Case Digest

Republic of the Philippines v. Spouses Jovito and Kathleen Bercede, G.R. No. 214223, reminds us that case law instructs that the unavailability or loss of the source documents listed higher in the list than the one being offered as the source for a petition for reconstitution must be proved by dear and convincing evidence. Sps. Bercede (Jovito and Kathleen) claims that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 4275. The property was allegedly purchased from Kathleen’s parents, evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. Kathleen’s parents, in turn, bought from Kathleen’s grandmother through an absolute deed of sale. Kathleen’s grandmother acquired the same from the heirs of the original owner, by way of an extrajudicial settlement. Thus, the subject property was still under the name of its original owner. Sps. Bercede, before the RTC, prayed for the reconstitution of OCT No. 4275. They averred that the original copy of the title (which should have been on file with the Register of Deeds) and the owner’s duplicate have both been lost and destroyed. The following documents were presented in support of the petition: a photocopy of the OCT, Tax Declaration, Tax Clearance, EJS and all the deeds of absolute sale, a Certification from the LRA-RD stating that the certificate of title covering the subject property was no longer available (either that it was burned or lost during the World War), and a Certification from the DENR which indicated the geographic position and plane coordinates of the cadastral survey covering the subject property. The Republic sought to dismiss the petition, arguing: The petition was granted by the RTC. LRA Certification confirmed the loss or destruction of the certificate of title. The spouses have shown that they have an interest over the property through the subsequent transfers, which culminated in their ownership. The Tax Dec, in relation to the photocopy of the OCT, means that the title is still in force and that the area and boundaries of the property are the same as those contained in OCT No. 4275. The republic appealed, interposing, among others the supposed intercalations and erasures on the photocopy of the OCT even if the RA 26 requires that the certificate of title should be free from apparent erasures and alterations. However, their appeal was denied by the CA. The Republic maintains that the spouses failed to prove that the owner’s duplicate of OCT was also missing, because the certificate by the LRA refers solely to the original supposed to be on its file, and resorting to a mere photocopy is unjustified. THE PETITION WAS GRANTED. The SC reversed the CA and the RTC, denying the petition for reconstitution. The purpose of reconstitution is to enable, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the reproduction of the lost or destroyed Torrens certificate in the same form and in exactly the same way it was at the time of the loss or destruction. In Denila v. Republic, the SC held that substantial compliance with jurisdictional requirements is not enough, because the acquisition of jurisdiction over a reconstitution case hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law. Both the RTC and the CA did not make any categorical ruling on whether the spouses have established that they failed to secure or find the documents mentioned paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 2 to justify their resort to a photocopy of OCT No. 4275. In fact, when Kathleen testified, it was shown that their only basis for seeking reconstitution of their title is that it was lost and destroyed based on the June 3, 2008 Certification issued by the LRA that the said OCT is not on their file. Based on this fact alone, the petition for reconstitution should have been dismissed by the RTC and should not have prospered. On this score, case law instructs that the unavailability or loss of the source documents listed higher in the list than the one being offered as the source for a petition for reconstitution must be proved by credible and convincing evidence. Therefore, the party praying for the reconstitution of a title must show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such documents and failed to find them before presentation of ‘other documents’ as evidence in substitution is allowed.

People of the Philippines v. Antonio M. Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, reminds us that the GSIS Act of 1997 punishes the heads of the offices of the national government, as well any employees of these offices who are responsible for collecting payments due to the GSIS but willingly fail or refuse to do so. Antonio M. Talaue, Efren C. Guiyab and Florante A. Galasinao were the mayor, treasurer, and municipal accountant, respectively, of Sto. Tomas, Isabela. They were accused by the GSIS of failing to remit the GSIS premium contributions of the employees working for the municipality’s government office, which is considered as a criminal act under the R.A. 8291, of the GSIS Act of 1997. During the trial, the prosecution presented Araceli Santos (Santos) as one of its witnesses. Santos is the Branch Manager of GSIS, Cauayan, Isabela Branch. She found that the municipal government failed to remit the total amount of P22,436,546.10, inclusive of interests, from the period of 01 January 1997 to 31 January 2004. She further stated that the agency head, treasurer, and accountant are in charge of remitting the contributions to the GSIS, and that the Mayor should have received the notices and demand letters and relayed its contents to the mentioned officers accordingly. Meanwhile, the defense presented accused Galasinao as its witness, who claimed he was not mandated by law to remit the GSIS contributions of the municipal employees. He claimed that the Municipal Treasurer, co-accused Guiyab, was responsible for remitting the GSIS contributions as it is the latter’s duty to manage the municipality’s funds. However, Guiyab had already passed away during the pendency of the case. Talaue was also presented by the defense as a witness and claimed to have told Guiyab to start paying the GSIS while the case was still ongoing, and that funds were already allocated for this purpose. He also claimed that payments have already been made to the GSIS, and that the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which was duly approved by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 118. Talaue concluded that he was not criminally liable, as the MOA, which supposedly supersedes all previous agreements, converted the municipality’s obligation to the GSIS as a loan instead of an unpaid obligation. This loan is said to be paid on a scheduled basis and subject to the reconciliation of accounts and data.  The Sandiganbayan acquitted accused Galasinao based on reasonable doubt, but found Talaue guilty of the crime charged. The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s Decision.  The GSIS Act of 1997 penalizes the heads of the offices of the national government, as well as any employees responsible for the collection of payments due the GSIS, who refuse, fail, or delay said accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from the time they have become due and demandable.  According to the Supreme Court, a municipal government is still part of the national government, and as the Mayor of Sto. Tomas, Isabela, Talaue is undoubtedly considered the head of office. The task of ensuring the remittance of accounts due the GSIS is, therefore, as much a burden and responsibility of the mayor as it is the burden and responsibility of those personnel who are involved in the collection of premium contributions. Congress purposely included heads of office in the list of those liable in order to create a sense of urgency on their part and deter them from passing the blame to their subordinates.  Unfortunately, Talaue’s testimony revealed a pattern of passing the buck to the municipal treasurer and contenting himself with repeating his oral instructions to make arrangements with the GSIS. It was only during the pendency of the civil case filed by the GSIS against him, his co-accused, and the municipality, that he instructed the treasurer to pay the municipality’s obligations, albeit in partial amounts.  Talaue’s failure to take drastic measures to rectify the situation and demand accountability betrays his nonchalance at the treasurer’s apparent lack of sense of urgency in complying with the law which appellant himself is equally, if not primarily, bound to observe. It cannot, therefore, be said that he did not intend to fail in remitting the contributions. His attitude toward the situation and toward the ineptitude of the municipal treasurer was the very recipe for failure. Moreover, while it may have been through Talaue’s initiative that the GSIS eventually restructured the obligations of the municipality through the MOA, said agreement only finds relevance with respect to the civil liability of the municipality and of the accused. This makes him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the GSIS Act of 1997, as he and the other employees tasked with collecting the GSIS contributions are responsible for ensuring the premiums are paid and/or sent to the GSIS on time.

The case of People of the Philippines v. Samiah S. Abdulah, G.R. No. 243941, reminds us that the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 provides steps in the chain of custody that must be strictly followed in order to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of seized items. On November 20, 2014, at 1:30 PM, an informant reported to the District Anti-Illegal Drug of the Eastern Police District about two girls selling illegal drugs in Marikina City. Police Officer 3 Erich Joel Temporal (PO3 Temporal) was tasked to go with the informant to investigate. At the area, the informant introduced PO3 Temporal to EB and Samiah S. Abdulah (Abdulah), who were using code names at the time. The informant told the sellers that he was interested in buying shabu; however, EB and Abdulah told PO3 Temporal to return the next day, as they did not have shabu at the time. A buy-bust team was formed accordingly, and PO3 Temporal was given a P500.00 bill to be used as buy-bust money. The team returned to the target area the next day. Abdulah then approached PO3 Temporal and asked about his order. The officer handed her the P500.00 bill, which she then passed to EB. EB placed the money in a sling bag and retrieved from it a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, which she handed to the officer. At this, PO3 immediately introduced himself as a police officer and apprehended Abdulah and EB. He seized the sling bag from EB, recovering the buy-bust money and another sachet of white crystalline substance. Believing that the area was unsafe for being “a Muslim area,” the team brought Abdulah and EB to the barangay hall where they marked, inventoried, and photographed the seized items. This was witnessed by Barangay Tanod Reynaldo Garcia, Barangay Kagawad Francisco delos Santos, Abdulah, and EB. Abdulah and a child in conflict with law (CICL) identified as “EB” were charged with violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, and the trial court found the accused Samiah Abdulah and CICL EB guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 5, Article II, of R.A. 9165. Aggrieved, Abdulah appealed the decision and argued that the arresting authorities failed to comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. She pointed out that the inventory and photographs were taken only at the barangay hall, without the presence of representatives from the media or the National Prosecution Service. The Supreme Court agreed with the contentions of Abdulah and it reversed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court ruled that the chain of custody requirements as written in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 ensures the integrity of the seized items. The integrity of the seized items cannot be trusted if there are procedural lapses in the chain of custody. In this case, the buy-bust team did not mark the seized drugs immediately after Abdulah and EB’s arrest. Instead, they did so once they got to the barangay hall; they had refused to do it in the area of arrest because it was “a muslim area.” The prosecutor’s attempt to justify the procedure lapse is too weak and enforces a bigoted view towards Muslim people. The team also failed to bring representatives of the media and the National Prosecution Service to serve as witnesses when they market the seized items; in fact, the team did not exert any effort into calling in these representatives. Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty to justify noncompliance with the law’s mandate. As long as there is still reasonable doubt on the accused’s culpability, he or she should continue to be presumed innocent. The presumption of innocence cannot be overcome by merely relying on the weakness of the defense, and the prosecution’s duty to prove the accused’s criminal liability must rise or fall upon its own merits. Thus, Samiah S. Absulah was ACQUITTED by the Supreme Court for the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She was then released from detention.

Ditiangkin, et. al. vs Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc., G.R. No. 246892, reminds that when the status of an employment is in dispute, the employer bears the burden to prove that the person whose service it pays for is an independent contractor rather than a regular employee with or without fixed terms.  In February 2016, Chrisden Cabrera Ditiangkin and several others were hired as riders by Lazada E-Services Philippines, Inc. They were primarily tasked to pick up items from sellers and deliver them to Lazada’s warehouse. Each of them signed an Independent Contractor Agreement which states that they will be paid P1,200.00 per day as service fee. The contractor states that they are engaged for a period of one year and that they’ll be using their privately-owned motorcycles for their trips.  Sometime in January 2017, the riders were told that they will no longer be given any schedules. They still reported for work for three days until they learned that their routes were given to other employees. The riders filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission against Lazada for illegal dismissal. Lazada argued that the riders were not regular employees but independent contractors. It also explained that after the surge of deliveries during the Christmas season, the demand decreased to its normal rate by January. Because of this, it had to reorganize the schedule to ensure all the riders will have a trip. It argued that the riders misunderstood the temporary team assignments as termination. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Lazada, while the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint. Despite this, the riders filed a Petition before the Supreme Court, asserting that they are regular employees and that there is an employer-employee relationship present. This is proven through the presence of all four factors of the four-fold test, which includes the following: the employer’s selection and engagement of the employee; the payment of wages; the power to dismiss; and the power to control the employee’s conduct. Furthermore, the riders also claimed that there is economic dependence in their employment with Lazada. Because they work twelve hours a day and six days a week, they are unable to gain other employment. This made them solely reliant on their employment with Lazada for income. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the riders and said Lazada failed to discharge their burden of proving that the riders were independent contractors, and that they didn’t fall under any of the categories of independent contractors.  The Court also found that all four factors of the four-fold test were indeed present. First, petitioners were directly employed by Lazada instead of engaged by a third-party; second, they received their salaries of P1,200.00 for each day of service; third, Lazada stated in the contract that it had the power to dismiss the riders; and fourth, Lazada had control over the means and methods of the performance of the riders’ work. It required the accomplishment of a route sheet and the submission of trip tickets and incident reports. The riders all risked a penalty of P500.00 if an item was lost, on top of its actual value. Finally, the court held that the services performed by the riders were integral to Lazada’s business, and that there is economic dependence in their employment with the company. As a result, this Petition for Review was GRANTED. The Supreme Court ordered Lazada to reinstate Ditiangkin et al to their former positions and pay their full back wages and other benefits.

Jarupay vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 247429 is an example of how psychological violence can be inflicted on someone through marital infidelity. By committing marital infidelity, the accused would be inflicting emotional anguish and mental suffering to his or her spouse. The complainant, AAA, and the accused, Jaime Araza y Jarupay, were married on October 5, 1989. AAA had no marital issues with Araza until he went to Zamboanga City for their networking business. One day, AAA received a text message stating that Araza was having an affair with their best friend. She went to Zamboanga to see for herself whether it was true, and was able to confirm that her husband was living with another woman named Tessie Luy Fabillar. AAA instituted a complaint against Araza and his alleged mistress for concubinage. The case was subsequently amicably settled after the parties executed an Agreement whereby Araza and Fabillar committed themselves never to see each other again. After the case was settled, Araza came to live with AAA again. However, it wasn’t long before Araza left once more. Out of desperation, AAA sought the help of the NBI to search for him. To her surprise, Araza had returned to live with his mistress again.  Based on the NBI agent’s investigation, Araza and his mistress, Fabillar, had been living together as husband and wife. Three children were born out of their affair. The truth caused AAA emotional and psychological suffering. She suffered from insomnia and asthma. At the time of the case, she was still taking anti-depressants and sleeping pills to cope with the psychological turmoil brought about by Araza’s marital infidelity. She then filed a case against Araza for Violence Against Women and Children on the grounds of psychological violence caused by his infidelity. Araza is fully liable for the crime of Violence against Women and their Children. One of the grounds for VAWC is psychological violence, as stated in Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. The law requires that the emotional anguish and mental suffering of the victim be proven. This is done by requiring the testimony of the victim to be presented in court.  The prosecution has established Araza’s guilt by proving that he committed psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA’s testimony was strong and credible, and her emotional anguish and mental suffering came to the point where even her health condition was adversely affected. As a result, the RTC found Araza guilty of the crime of violence against women under Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The CA denied Araza’s appeal and motion for reconsideration.

The case of Escandor vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211962, reminds us that the core of sexual harassment in the workplace is the abuse of power by a superior over a subordinate. This is specified and penalized by Republic Act No. 7877, also known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.  Mrs. Cindy Sheila Cobarde-Gamallo was a Contractual Employee of the NEDA Regional Office No. 7 for the UNICEF-assisted Fifth Country Program for Children. Meanwhile, Jose Romeo C. Escandor was a public officer and the Regional Director of ENDA Regional Office No. 7.  Escandor was charged with violating Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. Allegedly, he committed several acts of sexual harassment from July 1999 until November 2003, when Gamallo resigned from her job. These acts include but are not limited to: touching her without her consent, such as grabbing her hands or thigh, embracing her and kissing her on the forehead; telling her that if it were possible, he would have prevented her marriage with her husband; asking her on dates; sending her sexually suggestive messages; telling her that he was in love with her; giving her gifts of chocolates, wine, and a bracelet on Christmas; and grabbing her on a stairway and kissing her on the lips during an office Christmas party in 2002.  In his defense, Escandor testified that he never committed any of the acts that Gamallo accused him of doing. In fact, he asserted that the case was a plan hatched by several employees to oust him and his wife from the office.  The Sandiganbayan found Escandor guilty of sexual harassment. It gave credence to Gamallo’s testimony, noting that “there is nothing in the records that would indicate that Gamallo is dishonest or untruthful.” Escandor was sentenced to six months of imprisonment, as well as a fine of Php20,000.00. Escandor filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the Sandingbayan, leading to the creation of this petition. Despite his attempts to reconsider his verdict, Escandor’s guilt for sexual harassment was established beyond reasonable doubt. According to the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, three requirements must be met before someone can be convicted fo sexual harassment. Firstly, the accused must have authority, influence, or moral ascendancy over the victim. Secondly, the authority, influence, or moral ascendancy must be in a work, training, or education-related environment. Finally, the accused must make a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor from the victim. This case fulfills all three requirements to convict Escandor for sexual harassment. Though Escandor was not her immediate superior, he nonetheless had authority over Gamallo at their workplace. This fulfills the first two requirements. His actions, such as asking her out on dates and sending her unsolicited text messages alluding to sex, amounted to a request for sexual favors, fulfilling the third requirement. It should also be noted that R.A. No. 11313, also known as the Safe Spaces Act, does not undo or abandon the definition of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877, or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995. Instead, these two acts cover separate instances of sexual harassment. While the Safe Spaces Act punished acts of sexually harassing someone based on sexual orientation, gender identity and/or expression, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 punishes abuse of authority, influence or moral ascendancy to enable the sexual harassment of a subordinate. As a result, Escandor’s Petition for Review on Certiorari was DENIED by the Supreme Court. His punishment of imprisonment of six months and a fine of P20,000.00 remained.

The case of LBC Express-Vis, Inc. vs. Palco, G.R. No. 217101, reminds that an employee is considered constructively dismissed if he or she was sexually harassed by her superior and her employer failed to act on his or her complaint with prompt and sensitivity. Monica C. Palco started working for LBC Express-Vis Inc. on January 16, 2009 as a customer associate in its Gaisano Danao Branch. Her immediate superior, Arturo A. Batucan, then started to flirt with and sexually harass her. The final straw, however, was when Batucan sneaked in on Palco while she was working, held her on her hips and attempted to kiss her lips. While she shielded herself on his first attempt, he managed to kiss her lips on his second.  Bothered by the incident, she reported the incident to the LBC Head Office in Lapu Lapu City. When management did not immediately act on her complaint, Palco resigned. She asserted that she was forced to quit since she no longer felt safe at work. She then filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against the company and a Complaint for sexual harassment before the Danao City Prosecutor’s Office.  The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Palco.  The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed with modification but reduced the amount of moral damages to P50,000.00. This decision was also upheld by the Court of Appeals.  LBC then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that it should not be held liable for constructive dismissal. It pointed out that it did not know of, participate, or consent to Batucan’s acts towards Palco and only learned of his acts after Palco reported it. It also asserted that four months was not an unreasonable period to resolve a sexual harassment complaint.  Palco maintained that she was constructively dismissed. Constructive dismissal is a situation that occurs when an employee is forced to leave or quit his or her job due to the employer creating a hostile working environment. The resignation was not voluntary but was instead done to protect the employer, effectively making it a termination. If an employee wishes to assert that his or her resignation is a constructive dismissal, he or she will have to show how the employer created a hostile working environment for him or her. One of the ways a hostile working environment can be created is through the sexual harassment of an employee.  Batucan held a high position in the company and was Palco’s immediate supervisor when he sexually harassed her. Thus, he represented the company when he created a hostile working environment for Palco. Although the company cannot be solely held liable for Batucan’s actions, R.A. 7877, otherwise known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act, states that if the employer was informed of the acts of its managerial staff and does not contest or question it, it is deemed to have authorized or be complicit to the acts of its erring employee. Palco contends that LBC was insensible and acted in bad faith in failing to immediately act on her complaint. It took management four months and three weeks to resolve the matter, when a constructive dismissal case had already been filed.  As a result, the petition was DENIED by the Supreme Court. Monica C. Palco is found to have been constructively dismissed. LBC Express-Vis, Inc., is hereby adjudged liable to Monica C. Palco for separation pay, backwages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, as awarded by the National Labor Relations Commission in its Decision dated May 31, 2012.

Cecilia D. Mendoza vs. Atty. Cesar R. Santiago, Jr., A.C. No. 13548, reminds notaries public that the act of notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary public must observe the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of the document would be undermined. The complainant, Celia D. Mendoza, claims she is one of the heirs of Adela Espiritu-Barlaan, who died intestate on September 4, 2020. Adela Espiritu-Barlaan had no descendant or ascendant, but she did have siblings. She also left a parcel of land with an area of 247 square meters. On October 25, 2013, Gemma S. Barlaan executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver and Transfer of Rights (EJS), adjudicating to themselves the subject property. The EJS was acknowledged before and notarized by the respondent, Atty. Cesar R. Santiago, in his notarial book. A Transfer Certificate of Title was then issued in the name of John Alexander Barlaan. John Alexander Barlaan sold 147 square meters of the subject property to Monette Abac Ramos for P3,130,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 26, 2014. On March 12, 2015, John Alexander Barlaan executed another Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same subject property in favor of Monette Abac Ramos for Pl,500,000.00. Both Deeds of Sale were acknowledged before and notarized by Atty. Cesar R. Santiago in his notarial book. Monette Abac Ramos then filed a Complaint for Ejectment dated May 12, 2015 after discovering that the 147-square meter property was occupied by other relatives of Adela Espiritu-Barlaan. Attached to the Complaint was her Judicial Affidavit, showing her first deed of sale. She won the ejectment case, making the defendants vacate the property. On June 23, 2017, Celia D. Mendoza filed the instant Complaint, claiming that his act of notarizing the two Deeds of Sale is a violation of 2004 Notarial Practice Rule and CPR. Atty. Cesar R. Santiago then argued that:  The IBP-CBD found the act of notarizing the First and Second Deeds of Sale violated the 2004 Notarial Practice Rule and CPR, especially as the act was done to minimize his client’s liability from paying taxes. Thus, they recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, and that his notarial commission be revoked for two years. The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Cesar R. Santiago should additionally be disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for two years. Thus, respondent Atty. Cesar R. Santiago, Jr is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and Canon VI of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability.