Sadsad Tamesis Legal and Accountancy Firm

Case Digest

What are the Requirements of an Employer-Employee Relationship?: Ditiangkin, et. al. vs. Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc.

Ditiangkin, et. al. vs Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc., G.R. No. 246892, reminds that when the status of an employment is in dispute, the employer bears the burden to prove that the person whose service it pays for is an independent contractor rather than a regular employee with or without fixed terms.  In February 2016, Chrisden Cabrera Ditiangkin and several others were hired as riders by Lazada E-Services Philippines, Inc. They were primarily tasked to pick up items from sellers and deliver them to Lazada’s warehouse. Each of them signed an Independent Contractor Agreement which states that they will be paid P1,200.00 per day as service fee. The contractor states that they are engaged for a period of one year and that they’ll be using their privately-owned motorcycles for their trips.  Sometime in January 2017, the riders were told that they will no longer be given any schedules. They still reported for work for three days until they learned that their routes were given to other employees. The riders filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission against Lazada for illegal dismissal. Lazada argued that the riders were not regular employees but independent contractors. It also explained that after the surge of deliveries during the Christmas season, the demand decreased to its normal rate by January. Because of this, it had to reorganize the schedule to ensure all the riders will have a trip. It argued that the riders misunderstood the temporary team assignments as termination. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Lazada, while the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint. Despite this, the riders filed a Petition before the Supreme Court, asserting that they are regular employees and that there is an employer-employee relationship present. This is proven through the presence of all four factors of the four-fold test, which includes the following: the employer’s selection and engagement of the employee; the payment of wages; the power to dismiss; and the power to control the employee’s conduct. Furthermore, the riders also claimed that there is economic dependence in their employment with Lazada. Because they work twelve hours a day and six days a week, they are unable to gain other employment. This made them solely reliant on their employment with Lazada for income. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the riders and said Lazada failed to discharge their burden of proving that the riders were independent contractors, and that they didn’t fall under any of the categories of independent contractors.  The Court also found that all four factors of the four-fold test were indeed present. First, petitioners were directly employed by Lazada instead of engaged by a third-party; second, they received their salaries of P1,200.00 for each day of service; third, Lazada stated in the contract that it had the power to dismiss the riders; and fourth, Lazada had control over the means and methods of the performance of the riders’ work. It required the accomplishment of a route sheet and the submission of trip tickets and incident reports. The riders all risked a penalty of P500.00 if an item was lost, on top of its actual value. Finally, the court held that the services performed by the riders were integral to Lazada’s business, and that there is economic dependence in their employment with the company. As a result, this Petition for Review was GRANTED. The Supreme Court ordered Lazada to reinstate Ditiangkin et al to their former positions and pay their full back wages and other benefits.

What are the Requirements of an Employer-Employee Relationship?: Ditiangkin, et. al. vs. Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc. Read More »

Infidelity and Psychological Violence: Jarupay vs. People of the Philippines

Jarupay vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 247429 is an example of how psychological violence can be inflicted on someone through marital infidelity. By committing marital infidelity, the accused would be inflicting emotional anguish and mental suffering to his or her spouse. The complainant, AAA, and the accused, Jaime Araza y Jarupay, were married on October 5, 1989. AAA had no marital issues with Araza until he went to Zamboanga City for their networking business. One day, AAA received a text message stating that Araza was having an affair with their best friend. She went to Zamboanga to see for herself whether it was true, and was able to confirm that her husband was living with another woman named Tessie Luy Fabillar. AAA instituted a complaint against Araza and his alleged mistress for concubinage. The case was subsequently amicably settled after the parties executed an Agreement whereby Araza and Fabillar committed themselves never to see each other again. After the case was settled, Araza came to live with AAA again. However, it wasn’t long before Araza left once more. Out of desperation, AAA sought the help of the NBI to search for him. To her surprise, Araza had returned to live with his mistress again.  Based on the NBI agent’s investigation, Araza and his mistress, Fabillar, had been living together as husband and wife. Three children were born out of their affair. The truth caused AAA emotional and psychological suffering. She suffered from insomnia and asthma. At the time of the case, she was still taking anti-depressants and sleeping pills to cope with the psychological turmoil brought about by Araza’s marital infidelity. She then filed a case against Araza for Violence Against Women and Children on the grounds of psychological violence caused by his infidelity. Araza is fully liable for the crime of Violence against Women and their Children. One of the grounds for VAWC is psychological violence, as stated in Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. The law requires that the emotional anguish and mental suffering of the victim be proven. This is done by requiring the testimony of the victim to be presented in court.  The prosecution has established Araza’s guilt by proving that he committed psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA’s testimony was strong and credible, and her emotional anguish and mental suffering came to the point where even her health condition was adversely affected. As a result, the RTC found Araza guilty of the crime of violence against women under Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The CA denied Araza’s appeal and motion for reconsideration.

Infidelity and Psychological Violence: Jarupay vs. People of the Philippines Read More »

Sexual Harassment and the Safe Spaces Act: Escandor vs People of the Philippines

The case of Escandor vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211962, reminds us that the core of sexual harassment in the workplace is the abuse of power by a superior over a subordinate. This is specified and penalized by Republic Act No. 7877, also known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.  Mrs. Cindy Sheila Cobarde-Gamallo was a Contractual Employee of the NEDA Regional Office No. 7 for the UNICEF-assisted Fifth Country Program for Children. Meanwhile, Jose Romeo C. Escandor was a public officer and the Regional Director of ENDA Regional Office No. 7.  Escandor was charged with violating Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. Allegedly, he committed several acts of sexual harassment from July 1999 until November 2003, when Gamallo resigned from her job. These acts include but are not limited to: touching her without her consent, such as grabbing her hands or thigh, embracing her and kissing her on the forehead; telling her that if it were possible, he would have prevented her marriage with her husband; asking her on dates; sending her sexually suggestive messages; telling her that he was in love with her; giving her gifts of chocolates, wine, and a bracelet on Christmas; and grabbing her on a stairway and kissing her on the lips during an office Christmas party in 2002.  In his defense, Escandor testified that he never committed any of the acts that Gamallo accused him of doing. In fact, he asserted that the case was a plan hatched by several employees to oust him and his wife from the office.  The Sandiganbayan found Escandor guilty of sexual harassment. It gave credence to Gamallo’s testimony, noting that “there is nothing in the records that would indicate that Gamallo is dishonest or untruthful.” Escandor was sentenced to six months of imprisonment, as well as a fine of Php20,000.00. Escandor filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the Sandingbayan, leading to the creation of this petition. Despite his attempts to reconsider his verdict, Escandor’s guilt for sexual harassment was established beyond reasonable doubt. According to the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, three requirements must be met before someone can be convicted fo sexual harassment. Firstly, the accused must have authority, influence, or moral ascendancy over the victim. Secondly, the authority, influence, or moral ascendancy must be in a work, training, or education-related environment. Finally, the accused must make a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor from the victim. This case fulfills all three requirements to convict Escandor for sexual harassment. Though Escandor was not her immediate superior, he nonetheless had authority over Gamallo at their workplace. This fulfills the first two requirements. His actions, such as asking her out on dates and sending her unsolicited text messages alluding to sex, amounted to a request for sexual favors, fulfilling the third requirement. It should also be noted that R.A. No. 11313, also known as the Safe Spaces Act, does not undo or abandon the definition of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877, or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995. Instead, these two acts cover separate instances of sexual harassment. While the Safe Spaces Act punished acts of sexually harassing someone based on sexual orientation, gender identity and/or expression, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 punishes abuse of authority, influence or moral ascendancy to enable the sexual harassment of a subordinate. As a result, Escandor’s Petition for Review on Certiorari was DENIED by the Supreme Court. His punishment of imprisonment of six months and a fine of P20,000.00 remained.

Sexual Harassment and the Safe Spaces Act: Escandor vs People of the Philippines Read More »

LBC Express-Vis, Inc. vs. Palco

The case of LBC Express-Vis, Inc. vs. Palco, G.R. No. 217101, reminds that an employee is considered constructively dismissed if he or she was sexually harassed by her superior and her employer failed to act on his or her complaint with prompt and sensitivity. Monica C. Palco started working for LBC Express-Vis Inc. on January 16, 2009 as a customer associate in its Gaisano Danao Branch. Her immediate superior, Arturo A. Batucan, then started to flirt with and sexually harass her. The final straw, however, was when Batucan sneaked in on Palco while she was working, held her on her hips and attempted to kiss her lips. While she shielded herself on his first attempt, he managed to kiss her lips on his second.  Bothered by the incident, she reported the incident to the LBC Head Office in Lapu Lapu City. When management did not immediately act on her complaint, Palco resigned. She asserted that she was forced to quit since she no longer felt safe at work. She then filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against the company and a Complaint for sexual harassment before the Danao City Prosecutor’s Office.  The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Palco.  The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed with modification but reduced the amount of moral damages to P50,000.00. This decision was also upheld by the Court of Appeals.  LBC then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that it should not be held liable for constructive dismissal. It pointed out that it did not know of, participate, or consent to Batucan’s acts towards Palco and only learned of his acts after Palco reported it. It also asserted that four months was not an unreasonable period to resolve a sexual harassment complaint.  Palco maintained that she was constructively dismissed. Constructive dismissal is a situation that occurs when an employee is forced to leave or quit his or her job due to the employer creating a hostile working environment. The resignation was not voluntary but was instead done to protect the employer, effectively making it a termination. If an employee wishes to assert that his or her resignation is a constructive dismissal, he or she will have to show how the employer created a hostile working environment for him or her. One of the ways a hostile working environment can be created is through the sexual harassment of an employee.  Batucan held a high position in the company and was Palco’s immediate supervisor when he sexually harassed her. Thus, he represented the company when he created a hostile working environment for Palco. Although the company cannot be solely held liable for Batucan’s actions, R.A. 7877, otherwise known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act, states that if the employer was informed of the acts of its managerial staff and does not contest or question it, it is deemed to have authorized or be complicit to the acts of its erring employee. Palco contends that LBC was insensible and acted in bad faith in failing to immediately act on her complaint. It took management four months and three weeks to resolve the matter, when a constructive dismissal case had already been filed.  As a result, the petition was DENIED by the Supreme Court. Monica C. Palco is found to have been constructively dismissed. LBC Express-Vis, Inc., is hereby adjudged liable to Monica C. Palco for separation pay, backwages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, as awarded by the National Labor Relations Commission in its Decision dated May 31, 2012.

LBC Express-Vis, Inc. vs. Palco Read More »

Cecilia D. Mendoza vs. Atty. Cesar R. Santiago, Jr.

Cecilia D. Mendoza vs. Atty. Cesar R. Santiago, Jr., A.C. No. 13548, reminds notaries public that the act of notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary public must observe the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of the document would be undermined. The complainant, Celia D. Mendoza, claims she is one of the heirs of Adela Espiritu-Barlaan, who died intestate on September 4, 2020. Adela Espiritu-Barlaan had no descendant or ascendant, but she did have siblings. She also left a parcel of land with an area of 247 square meters. On October 25, 2013, Gemma S. Barlaan executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver and Transfer of Rights (EJS), adjudicating to themselves the subject property. The EJS was acknowledged before and notarized by the respondent, Atty. Cesar R. Santiago, in his notarial book. A Transfer Certificate of Title was then issued in the name of John Alexander Barlaan. John Alexander Barlaan sold 147 square meters of the subject property to Monette Abac Ramos for P3,130,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 26, 2014. On March 12, 2015, John Alexander Barlaan executed another Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same subject property in favor of Monette Abac Ramos for Pl,500,000.00. Both Deeds of Sale were acknowledged before and notarized by Atty. Cesar R. Santiago in his notarial book. Monette Abac Ramos then filed a Complaint for Ejectment dated May 12, 2015 after discovering that the 147-square meter property was occupied by other relatives of Adela Espiritu-Barlaan. Attached to the Complaint was her Judicial Affidavit, showing her first deed of sale. She won the ejectment case, making the defendants vacate the property. On June 23, 2017, Celia D. Mendoza filed the instant Complaint, claiming that his act of notarizing the two Deeds of Sale is a violation of 2004 Notarial Practice Rule and CPR. Atty. Cesar R. Santiago then argued that:  The IBP-CBD found the act of notarizing the First and Second Deeds of Sale violated the 2004 Notarial Practice Rule and CPR, especially as the act was done to minimize his client’s liability from paying taxes. Thus, they recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, and that his notarial commission be revoked for two years. The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Cesar R. Santiago should additionally be disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for two years. Thus, respondent Atty. Cesar R. Santiago, Jr is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and Canon VI of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability.

Cecilia D. Mendoza vs. Atty. Cesar R. Santiago, Jr. Read More »

Case Digest | KNUTSON VS. FLORES

Randy Michael Knutson, acting on behalf of minor Rhuby Sibal Knutson vs. Hon. Elisa R. Sarmiento-Flores, in her capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 69, Regional Trial Court, Taguig City, and Rosalina Sibal KnutsonG.R. No. 239215 | 12 July 2022 FACTS: Randy Michael Knutson (Randy), an American Citizen, met Rosalina Siba Knutson (Rosalina) in Singapore. They got married and had a daughter named Rhuby. The family lived in the Philippines. Randy and Rosalina became estranged after he discovered her extra-marital affairs, but Randy supported Rosalina and Rhuby. Rosalina got hooked in casinos and incurred large debts from casino financiers prompting her to sell the house and lot, condominium unit, and vehicles that Randy provided for the family. Rosalina rented an apartment and got herself a boyfriend. Randy advised Rosalina to be discreet in her illicit affairs because it is not good for Rhuby to see her mother with another man. Randy discovered later that Rosalina hurt Rhuby by pulling her hair, slapping her face and knocking her head. One time, Rosalina pointed a knife at Rhuby and threatened to kill her. Rosalina even texted Randy about her plan to kill their daughter and commit suicide. Randy reported the matter to the police station but the authorities explained that they cannot assist him in domestic abuse. The neighbors of Rosalina complained about noisy parties and pot sessions in her apartment. The lessor even terminated the lease after marijuana plants were confiscated in the premises. On December 7, 2017, Randy, on behalf of minor Rhuby, filed against Rosalina a petition under RA No. 9262 for the issuance of Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders before the RTC. Randy averred that Rosalina placed Rhuby in a harmful environment deleterious to her physical, emotional, moral, and psychological development. RTC Ruling: Dismissed the petition, explaining that protection and custody orders in RA No. 9262 cannot be issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child. It ratiocinated that the child’s mother cannot be considered as an offender under the law. Moreover, the remedies are not available to the father because he is not a “woman victim of violence”. Randy moved for a reconsideration but it was denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether the father can avail of the remedies under RA No. 9262 on behalf of his minor child against the mother’s violent and abusive acts.2. Whether RA No. 9262 covers a situation where the mother committed violent and abusive acts against her own child. RULING: 1. RA No. 9262 allows the father of the offended party to apply for protection and custody orders. In Garcia vs. Drilon, Section 9(b) of RA No. 9262 explicitly allows “parents or guardians of the offended party” to file a petition for protection orders. The statute categorically used the word “parents” which pertains to the father and the mother of the woman or child victim. Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget. The law speaks in clear language and no explanation is required. There is no occasion for the Court to interpret but only to apply the law when it is not ambiguous. Similarly, the statute did not qualify on who between the parents of the victim may apply for protection orders. Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, the courts must not distinguish. In any event, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC states that the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner to petitions for protection orders. 33 Under Section 5, Rule 3 of Rules of Court, “[a} minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad !item.” In this case, the title of the petition for issuance of a protection order is unequivocal, to wit: “RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON acting on behalf of minor RHUBYSIBAL KNUTSON, Petitioner, -versus- ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON, Respondent.“ There is no question that the offended party is Rhuby, a minor child, who allegedly experienced violence and abuse. Thus, Randy may assist Rhuby in filing the petition as the parent of the offended party. 2. RA No. 9262 covers a situation where the mother committed violent and abusive acts against her own child. Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 defines violence against women and their children as: “any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.” The law criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e., husband; former husband; or any person who has or had sexual or dating relationship with the woman, or with whom the woman has a common child. However, the Court in Garcia emphasized that the law does not single out the husband or father as the culprit. The statute used the gender-neutral word “person” as the offender which embraces any person of either sex. The offender may also include other persons who conspired to commit the violence, thus:  As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan [588 Phil.

Case Digest | KNUTSON VS. FLORES Read More »

Case Digest | ALEXANDER vS. SPS. ESCALONA

ALEXANDER vs. SPS. ESCALONAG.R. No. 25614119 July 2022 FACTS: Spouses Jorge and Hilaria Escalona were married on November 14, 1960. They acquired unregistered parcels of land in Olongapo City (Lots 1 and 2). Jorge waived his rights over Lot 1 to this illegitimate son, Reygan. A few years later, Reygan relinquished his right over Lot 1 to petitioner Belinda. Reygan also transferred Lot 2 to Belinda. They entered into a deed of sale covering lots 1 and 2. The spouses confronted Belinda and said that Reygan cannot validly sell the lots, while Belinda invoked the validity of her contracts with Reygan. The spouses filed a complaint for annulment of documents with damages against Belinda since: (1) Hilaria did not consent to the waiver of rights to Reygan as to Lot 1, (2) They never sold Lot 2 to a third person.  RTC upheld the transactions between Belinda and Reygan, ruling that the action to annul the documents have already prescribed. The CA reversed the RTC’s judgment. ISSUE: 1. What rules shall govern the status of a contract and the prescriptive period of an action when the husband and wife were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, but the alienation or encumbrance of the property transpired after the effectivity of the Family Code without the spouse’s consent?  2. What is the reckoning point of the applicable law — is the date of the marriage or the time of the transaction?  RULING: The SC held that the governing law is the Family Code. More than the date of marriage of the spouses, the applicable law must be reckoned on the date of the alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property made without the consent of the other spouse.  Under the Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the wife has the option to ask the courts for the annulment of contracts of the husband entered into without her consent. Hence, under the Civil Code, the transaction would have been simply voidable, and the wife has ten (10) years to cause the annulment of such contract. Under the Family Code, however, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property is void.  So when the alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without the wife’s consent, is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the said alienation or encumbrance is not void but merely voidable. The applicable laws are Art. 166 and 173 of the Civil Code. However, when made after the effectivity of the Family Code, it is void. The applicable law is Article 124 of the Family Code. The Family Code expressly repealed the relevant portions of the Civil Code, insofar it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights therein. A vested right refers to a present and fixed interest which is protected against arbitrary state action, covering legal or equitable title to enforce a demand as well as exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Hence, a new law cannot be invoked to prejudice or affect a right that has become vested while the old law was still in force. If Reygan and Belinda had vested rights, even the effectivity of the Family Code cannot impair their rights, which is expressly provided by the Family Code itself. However, they have no vested right since: the transaction for Lot 1 happened during the effectivity of the Family Code, and Hilaria did not give her written consent to these contracts. Hence, any alienation therein is actually void. The alienation of Lot 2 is likewise void since it was made without the Spouses Escalona’s consent.

Case Digest | ALEXANDER vS. SPS. ESCALONA Read More »

Case Digest | MARIA VICIA CARULLO-PADUA VS. JOSELITO PADUA

FACTS: Petitioner Maria Vicia Carullo-Padua (Maria) and respondent Joselito Padua (Joselito) were married, and their union produced a son. On July 17, 1997, Maria filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage with the trial court anchored on Art. 36 of the Family Code. Maria alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Joselito was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. During their cohabitation, Joselito exhibited excessive sexual desire and forced her to perform oral and anal sex with him; that there were occasions when respondent attempted to sexually molest her sister, nieces and their household help who were staying with them; that respondent admitted to said attempts of molestations but begged her to keep said incidents a secret; and at one point, at the heat of their quarrel, Joselito attempted to kill Maria by threatening to stab her with a letter opener. Maria also alleged that Joselito failed to provide financial support for her and their child as well as emotional and psychological support. Hence, Maria filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Joselito. During trial, Petitioner presented herself and psychiatrist Dr. Villegas as witnesses. Dr. Villegas testified that she diagnosed Joselito with a personality disorder of a sexual deviant or perversion based on Maria’s narrations. Dr. Villegas added that the psychological disorder of Joselito is grave, serious, and not clinically curable which rendered him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The trial court denied the petition, it held that the evidence adduced by Maria failed to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the validity of her marriage with respondent. On appeal, the appellate court sustained the judgment of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether the totality of evidence presented by Maria is sufficient to prove that Joselito is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Maria. RULING: No. Republic v Iyoy instructs that the psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) Gravity – it must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;(b) Juridical Antecedence – it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and(c) Incurability – it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In concluding that the husband was psychologically incapacitated, the Supreme Court used the following parameters (Tan-Andal guidelines) in determining what constitutes psychological incapacity:(1) The psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of marriage;(2) Caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed prior to their marriage;(3) Caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause; and(4) Proven by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, as categorically declared by the Court, expert testimony or the testimony of a psychologist/psychiatrist is no longer required to prove psychological incapacity. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the spouses’ lives before they contracted marriage may testify on their observations as to the incapacitated spouse’s behavior. What is important is that the totality of evidence is sufficient to support a finding of psychological incapacity. Using the foregoing yardsticks, the Supreme Court reviewed the totality of evidence presented by Maria and found that the same was miserably wanting to sustain the conclusion that Joselito was psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of marriage. The psychiatrist’s description of Joselito’s parents’ traits does not give this Court a deeper intuitive understanding of Joselito’s psychological state. Notably, there was no information how Joselito reacted towards the supposed contrasting personalities of his parents during his formative years. Neither was there any account as to how the said contrasting parenting behavior affected Joselito’s social, intellectual, moral, and emotional growth. To emphasize, the testimonies of ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage should include behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. Here, not only was there no interview or psychological test conducted upon Joselito, there was nobody who testified on vital information regarding his personality structure, upbringing and childhood such as members of his family, relatives, friends, and co-workers. The evaluation of Dr. Villegas on Joselito was based merely on information, accounts and descriptions relayed solely by Maria which glaringly and expectedly are biased.

Case Digest | MARIA VICIA CARULLO-PADUA VS. JOSELITO PADUA Read More »

Case Digest | REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOHN ARNEL H. AMATA

FACTS: John Arnel H. Amata (Respondent) and Haydee N. Amata (Haydee) met at Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, eventually became sweethearts, and got married. They are blessed with three children. Respondent’s and Haydee’s marriage was blissful at the incipient but eventually turned sour. After an alleged affair was discovered by Haydee, she became suspicious of respondent and started to secretly check his cellular phone. Respondent, feeling betrayed and angry about his spouse’s action, packed his things, left their abode, and stayed in a hotel. Respondent eventually returned home. However, their relationship continued to deteriorate, forcing respondent to leave the house again to spare their children from witnessing their fights. Respondent instituted the instant petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on October 13, 2008 on the ground of psychological incapacity. The psychological and marital evaluation conducted on respondent shows that he is suffering from a passive-aggressive personality disorder. The RTC declared the marriage of respondent and Haydee void ab initio. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the findings of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether there is sufficient basis to nullify respondent’s marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: Yes. Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage, must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Expounding on these characteristics means: that the incapacity should be grave or serious in a way that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party predating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. To support a petition for the severance of marital tie, it is not enough to show that a party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations or was unwilling to perform these obligations. It is indispensable for the party moving for the dissolution of marriage to present proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him or her from complying with his or her essential marital obligations. In this case, the couple had a normal relationship during the period of their courtship, when they were boyfriend-girlfriend, and even during the first 7 years of their 13-year marriage before the instant petition was filed. They had the occasional misunderstandings which they quickly resolved at the instance of the respondent. Respondent even testified that he is capable of taking good care of his wife and children. There was a momentary falling out during the marriage when respondent allegedly engaged in an affair but the couple eventually reconciled and Haydee even conceived their third child. Evidently, the totality of these evidence negates any manifestation that respondent was indeed afflicted with psychological disorder that is so grave, permanent, incurable, and existed at the inception of the marriage which incapacitated him to perform his matrimonial duties and obligations. At most, the evidence presented reveals that respondent’s refusal to cohabit with Haydee was because the marriage has become unsatisfactory. The frequent quarrels caused by suspicion of marital infidelity and the consequent sexual dissatisfaction of the respondent were some of the reasons he is now unwilling to assume the essential obligations of marriage. However, an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. And a person’s refusal to assume essential marital duties and obligations does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Case Digest | REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOHN ARNEL H. AMATA Read More »

gacor4d slotgacor4d sakuratoto3 totoagung amintoto qdal88 totokita3 qdal88 cantiktoto slot gacor 4d gacor4d gampang menang toto slot slot gacor 4d slot gacor maxwin agen toto slot gacor maxwin idn slot slot gacor slot gacor 4d slot gacor slot gacor 4d toto macau slot thailand toto slot slot thailand slot qris slot gacor gampang menang
  • sakuratoto2
  • situs gacor terpercaya
  • toto slot
  • slot togel
  • https://157.245.54.109/ https://128.199.163.73/ https://cadizguru.com/ https://167.71.213.43/