consuming the one-hour meal break as “straight time” employees and those consuming the 30-minute meal break as “non-straight time” employees, which established two policies on hours of work and meal period. This classification permitted the “straight time” employees to lump the short meal breaks into one-hour, which is against the CBA. This classification likewise resulted in those employees rendering twelve (12) hours of work in an eight-hour work day being compensated only with three (3) hours of overtime pay instead of four (4) hours, which is also against the CBA.   In sum, the CA correctly ruled that Bonpack’s employees who worked for 12 hours in an eight-hour workday, and took the 30-minute and two 15-minute rest breaks as their meal time in accordance with the CBA, must be

Atty. Adan, counsel for defendants in a criminal case for FOPDBPI, failed to appear during a scheduled hearing. The Respondent Judge ordered and ruled that Atty. Adan’s absence thereto is to be construed as a waiver on defense’s part to cross examine prosecution’s witness.  gacor4d toto macau link gacor toto online daftar amintoto bandar togel terpercaya ixplay agen slot gacor slot thailand slot gacor akun slot gacor togel slot amintoto slot mahjong toto macau slot gacor 4d wso slot toto slot akun gacor4d slot qris situs toto angka akurat toto macau toto slot For his part, and during the presentation of the prosecution’s second witness, Atty. Adan explained that he consulted a doctor during the date of the hearing because of the pain he experienced in his eyes. However, the Judge denied Atty. Adan’s MFR to the earlier order primarily because the medcert he presented was not notarized. Moreover, the accused invoked their right to cross-examine an adverse witness which was violated when the Judge construed their counsel’s absence as a waiver of said right. They also assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 10(b) of JA Rule, whose effect was the same as that of the Judge’s order. On the other hand, the Judge said that she did not apply JA Rule in her order, but instead the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases. ISSUE: Did Counsel’s failure to attend the hearing amounted to a waiver of the constitutional right to cross examine witnesses? RULING: NO. The right of petitioners to cross-examine Nenita, being a basic and fundamental right, should be seen as paramount. While the State has the right to due process, such right should not prevail over the accused’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses when it is not shown that the accused applied machinations to unreasonably deny the prosecution of its ability to prove its case.  Nonetheless, the constitutionality of the JA Rule, not being the lis mota of the case, was not passed upon. The Court ultimately resolved that the order was valid insofar as its ground is the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, NOT the JA Rule.

Agnes, the petitioner, and Joe-Ar, the respondent, met at a restaurant in Bacolod City. Their relationship immediately developed.  slot gacor 4d situs toto slot gacor 4d agen toto amintoto login slot gacor 4d link bandar togel toto togel restoslot4d situs slot gacor togel online slot gacor 4d situs toto idn toto mahjong ways 2 situs toto gacor4d gacor4d agen toto slot situs gacor4d gacor4d slot gacor 4d angka jitu situs toto situs toto Shortly after they met, Agnes, who was just 18 at the time, was asked by her mother to go to her brother’s house and live there. Joe-Ar, who was 21 at the time, went with her. Her brother’s house was small, so Agnes and Joe-Ar had to share a bedroom. Because of this, Agnes’ family assumed that they had intimate relations and urged them to get married, which they did. After they got married, they had a child. At this point, they were living with Joe-Ar’s in laws, to which Agnes objected to as she does not like her in-laws. True enough, they did not treat her well. As their marriage developed, their relationship grew sour; Joe-Ar had a bad temper and would physically assault Agnes. Agnes moved to Cebu to escape from the abuse and to work. When she moved, she found out that Joe-Ar fooled around with different women and even had a child with one of them. Joe-Ar also failed to support their son. Hence, she filed a case for nullity of marriage under Article 36. RTC granted the petition, stating that Joe-Ar’s personality disorder, as established by the psychological report, was the cause of his incapacity to comply with marital obligations. OSG filed an MR then appealed to the CA, questioning the reliance of the RTC on the psychological report, and that it was biased since only Agnes and her sister were interviewed without any independent witnesses. CA reversed the RTC, stating that the psych, the report, and the testimony of the psychologist cannot be given credence as he was not able to interview Joe-Ar. On juridical antecedence Juridical antecedence is established by showing that the psychological incapacity exists at the time of the celebration, even if it only manifests during the marriage. There must be a TESTIMONY to describe the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior. The petitioner must show that the incapacity “IN ALL REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD” already existed at the time the marriage was celebrated. NOTE: Here, although not discussed, I think this was established by the testimony of Agnes who lived with Joe-Ar and his family as well as the psychologist. The SC said, the psychological report observed that Joe-Ar’s family background and environment nurtured and led to this type of personality. Who should the psychologist interview? The personal examination of the psychologically incapacitated spouse is not indispensable in establishing Art. 36 cases. It is enough that the totality of evidence establishes the psychological incapacity of one or both spouses. It is an accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person’s psychiatric history on collateral information, or information from sources aside from the person evaluated. Here, the persons who testified were Agnes, her sister, and the psychiatrist. These were deemed sufficient by the SC. SC said: it is only reasonable that a psychological report is based on the testimony of the petitioning spouse since she is the one who had closely observed and interacted with her partner. However, SC also clarified that evidence should also come from other sources. Here, Dr. Gerong’s psychological assessment is not only based on the petitioner, but also on another source: petitioner’s sister. Thus, psychological assessments based on testimonies of the petitioner and her sister may be given credence, unless there are reasons to believe that the testimonies are fabricated to favor the petitioner. As long as the totality of the evidence establishes the private respondent’s psychological incapacity, the dissolution of the marriage is warranted. The SC considered all of the evidence adduced as sufficient to show the psychological incapacity of Joe-Ar, hence the marriage was dissolved.

Marlon Agapito (Agapito) was employed by Aeroplus Multi-Services (Aeroplus) as a housekeeper. restoslot4d slot gacor amintoto restoslot4d restoslot4d amintoto restoslot4d amintoto link toto slot restoslot totokita3 restoslot4d restoslot4d amintoto idn slot restoslot4d amintoto slotgacor4d slot gacor 4d amintoto gacor4d slot gacor 4d restoslot4d amintoto amintoto amintoto During a meeting, Agapito asked his immediate supervisor George Constantino (Constantino) about the unfair treatment he was getting in relation to his tardiness. Constantino, already irate, uttered, “Masyado kang ma-reklamo, kung ayaw niyo ang patakaran ko lumayas ka dito!” When Agapito reported this incident to Aeroplus’ personnel office, Constantino found out about it and gave him a letter memorandum for insubordination. Agapito was later suspended for 2 weeks. When Agapito reported back to work, Darrel Mendoza (Mendoza), Aeroplus’ OIC-Personnel, told him, “Wala na tiwala sayo ang Management kaya tanggal ka na!” When Agapito asked for an explanation, Mendoza shot back with, “Basta tanggal ka na!” Consequently, Agapito Filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, and money claims. He argues that: LA: Aeroplus liable for illegal dismissal The statements of Aeroplus’ OIC-Personnel Mendoza — “Wala na tiwala sayo ang Management kaya tanggal ka na!” and “Basta tanggal ka na!” followed by his directive for petitioner to get out of the office leave no doubt that petitioner was indeed dismissed outright without due process. NLRC: Reversed; uttered words do not constituted terminationCA: Affirmed NLRC Did the words Constantino and Mendoza utter amounted to illegal dismissal? YES. In illegal dismissal cases, before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Here, Agapito categorically recounted that Aeroplus OIC-Personnel Mendoza said “Wala na tiwala sayo ang Management kaya tanggal ka na!” and “Basta tanggal ka na!,” immediately followed by an unequivocal order for petitioners to get out of the office, speak for themselves. It was an outright termination of employment without just cause and due process. Accordingly, Aeroplus Multi-Services, Inc. is found liable for the illegal dismissal of Agapito and was ordered to pay backwages, separation pay, SIL, and damages.