Case Digest

Facts Respondent Sps. Ramon and Anita Viroomal obtained a loan from petitioner Manila Credit Corporation (MCC) under Promissory Note (PN) No. 7155 in the amount of 467,600.00 payable in 60 months. The loan has an interest rate of 23.36% per annum, and is secured by a real estate mortgage (REM) over Ramon’s property in Paranaque City. They later requested a loan restructuring, resulting in the execution of a second promissory note, Promissory Note No. 8351 (PN 8351), in the amount of PhP495,840 payable in 84 months at 24.99% interest per annum. The restructured amount represents the unpaid balance in PN 7155, including interests and penalty charges. When Spouses Viroomal failed to make timely authorizations, MCC demanded full payment of the outstanding obligation of PhP549,029.69 as of October 15, 2016. The spouses, however, claimed they had already paid a total of PhP1,175,638.12 and thus asked for a recomputation, but were ignored by MCC. MCC then proceeded with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, prompting Spouses Viroomal to file a complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of real estate mortgage as well as of the interest rate and other charges for being unconscionable, iniquitous, and immoral. The spouses argued that their loan obligation was already fully paid, had they not been burdened with the 36% per annum effective interest rate (EIR) and other charges which they claim were surreptitiously imposed by MCC. RTC Decision The RTC subsequently rendered a Decision in favor of Spouses Viroomal, declaring void PN 8351 and the interests compounded by MCC in PN 7155 for being grossly excessive. The spouses were thus allowed to recover from MCC overpayment in the amount of PhP417,859.58. The RTC also ordered the title in the name of MCC canceled, and Ramon’s title reinstated. CA Decision The RTC was affirmed by the CA, hence the recourse of MCC to the Court. It held that MCC imposed 36% per annum, equivalent to 3% per month effective interest rate (EIR) on respondents’ outstanding balance upon delay. The EIR was charged on top of the 1/10 of 1% of interest for each day it remains overdue, 1.5% per month penalty charge, and Php 100.00 collection fee, in addition to the stipulated 23.36% interest per annum on the principal amount. In total, MCC charged 77.46% interest per annum, which must be equitably reduced for being exorbitant and unconscionable. Issue Whether the stipulated interests, penalty charges, and the compounding of interests are valid as these were clearly expressed in the contract, which has the force of law between the parties. Ruling The Court cannot sustain the imposition of the compounded 3% monthly ElR. The evidence shows that the EIR was not indicated in PN No. 7155. MCC unilaterally imposed the EIR by simply inserting it in the disclosure statement. This is not valid and does not bind the respondents as it violates the mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil Code, which states that the validity or compliance to the contract cannot be left to the will of one of the parties. Reiterating its 2021 ruling in Megalopolis Properties, Inc. v. D’Nhew Lending Corporation, the Court held that while there is no “numerical limit on conscionability, the rate of 3% per month or 36% per annum is three times more than the 12% legal interest rate, and therefore excessive and unconscionable.” The Court added that the “willingness of the debtor in assuming an unconscionable rate of interest is inconsequential to its validity.” When MCC and the respondents executed PN No. 7155 in September 2009, the legal interest rate was fixed at l2% per annum. This rate was considered the reasonable compensation for forbearance of money. As held in Spouses Abella v. Spouses Abella, while the contracting parties may depart from the legal interest rate, any deviation therefrom must be reasonable and fair. If the stipulated interest for a loan is more than twice the prevailing legal rate of interest, it is for the creditor to prove that this rate is justified under the prevailing market conditions. No justification was offered by MCC in this case.  Further, under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, such contracts contrary to morals are inexistent and void from the beginning. In loan agreements, in particular, while the contracting parties may depart from the legal interest rate, any deviation therefrom must be reasonable and fair. “If the stipulated interest for a loan is more than twice the prevailing legal rate of interest, it is for the creditor to prove that this rate is justified under the prevailing market conditions,” held the Court. Note however that only the EIR and stipulated interest rates and penalties are declared void for being unconscionable. The very nature of the parties’ contract of loan entitles MCC to recover not only the principal amount, but also the payment of monetary interest from the respondents, as compensation for the use of the borrowed amount. Based on Article 1420 of the Civil Code, respondents’ obligation to pay the principal and the interest subsists as this can be separated from the void interests rates and charges.  For PN No. 7155, respondents have a total overpayment of Php 203,532.47. For PN No. 8351, it is void for lack of consideration as it was only executed by respondents to cover the supposed “unpaid balance” in PN No. 7155.

Facts: The CBA between Bonpack and Nagkakaisang Manggagawa SA Bonpack-Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (NMB-SUPER) states that: Bonpack and NMB-SUPER likewise agreed to establish a labor-management committee, which is a forum wherein the parties are compelled to meet at least once a month to tackle matters of mutual interest particularly those affecting labor-management relations, and/even resolve any dispute between the parties arising out of employer-employee relationship. Bonpack then unilaterally revised its old Company Rules and Regulations (CRR), purportedly to harmonize it with the new CBA. According to Bonpack, it rearranged the CRR’s layout for easy reference of the employees, and it incorporated the 120-minute grace period policy.  The revised CRR also defined the act of committing an “over break” as an offense wherein an employee “takes coffee or snack breaks of more than 15 minutes, or lunch breaks of more than one (1) hour for non-straight time and more than 30 minutes for straight time employees.” Said offense has a corresponding disciplinary action of “final written warning.”  This revised CRR was discussed in a general assembly of Bonpack’s employees conducted and held by Bonpack. However, NMB-SUPER unfavorably reacted to the implementation of the revised CRR without it being consulted at all, especially on the imposition of harsher penalties in the commission of company-defined offenses.  NMB-SUPER also claimed that Bonpack was underpaying the employees’ overtime pay by deducting their one-hour meal period from their total number of working hours with overtime. NMB-SUPER repeatedly requested from Bonpack to formally organize a labor-management committee, in order that NMB-SUPER’s concerns may be heard and be given appropriate response, but to no avail. Grievance Machinery: no settlement VA: Upheld the validity of the reformatted CRR. CA: Reversed the VA’s decision. Issues 1. Did Bonpack violate the CBA-mandated right to participate in policy and decision-making processes on matters affecting the general welfare of Bonpack’s employees? YES. It is settled that the exercise by an employer of its management prerogative is not absolute and is subject to limitations imposed by law, collective bargaining agreement, and general principles of fair play and justice. The CBA obligates Bonpack to discuss with NMB-SUPER matters that may involve decisions or policies that may adversely affect the general welfare of the members and all matters of mutual interest particularly those affecting labor-management relations.  While Bonpack indeed had management prerogatives, such prerogative was limited or regulated by the relevant provisions of the CBA, which Bonpackdid not comply with. Bonpack failed to show that it tried to reach out to the employees to obtain and consider their position on the revisions on the CRR.  Nor has Bonpack disputed that it ignored NMB-SUPER’s calls to create a labor management committee as was so required by it under the CBA, thus deliberately depriving NMB-SUPER of its right to participate in policy and decision-making processes on matters affecting the general welfare of the employees. When Bonpack conducted the general assembly with the employees, Bonpack merely discussed the revised CRR and handed copies of the same to the employees, contrary to the requirement in the CBA where such activities shall be done with NMB-SUPER in a labor-management committee forum. As such, the Court found that Bonpack never really consulted to its employees before it implemented the revised CRR. 2. Did Bonpack require its employees to observe one-hour meal breaks which resulted in the employees being underpaid? YES. Sec. 83, in relation to Sec. 85 of the Labor Code, states that the compensable eight (8) hours of work in a day does not include the sixty 60 minutes time-off for the regular meals of an employee, therefore, this statutory one-hour meal break, not being part of the normal working hours of an employee, is non-compensable. Nevertheless, the hours of work of the employees may be modified or regulated in a duly signed CBA between the employer and its employees. A CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.  As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. The CBA states that the working hours shall be eight (8) hours a day including a 30-minute meal break and two (2) 15-minute coffee breaks. This means that the meal time of the employees is divided into three shorter periods so that these periods can be considered as compensable (30-15-15).    However, Bonpack essentially admitted that it wittingly allowed the employees to consume one (1) whole hour of continuous meal break instead of the CBA-mandated 30-mute break and two 15-minutes rest periods. Bonpack, in defining the commission of “overbreak,” classified those consuming the one-hour meal break as “straight time” employees and those consuming the 30-minute meal break as “non-straight time” employees, which established two policies on hours of work and meal period. This classification permitted the “straight time” employees to lump the short meal breaks into one-hour, which is against the CBA. This classification likewise resulted in those employees rendering twelve (12) hours of work in an eight-hour work day being compensated only with three (3) hours of overtime pay instead of four (4) hours, which is also against the CBA.   In sum, the CA correctly ruled that Bonpack’s employees who worked for 12 hours in an eight-hour workday, and took the 30-minute and two 15-minute rest breaks as their meal time in accordance with the CBA, must be compensated for four hours of overtime pay.

Atty. Adan, counsel for defendants in a criminal case for FOPDBPI, failed to appear during a scheduled hearing. The Respondent Judge ordered and ruled that Atty. Adan’s absence thereto is to be construed as a waiver on defense’s part to cross examine prosecution’s witness.  For his part, and during the presentation of the prosecution’s second witness, Atty. Adan explained that he consulted a doctor during the date of the hearing because of the pain he experienced in his eyes. However, the Judge denied Atty. Adan’s MFR to the earlier order primarily because the medcert he presented was not notarized. Moreover, the accused invoked their right to cross-examine an adverse witness which was violated when the Judge construed their counsel’s absence as a waiver of said right. They also assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 10(b) of JA Rule, whose effect was the same as that of the Judge’s order. On the other hand, the Judge said that she did not apply JA Rule in her order, but instead the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases. ISSUE: Did Counsel’s failure to attend the hearing amounted to a waiver of the constitutional right to cross examine witnesses? RULING: NO. The right of petitioners to cross-examine Nenita, being a basic and fundamental right, should be seen as paramount. While the State has the right to due process, such right should not prevail over the accused’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses when it is not shown that the accused applied machinations to unreasonably deny the prosecution of its ability to prove its case.  Nonetheless, the constitutionality of the JA Rule, not being the lis mota of the case, was not passed upon. The Court ultimately resolved that the order was valid insofar as its ground is the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, NOT the JA Rule.

Agnes, the petitioner, and Joe-Ar, the respondent, met at a restaurant in Bacolod City. Their relationship immediately developed.  Shortly after they met, Agnes, who was just 18 at the time, was asked by her mother to go to her brother’s house and live there. Joe-Ar, who was 21 at the time, went with her. Her brother’s house was small, so Agnes and Joe-Ar had to share a bedroom. Because of this, Agnes’ family assumed that they had intimate relations and urged them to get married, which they did. After they got married, they had a child. At this point, they were living with Joe-Ar’s in laws, to which Agnes objected to as she does not like her in-laws. True enough, they did not treat her well. As their marriage developed, their relationship grew sour; Joe-Ar had a bad temper and would physically assault Agnes. Agnes moved to Cebu to escape from the abuse and to work. When she moved, she found out that Joe-Ar fooled around with different women and even had a child with one of them. Joe-Ar also failed to support their son. Hence, she filed a case for nullity of marriage under Article 36. RTC granted the petition, stating that Joe-Ar’s personality disorder, as established by the psychological report, was the cause of his incapacity to comply with marital obligations. OSG filed an MR then appealed to the CA, questioning the reliance of the RTC on the psychological report, and that it was biased since only Agnes and her sister were interviewed without any independent witnesses. CA reversed the RTC, stating that the psych, the report, and the testimony of the psychologist cannot be given credence as he was not able to interview Joe-Ar. On juridical antecedence Juridical antecedence is established by showing that the psychological incapacity exists at the time of the celebration, even if it only manifests during the marriage. There must be a TESTIMONY to describe the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior. The petitioner must show that the incapacity “IN ALL REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD” already existed at the time the marriage was celebrated. NOTE: Here, although not discussed, I think this was established by the testimony of Agnes who lived with Joe-Ar and his family as well as the psychologist. The SC said, the psychological report observed that Joe-Ar’s family background and environment nurtured and led to this type of personality. Who should the psychologist interview? The personal examination of the psychologically incapacitated spouse is not indispensable in establishing Art. 36 cases. It is enough that the totality of evidence establishes the psychological incapacity of one or both spouses. It is an accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person’s psychiatric history on collateral information, or information from sources aside from the person evaluated. Here, the persons who testified were Agnes, her sister, and the psychiatrist. These were deemed sufficient by the SC. SC said: it is only reasonable that a psychological report is based on the testimony of the petitioning spouse since she is the one who had closely observed and interacted with her partner. However, SC also clarified that evidence should also come from other sources. Here, Dr. Gerong’s psychological assessment is not only based on the petitioner, but also on another source: petitioner’s sister. Thus, psychological assessments based on testimonies of the petitioner and her sister may be given credence, unless there are reasons to believe that the testimonies are fabricated to favor the petitioner. As long as the totality of the evidence establishes the private respondent’s psychological incapacity, the dissolution of the marriage is warranted. The SC considered all of the evidence adduced as sufficient to show the psychological incapacity of Joe-Ar, hence the marriage was dissolved.

Marlon Agapito (Agapito) was employed by Aeroplus Multi-Services (Aeroplus) as a housekeeper. During a meeting, Agapito asked his immediate supervisor George Constantino (Constantino) about the unfair treatment he was getting in relation to his tardiness. Constantino, already irate, uttered, “Masyado kang ma-reklamo, kung ayaw niyo ang patakaran ko lumayas ka dito!” When Agapito reported this incident to Aeroplus’ personnel office, Constantino found out about it and gave him a letter memorandum for insubordination. Agapito was later suspended for 2 weeks. When Agapito reported back to work, Darrel Mendoza (Mendoza), Aeroplus’ OIC-Personnel, told him, “Wala na tiwala sayo ang Management kaya tanggal ka na!” When Agapito asked for an explanation, Mendoza shot back with, “Basta tanggal ka na!” Consequently, Agapito Filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, and money claims. He argues that: LA: Aeroplus liable for illegal dismissal The statements of Aeroplus’ OIC-Personnel Mendoza — “Wala na tiwala sayo ang Management kaya tanggal ka na!” and “Basta tanggal ka na!” followed by his directive for petitioner to get out of the office leave no doubt that petitioner was indeed dismissed outright without due process. NLRC: Reversed; uttered words do not constituted terminationCA: Affirmed NLRC Did the words Constantino and Mendoza utter amounted to illegal dismissal? YES. In illegal dismissal cases, before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Here, Agapito categorically recounted that Aeroplus OIC-Personnel Mendoza said “Wala na tiwala sayo ang Management kaya tanggal ka na!” and “Basta tanggal ka na!,” immediately followed by an unequivocal order for petitioners to get out of the office, speak for themselves. It was an outright termination of employment without just cause and due process. Accordingly, Aeroplus Multi-Services, Inc. is found liable for the illegal dismissal of Agapito and was ordered to pay backwages, separation pay, SIL, and damages.

Republic of the Philippines v. Spouses Jovito and Kathleen Bercede, G.R. No. 214223, reminds us that case law instructs that the unavailability or loss of the source documents listed higher in the list than the one being offered as the source for a petition for reconstitution must be proved by dear and convincing evidence. Sps. Bercede (Jovito and Kathleen) claims that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 4275. The property was allegedly purchased from Kathleen’s parents, evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. Kathleen’s parents, in turn, bought from Kathleen’s grandmother through an absolute deed of sale. Kathleen’s grandmother acquired the same from the heirs of the original owner, by way of an extrajudicial settlement. Thus, the subject property was still under the name of its original owner. Sps. Bercede, before the RTC, prayed for the reconstitution of OCT No. 4275. They averred that the original copy of the title (which should have been on file with the Register of Deeds) and the owner’s duplicate have both been lost and destroyed. The following documents were presented in support of the petition: a photocopy of the OCT, Tax Declaration, Tax Clearance, EJS and all the deeds of absolute sale, a Certification from the LRA-RD stating that the certificate of title covering the subject property was no longer available (either that it was burned or lost during the World War), and a Certification from the DENR which indicated the geographic position and plane coordinates of the cadastral survey covering the subject property. The Republic sought to dismiss the petition, arguing: The petition was granted by the RTC. LRA Certification confirmed the loss or destruction of the certificate of title. The spouses have shown that they have an interest over the property through the subsequent transfers, which culminated in their ownership. The Tax Dec, in relation to the photocopy of the OCT, means that the title is still in force and that the area and boundaries of the property are the same as those contained in OCT No. 4275. The republic appealed, interposing, among others the supposed intercalations and erasures on the photocopy of the OCT even if the RA 26 requires that the certificate of title should be free from apparent erasures and alterations. However, their appeal was denied by the CA. The Republic maintains that the spouses failed to prove that the owner’s duplicate of OCT was also missing, because the certificate by the LRA refers solely to the original supposed to be on its file, and resorting to a mere photocopy is unjustified. THE PETITION WAS GRANTED. The SC reversed the CA and the RTC, denying the petition for reconstitution. The purpose of reconstitution is to enable, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the reproduction of the lost or destroyed Torrens certificate in the same form and in exactly the same way it was at the time of the loss or destruction. In Denila v. Republic, the SC held that substantial compliance with jurisdictional requirements is not enough, because the acquisition of jurisdiction over a reconstitution case hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law. Both the RTC and the CA did not make any categorical ruling on whether the spouses have established that they failed to secure or find the documents mentioned paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 2 to justify their resort to a photocopy of OCT No. 4275. In fact, when Kathleen testified, it was shown that their only basis for seeking reconstitution of their title is that it was lost and destroyed based on the June 3, 2008 Certification issued by the LRA that the said OCT is not on their file. Based on this fact alone, the petition for reconstitution should have been dismissed by the RTC and should not have prospered. On this score, case law instructs that the unavailability or loss of the source documents listed higher in the list than the one being offered as the source for a petition for reconstitution must be proved by credible and convincing evidence. Therefore, the party praying for the reconstitution of a title must show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such documents and failed to find them before presentation of ‘other documents’ as evidence in substitution is allowed.

People of the Philippines v. Antonio M. Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, reminds us that the GSIS Act of 1997 punishes the heads of the offices of the national government, as well any employees of these offices who are responsible for collecting payments due to the GSIS but willingly fail or refuse to do so. Antonio M. Talaue, Efren C. Guiyab and Florante A. Galasinao were the mayor, treasurer, and municipal accountant, respectively, of Sto. Tomas, Isabela. They were accused by the GSIS of failing to remit the GSIS premium contributions of the employees working for the municipality’s government office, which is considered as a criminal act under the R.A. 8291, of the GSIS Act of 1997. During the trial, the prosecution presented Araceli Santos (Santos) as one of its witnesses. Santos is the Branch Manager of GSIS, Cauayan, Isabela Branch. She found that the municipal government failed to remit the total amount of P22,436,546.10, inclusive of interests, from the period of 01 January 1997 to 31 January 2004. She further stated that the agency head, treasurer, and accountant are in charge of remitting the contributions to the GSIS, and that the Mayor should have received the notices and demand letters and relayed its contents to the mentioned officers accordingly. Meanwhile, the defense presented accused Galasinao as its witness, who claimed he was not mandated by law to remit the GSIS contributions of the municipal employees. He claimed that the Municipal Treasurer, co-accused Guiyab, was responsible for remitting the GSIS contributions as it is the latter’s duty to manage the municipality’s funds. However, Guiyab had already passed away during the pendency of the case. Talaue was also presented by the defense as a witness and claimed to have told Guiyab to start paying the GSIS while the case was still ongoing, and that funds were already allocated for this purpose. He also claimed that payments have already been made to the GSIS, and that the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which was duly approved by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 118. Talaue concluded that he was not criminally liable, as the MOA, which supposedly supersedes all previous agreements, converted the municipality’s obligation to the GSIS as a loan instead of an unpaid obligation. This loan is said to be paid on a scheduled basis and subject to the reconciliation of accounts and data.  The Sandiganbayan acquitted accused Galasinao based on reasonable doubt, but found Talaue guilty of the crime charged. The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s Decision.  The GSIS Act of 1997 penalizes the heads of the offices of the national government, as well as any employees responsible for the collection of payments due the GSIS, who refuse, fail, or delay said accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from the time they have become due and demandable.  According to the Supreme Court, a municipal government is still part of the national government, and as the Mayor of Sto. Tomas, Isabela, Talaue is undoubtedly considered the head of office. The task of ensuring the remittance of accounts due the GSIS is, therefore, as much a burden and responsibility of the mayor as it is the burden and responsibility of those personnel who are involved in the collection of premium contributions. Congress purposely included heads of office in the list of those liable in order to create a sense of urgency on their part and deter them from passing the blame to their subordinates.  Unfortunately, Talaue’s testimony revealed a pattern of passing the buck to the municipal treasurer and contenting himself with repeating his oral instructions to make arrangements with the GSIS. It was only during the pendency of the civil case filed by the GSIS against him, his co-accused, and the municipality, that he instructed the treasurer to pay the municipality’s obligations, albeit in partial amounts.  Talaue’s failure to take drastic measures to rectify the situation and demand accountability betrays his nonchalance at the treasurer’s apparent lack of sense of urgency in complying with the law which appellant himself is equally, if not primarily, bound to observe. It cannot, therefore, be said that he did not intend to fail in remitting the contributions. His attitude toward the situation and toward the ineptitude of the municipal treasurer was the very recipe for failure. Moreover, while it may have been through Talaue’s initiative that the GSIS eventually restructured the obligations of the municipality through the MOA, said agreement only finds relevance with respect to the civil liability of the municipality and of the accused. This makes him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the GSIS Act of 1997, as he and the other employees tasked with collecting the GSIS contributions are responsible for ensuring the premiums are paid and/or sent to the GSIS on time.

The case of People of the Philippines v. Samiah S. Abdulah, G.R. No. 243941, reminds us that the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 provides steps in the chain of custody that must be strictly followed in order to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of seized items. On November 20, 2014, at 1:30 PM, an informant reported to the District Anti-Illegal Drug of the Eastern Police District about two girls selling illegal drugs in Marikina City. Police Officer 3 Erich Joel Temporal (PO3 Temporal) was tasked to go with the informant to investigate. At the area, the informant introduced PO3 Temporal to EB and Samiah S. Abdulah (Abdulah), who were using code names at the time. The informant told the sellers that he was interested in buying shabu; however, EB and Abdulah told PO3 Temporal to return the next day, as they did not have shabu at the time. A buy-bust team was formed accordingly, and PO3 Temporal was given a P500.00 bill to be used as buy-bust money. The team returned to the target area the next day. Abdulah then approached PO3 Temporal and asked about his order. The officer handed her the P500.00 bill, which she then passed to EB. EB placed the money in a sling bag and retrieved from it a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, which she handed to the officer. At this, PO3 immediately introduced himself as a police officer and apprehended Abdulah and EB. He seized the sling bag from EB, recovering the buy-bust money and another sachet of white crystalline substance. Believing that the area was unsafe for being “a Muslim area,” the team brought Abdulah and EB to the barangay hall where they marked, inventoried, and photographed the seized items. This was witnessed by Barangay Tanod Reynaldo Garcia, Barangay Kagawad Francisco delos Santos, Abdulah, and EB. Abdulah and a child in conflict with law (CICL) identified as “EB” were charged with violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, and the trial court found the accused Samiah Abdulah and CICL EB guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 5, Article II, of R.A. 9165. Aggrieved, Abdulah appealed the decision and argued that the arresting authorities failed to comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. She pointed out that the inventory and photographs were taken only at the barangay hall, without the presence of representatives from the media or the National Prosecution Service. The Supreme Court agreed with the contentions of Abdulah and it reversed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court ruled that the chain of custody requirements as written in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 ensures the integrity of the seized items. The integrity of the seized items cannot be trusted if there are procedural lapses in the chain of custody. In this case, the buy-bust team did not mark the seized drugs immediately after Abdulah and EB’s arrest. Instead, they did so once they got to the barangay hall; they had refused to do it in the area of arrest because it was “a muslim area.” The prosecutor’s attempt to justify the procedure lapse is too weak and enforces a bigoted view towards Muslim people. The team also failed to bring representatives of the media and the National Prosecution Service to serve as witnesses when they market the seized items; in fact, the team did not exert any effort into calling in these representatives. Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty to justify noncompliance with the law’s mandate. As long as there is still reasonable doubt on the accused’s culpability, he or she should continue to be presumed innocent. The presumption of innocence cannot be overcome by merely relying on the weakness of the defense, and the prosecution’s duty to prove the accused’s criminal liability must rise or fall upon its own merits. Thus, Samiah S. Absulah was ACQUITTED by the Supreme Court for the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She was then released from detention.