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Are Stipulated Interest Rates Inherently Unconscionable?: PABALAN v SABNANI

Facts Sabnani obtained a short-term loan from Pabalan amounting to P7.45 Million. As securities for the loan, he executed two Promissory Notes (PN) and a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over his condominium unit at the Skyland Plaza Condominium in Makati City. The First PN indicated that the loan amount is P1.45M, with 8% interest per month, payable within three months. Meanwhile, the second PN indicated a principal loan amount of P6M, with 5% interest per month, payable within three months. The PNs had provisions on the consequences of default, summarized as follows: The REM reiterated payment terms in the PNs and gave Pabalan the right to foreclose the property in case of default. It also had an acceleration clause stating that such failure to pay any amounts due would render the entire obligation immediately due and demandable. Sabnani failed to pay one installment and a demand letter was sent to him, asking him to pay the total amount of P8.9M which consisted of the P7.45M principal loan and interest and penalty charges of P1.49M. When Sabnani failed to pay again, Pabalan filed an application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Makati. Sabnani thus tried to annul the REM, PNs, and Notice of Sale, with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Preliminary Injunction (PI), and Damages. Pabalan asserted her right to foreclose the mortgage under the Deed they agreed upon. Prayers for TRO and PI were denied since Sabnani would not suffer any substantial injury considering that he could still participate in the public bidding or redeem his property within a year. Sabnani filed an amended complaint praying for the same reliefs, and additionally claimed that Pabalan made unauthorized deductions on the loan amounting to approximately 1M. He also argued that the rates of interest, penalty charges, and other fees imposed in the REM and PNs were illegal, excessive, exorbitant, and unconscionable, and should be voided. RTC and CA Rulings The RTC upheld the validity of the REM, PNs, and the foreclosure sale, rejecting the contention on the deductions as the same is negated by his signature on a Receipt acknowledging that he received the entire amount of the loan despite the deductions being reflected. It further held as to the interest charges that the usury law was no longer in force and that parties can freely impose interest rates as they may agree upon. Meanwhile, the CA upheld the ruling of the RTC, but modified the rates of interest to 1% per month, and the liquidated damages and attorney’s fees to 10% each. Thus, Pabalan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue Are the stipulated rates of interest, penalty charges, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees under the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage agreed by the parties unconscionable? Ruling of the SC The SC granted Pabalan’s Petition and upheld the interest rates, penalty charges, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees agreed upon. While Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982 suspended the Usury Law and has granted contracting parties wide latitude to stipulate interest rates, the SC has previously held that freedom to contract is not absolute and has cautioned that lenders do not have the “carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets” and thus has the discretionary power to intervene in certain cases and reduce stipulated interest rates that are found to be unconscionable, iniquitous, and illegal. However, stipulated interest rates are not inherently conscionable or unconscionable. These interest rates may be deemed unconscionable only “in light of the context in which they were imposed or applied”. The Supreme Court, quoting Vitug v. Abuda, held: “The freedom to stipulate interest rates is granted under the assumption that we have a perfectly competitive market for loans where a borrower has many options from whom to borrow. It assumes that parties are on equal footing during bargaining and that neither of the parties has a relatively greater bargaining power to command a higher or lower interest rate. It assumes that the parties are equally in control of the interest rate and equally have options to accept or deny the other party’s proposals. In other words, the freedom is granted based on the premise that parties arrive at interest rates that they are willing but are not compelled to take either by force of another person or by force of circumstances.” However, these premises are not always true and only in such cases should the Court step in to correct market imperfections resulting from unequal bargaining positions of the parties. Even in the landmark case of Lara’s Gifts and Decors Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, it was recognized in the ponencia of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M. V .F. Leonen that the standard used in determining the conscionability of a conventional interest rate is twice the legal rate of interest. BUT if the stipulated interest rate is higher than this standard, the creditor has the burden to prove that this was necessary under market conditions or show that the parties stood on equal footing when they agreed on it. It bears stressing that the new rules on conventional and compensatory interest rates established in Lara’s Gifts will not apply here considering that Pabalan sufficiently discharged her burden to prove that she and Sabnani were on equal footing when they reached their agreement. No greater interest of justice or equity would be served if the Court intervened. The determination of whether or not the parties stood on equal footing is necessarily done on a case-to-case basis after careful consideration of relevant factors. The Court shall examine the parties’ respective backgrounds and personal circumstances. It must compare the parties to verify if one of them was possibly disadvantaged due to moral dependence, mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap, to warrant

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SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA

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Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices. At the time, he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna, who he had seven children with. In February 1966, Atty. Luna and Eugenia eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property. They entered into a written agreement entitled “AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT” dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property. On January 12, 1976, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. On the same day, Atty. Luna got married to Soledad L. Lavadia. Afterwards, the newly-wed couple returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987. In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (also known as LUPSICON) where Atty. Luna was the managing partner. On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through Atty. Luna purchased a condominium unit to be used as LUPSICON’s law office. “JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x” In 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners. However, it was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of Atty. Luna over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. Atty. Luna thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. Atty. Luna passed away on July 12, 1997. HIs share in the condominium unit, including the law books, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, Atty. Luna’s son from his first marriage. Soledad, Atty. Luna’s second wife, filed a civil case against the heirs of Juan Luces Luna, represented by Gregorio Z. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna. She alleged that: RTC Decision (a) The condominium is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry; (b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from “JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna” to “JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna”; (c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been made for transport and storage. CA – BOTH PARTIES APPEALED Eugenia, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of Atty. Luna until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by Atty. Luna in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with Eugenia because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. Issues Eugenia, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of Atty. Luna until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by Atty. Luna in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with Eugenia because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. (pursuant to the Nationality Rule) The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows: Supreme Court But wasn’t the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia? The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an incident of the action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia. With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.

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Amadea Angela K. Aquino v. Rodolfo C. Aquino and Abbulah C. Aquino

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Miguel Aquino had three sons: Arturo, Rodolfo, and Abbulah. Arturo and a woman named Maria Angela Kuan Ho had relations, resulting in the birth of Angela Aquino, their illegitimate child. Maria and Arturo also had plans to get married. Sadly, Arturo passed away on January 10, 1999, before Angela was born and before he and Maria could officially marry. Though Maria and Arturo never got married, Miguel treated his granddaughter very fondly. In fact, he paid for all of Maria’s expenses during her pregnancy and had Angela live with the Aquinos in their ancestral home. Angela’s uncles, Rodolfo and Abbulah, were also quite fond of her, and Rodolfo was made to be one of Angela’s godfathers. Things changed drastically after Miguel’s death. Upon settlement of his estate, it was found that Angela was included among the heirs who would receive portions of the estate. Her uncles, Rodoldo and Abbulah, opposed this. This is because according to them: 1.) Angela was never legally recognized as a natural child, 2.) there was no proof of filiation, and 3.) under the Iron curtain rule in the Civil Code, Angela is barred from inheriting from the legitimate family of her putative father. May an illegitimate child inherit from his/her direct ascendants? YES. Children, regardless of their circumstances at birth, are QUALIFIED to inherit from their direct ascendants. This construction will harmonize two Civil Code provisions in Succession: There was no specification in the term “grandchildren” whether only legitimate children are allowed to inherit from their grandparents, so there was no need to qualify, much less restrict, the application to only legitimate grandchildren. It is unfair for an illegitimate child to be placed in an unfair situation wherein he/she is only inheriting half as much as his/her legitimate counterparts. The ponencia did away with the terms ”illegitimate” and “legitimate” when referring to children based on their parent’s status. Instead, Justice Leonen used the terms “marital” and “”nonmarital” children.

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LUCIA MANUEL Y CADIZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

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The private complainant, Flordeliza Uy, is allegedly the owner of “Ebot’s Farm”, a farm engaged in the chicken grower business. The petitioner, Lucia Manuel, is a long-time customer of Ebot’s farm. She would call in the morning to the farm and talk to Nemesio Artates, the booker for Ebot’s Farm. After that, Lucia Manuel would instruct her husband, Rolando, or her nephew, Arnel, to pick up the chickens in the evening and deliver the corresponding check payments. This case involves a series of transactions made in November 2005, for which Lucia Manuel issued 10 PNB checks in favor of Flordeliza Uy, the aggregate amount of which is P889,606.00. When the checks were presented for payment to the bank, the same were dishonored for the reason of “Account Closed.” Several demand letters were sent to Lucia Manuel, all of which were left unheeded. This prompted Flordeliza Uy to file a case against Lucia Manuel for B.P. 22 and Estafa under Art. 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The defense argued that the said farm was actually owned by a certain Alex Uson, and not Flordeliza Uy. Contrary to Uy’s claims, what Lucia Manuel would actually do is issue blank checks and only fill out the date and signature. This leaves out the name of the payee and amount. Then, her husband or nephew would pick-up the chickens and deliver the blank checks as guarantee for the payment of the obligation. She denied having transacted with Flordeliza Uy, and she likewise did not know why the checks were made payable to her since only transacted with Nemesio Artates, the booker of the said farm. Lucia Manuel admitted that she was aware that the checks would not be funded on time, which is why she would then ask Alex Uson not to present the checks for encashment and to renegotiate payment for her orders of live chicken. She further argued that she did not defraud Flordeliza Uy as she never transacted with her. Instead, she transacted with Alex Uson. She likewise pointed out that Flordeliza Uy never even attended the proceedings before the RTC. Decision of the RTC and the CA: The RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 (2)(d) of the RPC. The CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner. The CA held that all the elements of the crime were established by the prosecution. FIRST. Lucia Manuel made several purchases of live chickens from the farm, and to serve as payment thereof, she issued the subject postdated checks. Without these, Flordeliza Uy would not have parted with the chickens since these were assurances of payment. SECOND. One of the prosecution’s witnesses testified that the checking account was already closed when the subject checks were negotiated. In fact, she knew that she would not be able to pay the amounts corresponding thereof because she did not have sufficient funds. THIRD. Private complainant Flordeliza Uy was damaged to the extent of the value of the subject checks which represented the total value of the goods taken by Lucia Manuel from her. In a bid to exculpate herself from any liability, appellant maintains that the prosecution’s failure to present as witness private complainant Flordeliza deprived her of the right to confront the former. Therefore, such failure resulted in the prosecution’s inability to prove the indispensable element of deceit. In this case, records reflect that the elements of the crime of estafa could very well be proven and in fact had been established by the other prosecution witnesses who dealt directly with appellant. The testimony of private complainant Flordeliza would only be corroborative and therefore her non-presentation as a witness is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. Proceedings Before the Supreme Court: Petitioner retained the same arguments during her appeal. Curiously, the Petitioner filed before the Supreme Court a Reply with Motion to Admit praying that the SC grant their motion and admit into the records, among others, an Affidavit of Desistance executed by Flordeliza Uy. Likewise attached to the Reply is a copy of the Order issued by the MTC of San Rafael, Bulacan in the criminal case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, which dismissed the case against the petitioner. The OSG filed its Comment arguing that the Affidavit of Desistance and the testimony of Uy in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases should not be admitted in the instant case considering that they were made and introduced in a different proceeding. Ruling of the Supreme Court: The Petitioner was ACQUITTED by the Supreme Court. As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, the foregoing rule admits certain exceptions. The lower court’s actual findings will not bind the Supreme Court if facts that could affect the result of the case were overlooked and disregarded. The SC was convinced that the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution casts reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC. On the Affidavit of Desistance Generally, Courts view affidavits of desistance or recantation, if executed after conviction of the accused, with disfavor, suspicion and reservation. This is because these can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Thus, it has been held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the accused’s defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. However, under special and exceptional circumstances, an affidavit of desistance coupled with an express repudiation of the material points alleged in the Information, may engender doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge. The SC said that the effects and Uy’s Affidavit of Desistance, considering that if coupled with her testimony during the hearing for the affidavit’s admission, her non-presentation during trial,

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MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC

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FACTS Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (a.k.a. Grace Poe) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo in 1968. At age 5, she was adopted by celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (a.k.a Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesus Sonora Poe (a.k.a Susan Roces). She initially pursued a degree in Developmental Studies at the University of the Philippines but opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. She immigrated to the U.S. in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares, who was based in the U.S. at the time. In 2001, she became a naturalized American citizen and obtained an American passport. In 2004, Grace Poe returned to the Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for President. However, after a few months, she rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father’s deteriorating medical condition, who slipped into a coma and eventually expired. In her desire to be with her grieving mother, she and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 2005. On 7 July 2006, Grace Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. The BI declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in her name and in the names of her three children. In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Grace Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post, she executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship” before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. The following day, she submitted the said affidavit to the BI and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, Grace Poe stopped using her American passport. On 2 October 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” She obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. On 15 October 2015, Grace Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. Her filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases. These cases argued that Grace Poe cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling, and that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. They also argued that she fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. ISSUE RULING The petition was thus GRANTED. MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

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Case Digest | HERMA SHIPPING TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND HERMINIO S. ESGUERRA VS. CALVIN JABALLA CORDERO

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HERMA SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND HERMINIO S. ESGUERRA vs. CALVIN JABALLA CORDEROG.R. No. 244210 | 27 January 2020 FACTS: Cordero was employed on March 31, 1992 as Able Seaman by HSTC, a corporation engaged in the business of hauling, shipping and/or transporting oil and petroleum products in Philippine waters. During his employment, Cordero was part of the complement of M/Tkr Angat, where one of his primary duties entailed being a Helmsman or a duty look-out during vessel navigation. Sometime in 2015, HSTC discovered significant losses of the oil and petroleum products transported by M/Tkr Angat during its past twelve (12) voyages. Consequently, HSTC conducted an investigation and sent a Notice to Explain/Show Cause Memo on January 28, 2016 to five (5) crew members, including Cordero, requiring them to submit a written explanation for allegedly committing: (a) violation of HSTC’s Code of Discipline; (b) Serious Misconduct; and (c) Willful Breach of Trust and Confidence. Pending the investigation, the five (5) crew members were placed on preventive suspension. In his defense, Cordero denied the allegations against him and claimed that he did not see anything unusual or suspicious during the voyages, and that if there were any such case, he did not see them due to his poor eyesight. After HSTC found Cordero’s explanation insufficient, he was dismissed from employment through a Notice of Termination dated March 8, 2016.This prompted Cordero to file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. For their part, HSTC and Esguerra contended that the significant losses in the oil and petroleum products were confirmed after using a Four Point Analysis, an accepted formula adopted in the oil shipping industry to determine oil/petroleum loss during a sea voyage. Moreover, a suspicious event was captured and recorded by M/Tkr Angat‘ s CCTV camera, showing an unknown boat navigating its way at the side of the vessel, crew members coming out of their quarters, examining/investigating, and waving off the boat, and the blocking/covering of the CCTV camera for three (3) hours between December 26 and 27, 2015. They maintained that Cordero, as M/Tkr Angat‘s Helmsman/Watchman, was undoubtedly aware of the oil pilferage; having had a vantage point from the bridge of the vessel, he would not have missed any boat or vessel that will approach M/Tkr Angat from the side. Likewise, Cordero would have seen who removed the cover of the CCTV camera that was blocked. However, despite the incident, Cordero did not report any irregularity to HSTC. The Labor Arbiter Ruling: In a Decision dated November 21, 2016, the Labor Arbiter (LA) found Cordero’s employment to have been validly terminated and thus, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC Ruling: In a Decision dated February 28, 2017, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s dismissal of the complaint upon a finding that Cordero was validly dismissed for a just cause. The Court of Appeals Ruling: The CA affirmed the NLRC Decision with a modification directing HSTC and Esguerra to pay Cordero separation pay equivalent to one (1)-month salary for every year of service from March 1992 until finality of judgment. While the CA concurred with the labor tribunals’ finding that Cordero’s employment was validly terminated for a just cause, it found that the penalty of dismissal was too harsh under the following circumstances: (a) Cordero worked for HSTC for twenty-four (24) years;(b) the incident while he was on duty was his first offense;(c) he had no derogatory record; and(d) he was already preventively suspended for the infractions he committed. Accordingly, the CA remanded the case to the LA for the proper computation of separation pay. ISSUE: Did the CA correctly awarded separation pay in favor of Cordero “as a measure of compassionate justice” in the exercise of its “equity jurisdiction? RULING: As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of “social justice” or on “equitable grounds.” In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice. A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best, it may mitigate the penalty, but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character. That Cordero had been employed with HSTC for twenty-four (24) years does not serve to mitigate his offense nor should it be considered in meting out the appropriate penalty therefor. In fact, it may be reasonably argued that the infraction that he committed against HSTC, i.e., theft of invaluable company property, demonstrates the highest degree of ingratitude to an institution that has been the source of his livelihood for twenty-four

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Case Digest | KNUTSON VS. FLORES

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Randy Michael Knutson, acting on behalf of minor Rhuby Sibal Knutson vs. Hon. Elisa R. Sarmiento-Flores, in her capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 69, Regional Trial Court, Taguig City, and Rosalina Sibal KnutsonG.R. No. 239215 | 12 July 2022 FACTS: Randy Michael Knutson (Randy), an American Citizen, met Rosalina Siba Knutson (Rosalina) in Singapore. They got married and had a daughter named Rhuby. The family lived in the Philippines. Randy and Rosalina became estranged after he discovered her extra-marital affairs, but Randy supported Rosalina and Rhuby. Rosalina got hooked in casinos and incurred large debts from casino financiers prompting her to sell the house and lot, condominium unit, and vehicles that Randy provided for the family. Rosalina rented an apartment and got herself a boyfriend. Randy advised Rosalina to be discreet in her illicit affairs because it is not good for Rhuby to see her mother with another man. Randy discovered later that Rosalina hurt Rhuby by pulling her hair, slapping her face and knocking her head. One time, Rosalina pointed a knife at Rhuby and threatened to kill her. Rosalina even texted Randy about her plan to kill their daughter and commit suicide. Randy reported the matter to the police station but the authorities explained that they cannot assist him in domestic abuse. The neighbors of Rosalina complained about noisy parties and pot sessions in her apartment. The lessor even terminated the lease after marijuana plants were confiscated in the premises. On December 7, 2017, Randy, on behalf of minor Rhuby, filed against Rosalina a petition under RA No. 9262 for the issuance of Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders before the RTC. Randy averred that Rosalina placed Rhuby in a harmful environment deleterious to her physical, emotional, moral, and psychological development. RTC Ruling: Dismissed the petition, explaining that protection and custody orders in RA No. 9262 cannot be issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child. It ratiocinated that the child’s mother cannot be considered as an offender under the law. Moreover, the remedies are not available to the father because he is not a “woman victim of violence”. Randy moved for a reconsideration but it was denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether the father can avail of the remedies under RA No. 9262 on behalf of his minor child against the mother’s violent and abusive acts.2. Whether RA No. 9262 covers a situation where the mother committed violent and abusive acts against her own child. RULING: 1. RA No. 9262 allows the father of the offended party to apply for protection and custody orders. In Garcia vs. Drilon, Section 9(b) of RA No. 9262 explicitly allows “parents or guardians of the offended party” to file a petition for protection orders. The statute categorically used the word “parents” which pertains to the father and the mother of the woman or child victim. Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget. The law speaks in clear language and no explanation is required. There is no occasion for the Court to interpret but only to apply the law when it is not ambiguous. Similarly, the statute did not qualify on who between the parents of the victim may apply for protection orders. Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, the courts must not distinguish. In any event, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC states that the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner to petitions for protection orders. 33 Under Section 5, Rule 3 of Rules of Court, “[a} minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad !item.” In this case, the title of the petition for issuance of a protection order is unequivocal, to wit: “RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON acting on behalf of minor RHUBYSIBAL KNUTSON, Petitioner, -versus- ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON, Respondent.“ There is no question that the offended party is Rhuby, a minor child, who allegedly experienced violence and abuse. Thus, Randy may assist Rhuby in filing the petition as the parent of the offended party. 2. RA No. 9262 covers a situation where the mother committed violent and abusive acts against her own child. Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 defines violence against women and their children as: “any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.” The law criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e., husband; former husband; or any person who has or had sexual or dating relationship with the woman, or with whom the woman has a common child. However, the Court in Garcia emphasized that the law does not single out the husband or father as the culprit. The statute used the gender-neutral word “person” as the offender which embraces any person of either sex. The offender may also include other persons who conspired to commit the violence, thus: As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan [588 Phil.

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Case Digest | ALEXANDER vS. SPS. ESCALONA

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ALEXANDER vs. SPS. ESCALONAG.R. No. 25614119 July 2022 FACTS: Spouses Jorge and Hilaria Escalona were married on November 14, 1960. They acquired unregistered parcels of land in Olongapo City (Lots 1 and 2). Jorge waived his rights over Lot 1 to this illegitimate son, Reygan. A few years later, Reygan relinquished his right over Lot 1 to petitioner Belinda. Reygan also transferred Lot 2 to Belinda. They entered into a deed of sale covering lots 1 and 2. The spouses confronted Belinda and said that Reygan cannot validly sell the lots, while Belinda invoked the validity of her contracts with Reygan. The spouses filed a complaint for annulment of documents with damages against Belinda since: (1) Hilaria did not consent to the waiver of rights to Reygan as to Lot 1, (2) They never sold Lot 2 to a third person. RTC upheld the transactions between Belinda and Reygan, ruling that the action to annul the documents have already prescribed. The CA reversed the RTC’s judgment. ISSUE: 1. What rules shall govern the status of a contract and the prescriptive period of an action when the husband and wife were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, but the alienation or encumbrance of the property transpired after the effectivity of the Family Code without the spouse’s consent? 2. What is the reckoning point of the applicable law — is the date of the marriage or the time of the transaction? RULING: The SC held that the governing law is the Family Code. More than the date of marriage of the spouses, the applicable law must be reckoned on the date of the alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property made without the consent of the other spouse. Under the Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the wife has the option to ask the courts for the annulment of contracts of the husband entered into without her consent. Hence, under the Civil Code, the transaction would have been simply voidable, and the wife has ten (10) years to cause the annulment of such contract. Under the Family Code, however, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property is void. So when the alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without the wife’s consent, is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the said alienation or encumbrance is not void but merely voidable. The applicable laws are Art. 166 and 173 of the Civil Code. However, when made after the effectivity of the Family Code, it is void. The applicable law is Article 124 of the Family Code. The Family Code expressly repealed the relevant portions of the Civil Code, insofar it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights therein. A vested right refers to a present and fixed interest which is protected against arbitrary state action, covering legal or equitable title to enforce a demand as well as exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Hence, a new law cannot be invoked to prejudice or affect a right that has become vested while the old law was still in force. If Reygan and Belinda had vested rights, even the effectivity of the Family Code cannot impair their rights, which is expressly provided by the Family Code itself. However, they have no vested right since: the transaction for Lot 1 happened during the effectivity of the Family Code, and Hilaria did not give her written consent to these contracts. Hence, any alienation therein is actually void. The alienation of Lot 2 is likewise void since it was made without the Spouses Escalona’s consent.

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Case Digest | MARIA VICIA CARULLO-PADUA VS. JOSELITO PADUA

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FACTS: Petitioner Maria Vicia Carullo-Padua (Maria) and respondent Joselito Padua (Joselito) were married, and their union produced a son. On July 17, 1997, Maria filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage with the trial court anchored on Art. 36 of the Family Code. Maria alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Joselito was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. During their cohabitation, Joselito exhibited excessive sexual desire and forced her to perform oral and anal sex with him; that there were occasions when respondent attempted to sexually molest her sister, nieces and their household help who were staying with them; that respondent admitted to said attempts of molestations but begged her to keep said incidents a secret; and at one point, at the heat of their quarrel, Joselito attempted to kill Maria by threatening to stab her with a letter opener. Maria also alleged that Joselito failed to provide financial support for her and their child as well as emotional and psychological support. Hence, Maria filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Joselito. During trial, Petitioner presented herself and psychiatrist Dr. Villegas as witnesses. Dr. Villegas testified that she diagnosed Joselito with a personality disorder of a sexual deviant or perversion based on Maria’s narrations. Dr. Villegas added that the psychological disorder of Joselito is grave, serious, and not clinically curable which rendered him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The trial court denied the petition, it held that the evidence adduced by Maria failed to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the validity of her marriage with respondent. On appeal, the appellate court sustained the judgment of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether the totality of evidence presented by Maria is sufficient to prove that Joselito is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Maria. RULING: No. Republic v Iyoy instructs that the psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) Gravity – it must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;(b) Juridical Antecedence – it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and(c) Incurability – it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In concluding that the husband was psychologically incapacitated, the Supreme Court used the following parameters (Tan-Andal guidelines) in determining what constitutes psychological incapacity:(1) The psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of marriage;(2) Caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed prior to their marriage;(3) Caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause; and(4) Proven by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, as categorically declared by the Court, expert testimony or the testimony of a psychologist/psychiatrist is no longer required to prove psychological incapacity. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the spouses’ lives before they contracted marriage may testify on their observations as to the incapacitated spouse’s behavior. What is important is that the totality of evidence is sufficient to support a finding of psychological incapacity. Using the foregoing yardsticks, the Supreme Court reviewed the totality of evidence presented by Maria and found that the same was miserably wanting to sustain the conclusion that Joselito was psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of marriage. The psychiatrist’s description of Joselito’s parents’ traits does not give this Court a deeper intuitive understanding of Joselito’s psychological state. Notably, there was no information how Joselito reacted towards the supposed contrasting personalities of his parents during his formative years. Neither was there any account as to how the said contrasting parenting behavior affected Joselito’s social, intellectual, moral, and emotional growth. To emphasize, the testimonies of ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage should include behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. Here, not only was there no interview or psychological test conducted upon Joselito, there was nobody who testified on vital information regarding his personality structure, upbringing and childhood such as members of his family, relatives, friends, and co-workers. The evaluation of Dr. Villegas on Joselito was based merely on information, accounts and descriptions relayed solely by Maria which glaringly and expectedly are biased.

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Case Digest | PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vS. DOMINGO CASTILLO, JR.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO CASTILLO, JR. G.R. No. 121768 21 July 1997 FACTS: Domingo Castillo, Jr. (Boyet) and his father Domingo Castillo Sr. (Domingo), the victim in this case, were in the D&G restaurant in Norzagaray, Bulacan drinking beer. After two (2) hours of drinking, a group of noisy customers arrived. Dimongo knew about his son’s propensity to get into fights so he asked Boyet to go home with him. Boyet drove to the direction of their home in Angat, Bulacan. An argument ensued between Boyet and his father, who were both a bit drunk already, because the former kept insisting that he should go back to the restaurant while the latter prevented him from doing so. Boyet abruptly stopped the pick-up upon nearing their house and the victim alighted therefrom. Holding a bottle of beer in his right hand, the victim raised both of his hands, stood in from of the pickup and said, “sige kung gusto mo sagasaan mo ako, hindi ka makakaalis” (go ahead, run over me if you want to leave). Boyet slowly drove the pick-up forward threatening to run over the victim. Domingo exclaimed, “papatayin mob a ako?” (are you going to kill me?). Boyet backed-up almost hitting an owner type jeep parked at the side of the road and on board which were four (4) people conversing with each other, including prosecution eyewitness, Ma. Cecilia Mariano. Then at high speed, Boyet drove the pick-up forward hitting the victim in the process. Not satisfied with what he had done, Boyet put the vehicle in reverse thereby running over the victim a second time. The appellant then alighted from the vehicle and walked towards their house. Arthur Agaran saw the incident and brought the victim to Dolorosa Hospital at Norzagaray where he died. Boyet passed off the death of his father as an accident. However, a suspicion of foul place surfaced when his sister, Leslie C. Padilla, was given different versions of his death. Thus, she fled an information alleging parricide against her brother. The RTC found Boyet guilty beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether Boyet is guilty of parricide. RULING: YES. The prosecution has successfully established the elements of parricide: (1) the death of the deceased; (2) that he or she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act done without malice but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence, and which has harmed society or an individual. The records are bereft of any evidence that the appellant had tried to avoid hitting the victim who positioned himself in front of the pick-up. On the contrary, Mariano’s testimony is to the effect that prior to actually hitting the victim, the appellant was intimidating him by moving the pick-up forward, thus prompting the victim to exclaim, “papatayin mo ba ako?”. Worse, the appellant back-up to gain momentum, then accelerated at a very fast speed knowing fully well that the vehicle would definitely hit the victim who was still standing in front of the same, A man who had not intended to harm his own father would not walk but more likely run in search of help. Aware of the fact that his father’s life is precariously hanging in the balance, the normal reaction of a child is to waste no time in trying to save his life. The appellant, on the other hand, did not even lift a finger to help his own father whose life he had so brutally taken away. It was Agaran and other workers who, on their own accord, brought the victim to the hospital. In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the court find it difficult to believe that the appellant did not act with malice.

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