Jurisprudence

Facts Lingganay was hired by the respondents as a bus driver sometime in 2013. In October 2013, he figured in an accident while driving the company bus along Maharlika Hi-way in Brgy. Concepcion, Quezon Province.  On 30 December 2016, Lingganay was involved in another accident—this time, with a motorcycle. On 01 May 2017, Lingganay again figured in an accident as he crashed into the rear portion of a Toyota Wigo while driving the company bus along the San Juanico Bridge, Samar.  On 29 May 2017, respondents decided to terminate Lingganay from Employment for transgressing the company rules and regulations on health and safety, i.e. “Violation 8.1.4 – Any form of laxity, reckless driving, and gross negligence, resulting to damages to property, injuries, death, and other casualties.”  This prompted Lingganay to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondents.  The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of the respondents and dismissed Lingganay’s complaint, which the NLRC affirmed. The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed with the labor tribunals that Lingganay was validly dismissed  as he repeatedly violated the Health and Safety Rules of the Company, and also on the ground of gross and habitual neglect of duties in accordance with Art. 282 of the Labor Code.  Lingganay insists that even if he was indeed negligent in the performance of his tasks, it was not shown that his negligence was both gross and habitual, since his past mishaps were merely minor.  Hence, this present petition for review on certiorari.  Issue Whether or not Lingganay was validly dismissed from employment.  Ruling YES. The Supreme Court  (SC) held that respondents validly terminated Lingganay from employment for transgressing the company rules and regulations on health and safety, and for his gross and habitual neglect of his duties under Art. 297(b) of the Labor Code.  Furthermore, the SC declared that even assuming arguendo that the employee’s gross negligence was not habitual, the element of habituality may be dispensed with in instances when the recklessness caused substantial damage or loss to the employer.  Here, the infraction of Lingganay when he crashed into the Toyota Wigo caused substantial damage to the car in the amount of Php99,000.00 and to the company bus amounting to Ph6,500. Respondents were compelled to pay the full amount of Php99,000 just to avoid any possible legal suit against the company. This damage was so substantial that respondents cannot be legally compelled to continue his employment. 

Doctrine: Insurers must not be allowed to delay the payment of claims by filing frivolous cases in court, hoping that the inevitable may be put off for years—or even decades—by the pendency of these unnecessary court cases Facts Romeo obtained an accident insurance policy from several insurance companies including Philam Life Insurance. One day, as he was coming out of the bathroom, Romeo tripped causing his right eye to hit the arm rest of a chair. He called out to his spouse, Luisa, who promptly rushed to his side Romeo was immediately brought to the clinic Dr. Villanueva. After a series of check-ups, he underwent an enucleation, a surgical procedure involving the removal of his right eye. On account of the surgery, he incurred medical expenses in the sum of PHP 31,060.00. Consequently, Romeo filed written notices of injury with the insurance companies. To his dismay, his claims were disapproved based on the joint affidavit of their former household helpers who denied the occurrence of the accident.  The disapproval of the claims prompted Romeo and Luisa (spouses Soriano) to lodge separate complaints before the RTC against the insurance companies for accident insurance proceeds, specific performance, damages, and attorney’s fees. During the trial, spouses Soriano presented themselves and Dr. Villanueva as witnesses. On the other hand, Philam Life proffered the testimony of the househelperand the medical opinion of Dr. Dr. Valenton, a credited physician of Philam Life. In due course, the RTC rendered its Judgment, dismissing the complaints based on the equipoise rule. Issue Whether or not the RTC erred in not granting Romeo the insurance proceeds? Ruling Yes. In civil cases, the quantum of evidence to be observed is preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means that evidence which is more convincing to the Court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.  Jurisprudence teaches that when the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine. Here, the RTC erred in applying the equipoise rule considering that the spouses Soriano were able to prove through preponderance of evidence that Romeo’s injury was caused by an accident, thus entitling him to the proceeds of the subject accident insurance policies. Their testimonies were sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Villanueva, who clearly explained the findings he gathered in his examination of Romeo on January 29, 2001 or the day of the accident Determined to prove that Romeo was not entitled to the insurance benefits, PhilamLife raised Dr. Valenton ‘s medical opinion to controvert Dr. Villanueva’s testimony. It claims that Dr. Villanueva found no abrasion or hematoma. However, a perusal of Dr. Villanueva’s testimony plainly reveals that he “observed sub-conjunctival harmorhage, hemorrhage occuring in between the consubjunctival sclera of the eye. In contrast, Dr. Valenton, by his own admission, did not personally examine Romeo, but merely offered a different interpretation based on the findings made by Dr. Villanueva Hence, the Court ordered Philam Life, along with the other insurance companies, to pay jointly and severally actual damages or medical reimbursement to spouses Soriano in the amount of PHP 31,060.00 and the insurance proceeds for the permanent and irrecoverable loss of sight and of Romeo’s right eye.  In so ruling, the Court commiserated with the two-decade plight of spouses Soriano, surpassing the death of Romeo. Certainly, insurers must not be allowed to delay the payment of claims by filing frivolous cases in court, hoping that the inevitable may be put off for years—or even decades—by the pendency of these unnecessary court cases. They employ this period to benefit from collecting the interest and returns on both the premiums previously paid by the insured clients and the insurance proceeds which should otherwise go to their beneficiaries.  Philam Life’s deliberate delay in the payment of insurance proceeds and protracted litigation warrant the imposition of exemplary damages. This imposition serves as a warning to insurers or insurance companies of the consequences of unreasonably denying or delaying the payment of legitimate claims. Hence, aside from the insurance claim, Philam Life was also ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of PHP 50,000.00 with interest.

Doctrine: Employer’s insulting words and hostile behavior toward an employee constitutes constructive dismissal Facts: In 2009, Bartolome was hired by Toyota Q. Ave as a marketing professional trainee of its Vehicle Sales Department. He became a regular employee in 2010, tasked in selling of Toyota’s cars, products, and services.  On December 2015, Bartolome received a Notice of Decision for Habitual Absences for October 2015 and a Notice of Explanation for the same offense for November 2015. He also received a notice putting him on a 7-day suspension for  another offense.  A meeting was set by management for the purpose and Bartolome brought his sibling along, who was a lawyer. After the meeting, he thought that the matter was settled but then the president of the company, in another meeting, uttered remarks against him, especially for bringing his sibling along.  This began a series of incidents which lead Bartolome to resign: These series of events and the hostile working environment become unbearable for him to continue working, and thereafter, he resigned.  Even when he was processing his clearance, he was treated like a stranger. His last pay did not include his commissions and his 13th month pay. ISSUE: Was Bartolome constructively dismissed?  YES. The foregoing chain of events created a hostile working environment that made it impossible and unbearable for petitioner to continue working for TQAI. On this score, we emphasize that these events were not even refuted by respondents themselves. In weighing the argument of the parties, it is important to examine the evidence presented. As substantial evidence, or “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” the detailed series of events supported by documentary evidence of petitioner must be given credence over the general denial of the respondents. The uttered words of respondents against petitioner, contrary to the respondents’ allegation, are not self-serving statements. Here, petitioner’s account of the events which rendered his employment conditions unbearable, leaving him with no other choice but to resign, was “candid, straightforward[,] and categorical.” It came from matters of his own personal knowledge. It should not be brushed aside, more so since it was unrefuted by the other party and was even amply corroborated by documentary evidence. Verily, petitioner was constructively dismissed. Surely, the calculated and combined acts of his higher ups constitute acts of disdain and hostile behavior, supporting the conclusion that they were collectively easing out petitioner who consequently had no choice but leave his employment. This is constructive dismissal pure and simple. Though the labor arbiter found nothing extraordinary about the resignation letter as it did not exactly indicate a tone of anger nor some sense of ingratitude, the circumstance before the resignation would show that he did not contemplate nor had any intention of resigning from the company were it not for respondents’ hostile and disdainful actions. When he tried to process his clearance on April 21, 2016, he was treated like a “stranger-criminal” and subjected to undue harassment. Notably, the document titled “special release of claim and/or quitclaim” dated July 9, 2016, bore, beside his signature, the term “w/o prejudice.” It was an unequivocal reservation of his right to bring an action against respondents despite his execution thereof. Thus, merely 24 days after, on August 4, 2016, he filed a Complaint for illegal/constructive dismissal and money claims against respondents. Doubtless, his resignation was involuntary and bore a clear reservation to file an action against respondents.

G.R. 228357, 16 April 2024 Facts In September 2013, Barbosa signed a six-month probationary employment contract with C.P. Reyes Hospital. During this period, she would train as a Staff Nurse, then as a Ward Head Nurse, then as a Training Supervisor. However, on December 30, 2023, C.P. Reyes Hospital terminated her probationary employment, citing negative performance feedback. This prompted Barbosa to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against C.P. Reyes Hospital. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of  Barbosa and ruled that she was illegally dismissed. The LA based its decision on the numerical passing marks given by Barbosa’s evaluators showing that she successfully met C.P. Reyes Hospital’s standards. The NLRC subsequently reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s ruling in favor of Barbosa. Barbosa filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issues: Ruling The Supreme Court ruled that Barbosa was illegally dismissed; and hence, entitled to backwages. Probationary employment may be terminated when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of engagement. However, in Barbosa’s case, the Court found her dismissal baseless since she obtained the passing grades needed to meet the standards for regularization based on the probationary employment contract. On the other hand, the Court found C.P. Reyes Hospital’s claims of unsatisfactory performance as ungenuine as they were only issued two weeks after Barbosa had already been terminated and without an accompanying performance evaluation. As Barbosa was illegally dismissed, she is entitled to reinstatement, full back wages, and other benefits. The Court clarified that illegally dismissed probationary employees, like regular employees, are entitled to backwages up to their actual reinstatement and not only until the end of their probationary period. In case reinstatement is not feasible, backwages shall be computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the finality of the Decision in the illegal dismissal case. The Court held that both the Constitution and the Labor Code did not distinguish between regular and probationary employees in guaranteeing the right to security of tenure. It added that the mere lapse of the probationary period without regularization does not by itself sever the employment relationship. Without any valid grounds to dismiss a probationary employee, there is no basis to terminate the employment. Thus, the employee is entitled to work even beyond the probationary period. The Court thus ruled that in Barbosa’s case, backwages should be computed from January 1, 2014, when compensation was withheld from her, until the finality of the Court’s decision.

Facts Petitioners Domingo Naldo, Jr., Rogelio Benitez, Isidro Alfonso, Jr., Ronaldo Ledda, Bernardo Fabulare, Armando De Luna, and Nelson Villacentino (collectively, petitioners) were security guards of respondent Corporate Protection Services, Phils, Inc. (CORPS) assigned to Tarlac and Cabanatuan City. Petitioners stated that CORPS required them to work 12 hours a day, every day, including regular and special holidays and their scheduled rest days. Despite this, they claim that they did not receive their regular or special holiday pay, rest day pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, and Emergency Cost of Living Allowance (ECOLA) from CORPS. They also stated that CORPS would deduct certain amounts of money from their salaries per month for trust fund savings and as cash bond. During their conciliation-mediation conference before the NCMB to discuss their grievances, a representative of CORPS offered to pay all their money claims if the employees submitted signed resignation letters. Relying on this, the employees complied. CORPS also made them sign separate quitclaims. However, upon receiving the checks the petitioners soon discovered that they only covered the amounts of trust fund savings and cash bonds. The employees tried to return the checks, but CORPS explained that the checks for the remaining money claims, which were still being processed, would follow. This was reflected in the Minutes of the proceedings. When the employees showed up for work the next day, their supervisors prevented them, claiming they had already supposedly resigned. By the end of the month, CORPS still had not given them checks for the remaining money claims, and they were not allowed to report for duty. CORPS still did not pay the employees’ money claims as promised, and the employees were still not allowed to report for duty. The employees then filed a complaint against CORPS for nonpayment of salary and benefits and constructive illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, ruling that the employees voluntarily signed the quitclaims and the resignation letters, and that there was no clear proof that they were signed under duress. They are thus barred from seeking further claims against CORPS. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC. The NLRC ruled that while the petitioners had no intention to resign, there was still no illegal dismissal as CORPS had never dismissed the petitioners in the first place. The NLRC also held that there was a mere miscommunication between the parties as to the money claims. The NLRC ordered petitioners to return to work and ordered CORPS to accept them. Both parties were not satisfied with this ruling and both filed their Motions for Reconsideration, but they were both denied by the NLRC in a Resolution.  Both the petitioners and CORPS then filed their Petitions for Certiorari with the CA. In its Petition for Certiorari, CORPS claimed that the petitioners were guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping is the term for petitioners taking their legal case in whichever court they believe is most likely to provide the judgment they want. CORPS also claimed that the petitioners were barred from filing a complaint because of their quitclaims, which are an acknowledgment that the petitioners’ money claims had all been paid. According to the CA, the petitioners were not guilty of forum shopping, as they had filed a Request for Assistance with the DOLE NCMB through the Single-Entry Approach (SEnA). All labor disputes, with certain exceptions, are required to undergo SEnA as a mandatory procedure prior to the filing of a labor complaint. Thus, availing of SEnA and later on filing a complaint before the NLRC does not amount to forum shopping. The CA also ruled that the resignation letters and quitclaims were invalid, as they were not made voluntarily. Still, the CA agreed with the NLRC that there was no illegal dismissal, and as such, the payment of back wages could not be given as a matter of course. Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration, but were denied by the CA, hence this Petition. Issues The issues for the Court’s resolution are: Ruling 1. The Supreme Court ruled that the quitclaims that the employees signed were void for being executed by CORPS with an intent to defraud. The Court reiterated that for a quitclaim to be valid, (a) there must be no fraud or deceit on the part of any parties; (b) the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (c) the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. The employer bears the burden to prove that the quitclaim constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement of what an employee is entitled to recover, and that the one accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with full understanding. In this case, the employees signed the quitclaims with the honest belief, based on CORPS’ assurances, that they would be paid their money claims in full, as supported by the Minutes of their conciliation-mediation conference. The Minutes show that the CORPS representative expressly stated that management would reconcile the employees’ other claims. The Court found that both parties were aware that there were pending money claims to be reconciled and that the checks did not represent the entire amount due to the employees. The employees likewise did not accept the checks with the intention of forgoing all other money claims against CORPS. 2. The Court also ruled that CORPS constructively dismissed the employees. It is apparent from the facts that CORPS’ representative assured the employees that they would be paid their money claims if they submitted their resignation letters and signed the pro forma quitclaims.  In the instant case, CORPS, through fraud, induced the employees into signing resignation letters and quitclaims. In doing so, CORPS attempted to disguise the employees’ dismissal as a voluntary termination of employment.Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. CORPS is hereby ordered to reinstate the petitions and to pay each of the petitioners their backwages; overtime pay, holiday pay, rest day premium,

Facts Bison is the recruitment agency that deployed AAA to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) as an OFW. AAA was hired by Bison as a Cleaning Laborer under a two-year contract and was deployed to Saudi Arabia on October 18, 2017. In January of 2019, after working for fifteen months, AAA underwent routine medical examination and was found positive for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). As a foreign employer, Bison terminated AAA’s employment, as under the laws of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, an HIV+ individual is considered unfit to work. He was sent back to the Philippines on February 8, 2019. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal, but ruled that AAA is entitled to his unpaid salary from January 26, 2019 to February 7, 2019, vacation leave pay, and attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter decreed that the laws of Saudi Arabia, which state that an HIV+ individual is considered unfit to work, is “a state prerogative of the KSA which deserves our respect.” Further, they also postulated that Republic Act No. 8504, or the “Philippine AIDS Prevention and Control Act of 1998” is a “local law” that should apply only “within our jurisdiction and not to KSA.” In response, AAA filed a Memorandum of Partial Appeal before the NLRC. Contrary to the Labor Arbiter’s finding, the NLRC found that AAA was illegally dismissed. The NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Bison. Because of this, Bison filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA agreed with the NLRC that Philippine law governs the terms of the employment contract as well as the rights of the employee. This conclusion stems from the principle of lex loci contractus, meaning “law of the place where the contract is made.” The CA reasoned that since the law “categorically prohibits the use of a person’s HIV+ condition as a ground for dismissal,” there was no valid cause to terminate AAA. The CA denied Bison’s motion for reconsideration, causing Bison to file a Petition for Review. Issue Bison argues that the CA erred in applying the principle of lex loci contractus rather than the principle of pacta sunt servanda in resolving the legality of AAA’s dismissal. Pacta sunt servanda means “agreements must be kept,” meaning that parties are required to honor their agreements and obligations. Ruling The Court will not engage in an academic discussion on the principle of pacta sunt servanda where the case is essentially one for illegal dismissal of an OFW. Under Section 49(a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 11166, or the Philippine HIV and AIDS Policy Act, it is unlawful for employees to be terminated from work on the sole basis of their HIV status. Since Philippine law prohibits the use of a person’s HIV-positive condition as a ground for dismissal, there was no valid cause to terminate AAA. Further, if the foreign law stated in the employment contract contradicts Philippine law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, then Philippine law shall apply. In this case, even if it is proven that Saudi Arabian law prohibits workers who test positive for HIV, RA 11166 takes precedence over it for being against Philippine law.