Facts
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973, to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month, which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate supervisor, Mila de la Rosa, and the personnel officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident, she was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00, which was eventually increased to P5,000.00, to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, the private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment. After the parties submitted their position papers as required by the labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24, 1988 the latter rendered a decision ordering the respondent Apex Mining Company, Inc. to pay Sinclita Candida a total of ₱55,161.42 for salary differential, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay differential and separation pay.
Not satisfied therewith, the petitioner appealed to the public respondent NLRC, wherein in due course a decision was rendered dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the appealed decision.
Hence, the petition for review by certiorari. The main thrust of the petition is that the private respondent should be treated as a mere house helper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the private respondent should be treated as a mere house helper or domestic servant, and not as a regular employee of the petitioner.
Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms “househelper” or “domestic servant” are defined as follows:
The term “househelper” as used herein is synonymous to the term “domestic servant” and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer’s home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family.
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such a house helper or domestic servant who is employed in the employer’s home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family. Such a definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys, and other similar househelps.
The criterion is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or a company staff house may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staff houses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such instances, they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned, entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the house helper or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of the business of the employer that such house helper or domestic servant may be considered an employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. The mere fact that the house helper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staff houses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of the public respondent NLRC, are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.