Trigger warning: Mentions of rape and sexual assault
Facts
The private complainant, AAA264724, was born on June 18, 2003. On the evening of October 26, 2017, while she was alone at home, the accused, Toralde—her romantic partner since June 2017—paid her a surprise visit. During the visit, Toralde insisted on engaging in sexual intercourse with AAA264724. She refused, citing her menstrual period. Persisting, Toralde dragged her to her bedroom and threatened to release a video of them kissing to her relatives if she refused. Intimidated, she gave in to his demands.
Two days later, her grandmother, BBB264724, discovered a blood-stained undershirt and confronted her. AAA264724 disclosed the incident, and together they went to the police station to file a complaint, leading to the initiation of the present case.
The defense denied the allegations and relied on the “sweetheart defense,” asserting that the sexual act was consensual because of their romantic relationship.
ISSUE: Whether the romantic relationship between the accused and the private complainant negates the charge of rape.
Ruling
“Notwithstanding the proven fact of their relationship, this Court adds posthaste that this would not necessarily establish consent. As ruled in Olesco, it is insufficient to merely prove that the accused and the victim were lovers; it must likewise be shown via compelling evidence that the victim consented to the sexual relations: ‘[t]he second [element] is as important as the first [element], because this Court has held often enough that love is not a license for lust.’ Consistently, ‘a love affair does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually violated against her will.
‘Harping on this principle, this Court, in People v. Gecomo, held:
It should be borne in mind that love is not a license for carnal intercourse through force or intimidation. Even granting that appellant and complainant were really sweethearts, that fact alone would not negate the commission of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. From a mere fiancée, definitely a man cannot demand sexual submission and, worse, employ violence upon her on a mere justification of love. A man can even be convicted for the rape of his common-law wife.
Prescinding from these concepts, the linchpin in successfully invoking the sweetheart defense is the victim’s consent to the sexual congress. Stated differently, to destroy the prosecution’s theory of rape, it is incumbent upon the defense to prove that the sexual intercourse was consensual.
To reiterate an earlier invoked principle, ‘[t]he revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint.’
Given AAA264724’s straightforward and candid testimony that the petitioner, through coercion, took advantage of her, this Court does not doubt her credibility. To iterate the ruling in People v. Talan, ‘[w]hen the victim’s testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused’s conviction.’
In fine, the particular circumstances in this case prove that, contrary to the facts in Bangayan and Monroy, no consent can be attributed to AAA264724 when she was defiled by the petitioner to gratify his selfish desires. While this Court cannot close its eyes to the sexual predisposition and awareness of this generation’s youth, its duty to uphold the welfare and protection of children against any and all forms of abuse still remains. Accordingly, petitioner must be convicted of rape.