Jurisprudence

On March 26, 2014, a drunk Marvin L. San Juan willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threatened the life of AAA, a fifteen year old child, by poking a gun at him without any justifiable cause. This act amounts to a crime, thereby subjecting the minor to psychological cruelty and emotional maltreatment. San Juan argued that he cannot be held liable for child abuse because the information did not allege, nor was his intention to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA proven in trial. Issue Can the accused be held guilty of child abuse? With respect to the act of child abuse, Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610  provides:  Ruling Specific criminal intent must be alleged and proved by the prosecution, and must be established by the prosecution as a fact. Meanwhile, general criminal intent is presumed from the criminal act.  It is a general rule that if it is proved that the accused committed the unlawful act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with a criminal intention, and that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. However, there are certain crimes of which a specific intent to accomplish a particular purpose is an essential element. This specific intent was taken into consideration by this Court in the analysis of crimes involving violation of Section 3(b )(2) of R.A. No. 7610.  Pointing a firearm towards a minor is intrinsically cruel.  “Certainly, the term cruelty, in its common usage, simply means suffering that is excessive and unnecessary to the purpose to be achieved by an offender. An act that is accompanied by such a cruel act can easily be determined by the manner it was executed. It does not need an inquiry into the specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child, as being referred to under the Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610. “ Bottom Line When the act itself is examined based on the inherent characteristic of the act itself and the manner of its execution, and it later turns out to be intrinsically cruel, there should be no need to look into the specific intent. Again, the term cruelty, when not qualified by the terms “to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child,” may still be utilized based on its common usage.

The case of Christian Cadajas vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 247348, raises several issues that are deserving of separate discussions. For now, we shall focus on the issue of the violation of one’s right to privacy. Facts Christian Cadajas met the victim, AAA, in the canteen where he works. At the time, he was 24 while AAA was 14. Their relationship began when AAA’s younger sibling told Cadajas that AAA had a crush on him. Cadajas tried to evade AAA, but then she began to stalk him and eventually sent a request in his Facebook Messenger, which he accepted. Cajadas and AAA would then begin exchanging messages on Facebook Messenger. Eventually, Cadajas courted AAA for two weeks, until they got together on April 2, 2016. AAA would borrow the cellphone of her mother, BBB, to access her own Facebook account. This is how BBB learned of the relationship in June 2016. She was then able to read their messages whenever AAA forgot to log out of her account. BBB disapproved of their relationship because AAA was still too young, but the couple ignored her admonishment. Sometime in October 2016, BBB was disheartened when she read that Cadajas was sexually luring her daughter into meeting with him in a motel. She confronted Cadajas and told him to stay away from AAA as she was still a minor. At around 5:30 in the morning of November 18, 2016, BBB was shocked to find out that Cadajas had been coaxing her daughter into sending him photos of her own breasts and vagina. AAA relented and sent Cadajas the photos he was asking. When AAA learned that her mother read their conversation, she rushed to a computer shop to delete her messages. BBB, however, was able to force her to open Cadajas’s Facebook Messenger account to get a copy of their conversation. Cadajas admitted to sending AAA messages such as, “oo ready ako sa ganyan,” and “sige hubad.” He, however, denied having sent AAA photos of his privates. On November 17, 2016, AAA asked Cadajas to delete their messages from his account. He even told her, “bakit kasi hindi ka pa nagtitino, hayan tuloy nakita ng mama mo.” On the same day, Cadajas broke up with AAA because her mother did not like him. Cadajas was charged for violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, also known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. He was also charged for child pornography as defined and penalized under Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175, known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,  in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775, known as the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009. One of the arguments raised by the petitioner concerns the admissibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution, which was taken from his Facebook messenger account. He claims that the photos presented in evidence during the trial of the case were taken from his Facebook messenger account. According to him, this amounted to a violation of his right to privacy, and therefore, any evidence obtained in violation thereof amounts to a fruit of the poisonous tree. Issue Is the evidence, which was taken from Cadajas’ Facebook messenger account, presented by the prosecution inadmissible, and therefore violated Cadajas’ right to privacy? Under the 1987 Constitution, the right of privacy is expressly recognized under Article III, Sec. 3 thereof, which reads: SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.  While the above provision highlights the importance of the right to privacy and its consequent effect on the rules on admissibility of evidence, one must not lose sight of the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect private individuals against government intrusions. Hence, its provisions are not applicable between and amongst private individuals. While the case of Zulueta v. Court of Appeals (Zulueta) may appear to carve out an exception to the abovementioned rule by recognizing the rule on inadmissible of evidence between spouses when one obtains evidence in violation of his/her spouse’s right to privacy, such a pronouncement tis a mere obliter dictum that cannot be considered as a binding precedent. This is because the petition brought to the Court in Zulueta simply asked for the return of the documents seized by the wife and thus, pertained to the ownership of the documents therein. Moreover, documents were declared inadmissible because of the injunction order issued by the trial court and not on account of Art. III, Sec. 3 of the Constitution. At any rate, violation of the right to privacy between individuals is properly governed by the provisions of the Civil Code, the Data Privacy Act (DPA), and other pertinent laws, while its admissibility shall be governed by the rules on relevance, materiality, authentication of documents, and the exclusionary rules under the Rules on Evidence. In this case, the photographs and conversations in the Facebook Messenger account that were obtained and used as evidence against Cadajas, which he considers as fruit of the poisonous tree, were not obtained through the efforts of the police officers or any agent of the State. Rather, these were obtained by a private individual. Indeed, the rule governing the admissibility of an evidence under Article III of the Constitution must affect only those pieces of evidence obtained by the State through its agents. It is these individuals who can flex government muscles and use government resources for possible abuse. However, where private individuals are involved, for which their relationship is governed by the New Civil Code, the admissibility of an evidence cannot be determined by the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Be that as it may, the act of AAA cannot be said to

Facts Sabnani obtained a short-term loan from Pabalan amounting to P7.45 Million. As securities for the loan, he executed two Promissory Notes (PN) and a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over his condominium unit at the Skyland Plaza Condominium in Makati City. The First PN indicated that the loan amount is P1.45M, with 8% interest per month, payable within three months. Meanwhile, the second PN indicated a principal loan amount of P6M, with 5% interest per month, payable within three months.  The PNs had provisions on the consequences of default, summarized as follows: The REM reiterated payment terms in the PNs and gave Pabalan the right to foreclose the property in case of default. It also had an acceleration clause stating that such failure to pay any amounts due would render the entire obligation immediately due and demandable.  Sabnani failed to pay one installment and a demand letter was sent to him, asking him to pay the total amount of P8.9M which consisted of the P7.45M principal loan and interest and penalty charges of P1.49M. When Sabnani failed to pay again, Pabalan filed an application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Makati. Sabnani thus tried to annul the REM, PNs, and Notice of Sale, with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Preliminary Injunction (PI), and Damages. Pabalan asserted her right to foreclose the mortgage under the Deed they agreed upon. Prayers for TRO and PI were denied since Sabnani would not suffer any substantial injury considering that he could still participate in the public bidding or redeem his property within a year.  Sabnani filed an amended complaint praying for the same reliefs, and additionally claimed that Pabalan made unauthorized deductions on the loan amounting to approximately 1M. He also argued that the rates of interest, penalty charges, and other fees imposed in the REM and PNs were illegal, excessive, exorbitant, and unconscionable, and should be voided.  RTC and CA Rulings The RTC upheld the validity of the REM, PNs, and the foreclosure sale, rejecting the contention on the deductions as the same is negated by his signature on a Receipt acknowledging that he received the entire amount of the loan despite the deductions being reflected. It further held as to the interest charges that the usury law was no longer in force and that parties can freely impose interest rates as they may agree upon. Meanwhile, the CA upheld the ruling of the RTC, but modified the rates of interest to 1% per month, and the liquidated damages and attorney’s fees to 10% each. Thus, Pabalan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue Are the stipulated rates of interest, penalty charges, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees under the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage agreed by the parties unconscionable? Ruling of the SC  The SC granted Pabalan’s Petition and upheld the interest rates, penalty charges, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees agreed upon.  While Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982 suspended the Usury Law and has granted contracting parties wide latitude to stipulate interest rates, the SC has previously held that freedom to contract is not absolute and has cautioned that lenders do not have the “carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets” and thus has the discretionary power to intervene in certain cases and reduce stipulated interest rates that are found to be unconscionable, iniquitous, and illegal. However, stipulated interest rates are not inherently conscionable or unconscionable. These interest rates may be deemed unconscionable only “in light of the context in which they were imposed or applied”. The Supreme Court, quoting Vitug v. Abuda, held: “The freedom to stipulate interest rates is granted under the assumption that we have a perfectly competitive market for loans where a borrower has many options from whom to borrow. It assumes that parties are on equal footing during bargaining and that neither of the parties has a relatively greater bargaining power to command a higher or lower interest rate. It assumes that the parties are equally in control of the interest rate and equally have options to accept or deny the other party’s proposals. In other words, the freedom is granted based on the premise that parties arrive at interest rates that they are willing but are not compelled to take either by force of another person or by force of circumstances.” However, these premises are not always true and only in such cases should the Court step in to correct market imperfections resulting from unequal bargaining positions of the parties.  Even in the landmark case of Lara’s Gifts and Decors Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, it was recognized in the ponencia of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M. V .F. Leonen that the standard used in determining the conscionability of a conventional interest rate is twice the legal rate of interest. BUT if the stipulated interest rate is higher than this standard, the creditor has the burden to prove that this was necessary under market conditions or show that the parties stood on equal footing when they agreed on it.  It bears stressing that the new rules on conventional and compensatory interest rates established in Lara’s Gifts will not apply here considering that Pabalan sufficiently discharged her burden to prove that she and Sabnani were on equal footing when they reached their agreement. No greater interest of justice or equity would be served if the Court intervened. The determination of whether or not the parties stood on equal footing is necessarily done on a case-to-case basis after careful consideration of relevant factors. The Court shall examine the parties’ respective backgrounds and personal circumstances. It must compare the parties to verify if one of them was possibly disadvantaged due to moral dependence, mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap, to warrant